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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how military members and veterans with Operational Stress
Injuries are treated by Canadian justice systems. It suggests a correlation between mental
injuries sustained on operations by military personnel and propensities for military and
societal misconduct. By comparing civilian and military processes with American justice
counterparts, a plan to improve the existing Canadian legal landscape is proposed. Using
an analysis of the underlying philosophy and purpose of military justice, a problem
solving diversionary court is recommended, along with legislative and policy
amendments. The use of a consent-based “Treatment Standing Court Martial” would
place military justice officials parallel to civilian justice alternative measures programs,
and in a better position to break the cycle of recidivism among veterans by addressing
root causes. Education to reduce stigma along with military-civilian partnerships are also
advocated to enhance the detection of mental illness and to foster early treatment for
military personnel and veterans. The overall goals of the work include: reducing
recidivism, improving operational efficiency and taking care of military members,
veterans and their families.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

After ten years of combat in Afghanistan, with troops still remaining in that war
zone to train the Afghan security forces, 1 Canadian military officials are now dealing
with healing the combat wounds of thousands of veterans. These wounds are not always
visible. In fact, many have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),
operational stress injuries (OSI) and traumatic brain injuries (TBI). Unfortunately, these
“hidden wounds of war” often manifest as disciplinary or criminal activity, attracting the
scrutiny of the military justice system or the civilian justice system. Research has shown
that punishing and incarcerating veterans with these hidden wounds, without proper
comprehensive treatment, results in higher than necessary rates of recidivism. 2 Due to the
nature of their specialized training to inflict violence and their related experiences, the

1

See e.g. “Operation ATTENTION”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces
<http://www.cefcom.forces.gc.ca/pa-ap/ops/attention/index-eng.asp>: “Operation
ATTENTION is Canada’s participation in the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan
(NTM-A), which delivers training and professional development support to the national
security forces of Afghanistan: the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan Air Force
(AAF), and the Afghan National Police (ANP) [.…] In 2012, now a mature mission,
NTM-A is working to sustain its momentum while initiating preparations for the transfer
of the lead security responsibility to Afghan control in 2014. This is a conditions-based
process that will take place when: the Afghan national security forces are ready to
shoulder responsibility for security with steadily decreasing assistance from ISAF
[(International Security Assistance Force)….]”
2
Major Evan R. Seamone, “Reclaiming The Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice: The
Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and
TBI and Reduce Recedivism” (2001) 208 Mil L Rev 1 at 38: “Studies reveal that drug
courts reduce recidivism and save more costs than traditional probation or prison. […] As
applied to the treatment of mental illness […] there are strong indicators that the basic
drug court principles work equally well.”
1

treatment of combat veterans with PTSD and TBIs has been recognized as a matter of
public safety. 3
The civilian justice system has adapted in recent years by pursuing more
rehabilitative approaches when dealing with offenders with mental disorders. “Problemsolving” 4 courts (PSC) have exploded in North America. Numerous Canadian
jurisdictions now have mental health courts (MHC) 5 and/or drug treatment courts
(DTC). 6 Twenty-six American jurisdictions have created 88 veteran treatment courts
(VTC), which are a combination of MHCs, DTCs and other PSCs for their veteran
offenders. 7 At present, Canadian veterans who are released (or serving members who
commit offences over which the military does not choose to exercise jurisdiction) may

3

Ibid., at 3: “In contrast to problem-solving courts, which target the illness underlying
criminal conduct, courts-martial function as problem-generating courts when they result
in punitive discharges that preclude mentally ill offenders from obtaining Veterans
Affairs (VA) treatment. Such practices create a class of individuals whose untreated
conditions endanger public safety and the veteran as they grow worse over time.”
4
John H. Kramer, “Problem Solving Courts: New Approaches to Criminal Justice”,
(2010) 39 Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 466: “Problem solving courts
(PSC) have exploded onto the criminal justice scene in the last twenty years.”
5
Donalee Moulton, “Mental health courts gain popularity across Canada” The Lawyer’s
Weekly (1 June 2007), online: LexisNexis Canada Inc.
<http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/index.php?section=article&articleid=484>: “A few
provinces, such as Ontario and New Brunswick, have mental health courts already up and
running. Some provinces, like Newfoundland and Labrador, have ongoing pilot programs
in place. Now they are being joined by other jurisdictions looking for ways to decrease
the criminalization of the mentally ill while at the same time decreasing the growing
number of individuals cramming provincial and federal jails”.
6
“Drug Treatment Court Funding Program”, online: Department of Justice Canada
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/pb-dgp/prog/dtc-ttt/index.html>: “There are 6 federallyfunded DTC pilot sites operating in Canada: Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg,
Ottawa and Regina.”
7
Tori DeAngelis, “Help for struggling veterans - Psychologists are involved in a new
type of court that helps veterans on the wrong side of the law get the help they need to
restart their lives”, online: (2012) 43:3 Monitor on Psychology 34
<http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/03/veterans.aspx>. Note: More VTCs have been
created since this count of 88 and continue to develop across the country.
2

have access to civilian rehabilitative alternative measures. Conversely, the military justice
system currently has no similar mechanism in order to divert mentally ill veterans into
these rehabilitative justice-led programs. Similarly, the civilian models do not yet fully
incorporate the unique nature of military service into their PSC multi-disciplinary teams
when dealing with veterans.
This thesis will argue that everyone suffering from a mental disability ought to
have equal access to a justice system which is sensitive to their concerns. I will show that
many Canadian civilians have access to problem solving courts, which are sensitive to
their concerns; however, military personnel do not uniformly have access to mental
health courts or other diversionary treatment courts. As a result, traumatized military
personnel do not have equal access to a justice system sensitive to their concerns, and
there is no military reason to deprive them of this access. Further, there is an urgent need
to address this issue now. This thesis proposes that a problem solving court be created
within military justice processes and that existing civilian processes be improved to meet
the unique needs and concerns of released veterans.
In order to substantiate this position, Chapter One will review the history of
mental health in combat and modern understandings of the injuries, including the concept
of comorbidity. It will articulate the difficulty in detecting the illness, particularly for
justice officials, and explain how insufficient treatment exacerbates the problem. Further,
it will compare existing processes for dealing with mentally injured veterans in the
civilian and military justice systems.
Chapter Two will develop why this issue is relevant now by describing the scope
of the problem for the Canadian Forces and the current challenges in detection and

3

prevention of activities attracting military penal consequences. In addition, it will show
that there are significant numbers of veterans anticipated to be suffering from OSIs and
the correlative disciplinary or criminal behavior. It will also provide some relevant
recommendations on improving the current justice processes for veterans, reducing OSI
stigma and fostering related treatment.
Chapter Three will provide a comparative analysis of prosecuting veterans within
the Canadian and the current American systems of justice. In so doing, it will compare
four main areas, namely: the magnitude of the problem, the military justice process, the
civilian justice process and veterans treatment courts. The comparison will assist in
formulating the proposed Canadian approach. It will also provide some relevant
recommendations on improving the current justice processes for veterans, reducing OSI
stigma and fostering related treatment.
Building upon existing civilian and foreign models and ideas, Chapter 4 will
propose a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures Process. This process will
include a court martial structure that allows diversion for treatment where appropriate. It
will justify its use by referring to the underlying philosophies of the military justice
system, statements of key officials, and the stated purpose of military justice: namely,
discipline, morale and efficiency. It will express the hope that innovative justice methods
will better balance rehabilitation, public safety and the public interest by treating veterans
with the respect and care that they deserve. In addition, Chapter Four will also advocate
for building partnerships with civilian justice officials by using a “whole of governments”
approach to deal with veterans who have or will reintegrate into civil society. It will
provide a blueprint or “campaign plan” upon which the Canadian Forces and others can

4

build. It will suggest three main areas of action, namely: legislative reform, policy
reform, and an educational initiative for justice issues impacting veterans and military
members with OSIs.
Using primarily doctrinal, comparative, interdisciplinary and policy scholarship
methodologies, this thesis will conclude that while all players truly have the best interests
of Canadian Forces veterans at heart, they must consider new “tactics” to improve
conditions and existing justice processes for our nation’s veterans.
As a legal officer in the Canadian forces with more than a decade of experience in
military prosecutions and advising front-line units on summary trials, I will periodically
provide observations within this work, which is based on my personal experience.
In addition, it should be made clear at the outset that while the arguments
contained within this thesis place significant value on veterans and military personnel and
their related treatment, the intent is not to devalue or prioritize veterans over any other
profession, group or persons suffering from mental illness. Ideally, the
reccommendations in this thesis should be tailored to all Canadians suffering from mental
disabilities; however this work focuses only on the welfare of military members, veterans
and their families. The purpose is not to fetishize militarism. Rather, the hope is to draw
attention to veteran issues and their correlation to operating an effective fighting force - a
tool in governance and diplomacy.

1.1 MENTAL HEALTH IN COMBAT
1.1.1

A Historical Review
As it is often said, in order to understand where we are going, we have to

5

understand where we have been. Using a doctrinal approach to understand mental health
injuries among military personnel, a brief review of how militaries have dealt with these
injuries in the past is necessary to ground the argument being made here. Well-known
World War II American military general George S. Patton, Jr. is attributed with having
said “I am convinced that much more emphasis should be placed on history. The purpose
of history is to learn how human beings react when exposed to the danger of wounds or
death [.…]” 8 Further, military history and “lessons learned” are currently used by the
Canadian Forces in determining future military doctrine and theory. 9
The concept of suffering a mental health injury in combat is not new. As early as
1900 BC, there were reports by Egyptian physicians of what would now be described as
PTSD symptoms related to combat. 10 These symptoms and related reporting crossed all
cultures throughout the history of military combat. 11

8

Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers: 1940-1945 (United States of America: Da Capo
Press, 1974) at 750.
9
See e.g. “Chapter 1 – Canadian Military Doctrine”, online: National Defence and the
Canadian Forces <http://www.cfd-cdf.forces.gc.ca/sites/page-eng.asp?page=10772>:
“Canadian Military Doctrine provides the military strategic guidance essential for the
development and the employment of the full range of CF capabilities across the spectrum
of operations in response to government direction. […] By building on lessons learned
with an understanding of the future, military doctrine provides the rationale behind the
organization and the employment of military forces and assists in the determination of
appropriate roles and missions.” [Emphasis mine]
10
Abdalla Bowirrat et al., “Neuro-psychopharmacogenetics and Neurological
Antecedents of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Unlocking the Mysteries of Resilience and
Vulnerability” online: (2010) 8:4 Curr Neuropharmacol 335
<http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3080591/>.
11
See e.g. Steve Bentley, “A Short History of PTSD: From Thermopylae to Hue Soldiers
Have Always Had A Disturbing Reaction To War” The VVA Veteran (March/April 2005)
online: Vietnam Veterans of America
<http://www.archive.vva.org/TheVeteran/2005_03/feature_HistoryPTSD.htm>.
6

The first term used to describe PTSD was “nostalgia” in 1678, though its name
has changed over time. 12 In 18th century, it was referred to as “homesickness,” while
during the American Civil War it was called “soldier’s heart”. 13 During World War I, it
was known as “shell shock” and “war neurosis,” whereas World War II literature refers
to it as “battle fatigue” and “combat exhaustion”. 14 It should be noted that up until this
point, most of the terminology used seemed to infer a non-medical condition that would
pass. This is consistent with the historical stigma component of the problem we currently
have today.
During the Gulf War in the early 1990s the symptomology was called “combat
stress reaction”. 15 More recently, since the commencement of the Iraq and Afghanistan
conflicts, it has been referred to as PTSD and OSIs by most western nations. Some highranking military officials and academics have argued that using modern medical
terminologies for combat related trauma impedes treatment. This recently resulted in calls
to change the name of the military ailment. 16 The Americans ultimately rejected this

12

“History of PTSD: ‘Every man has his breaking point’”, online: WordPress.com
<http://historyofptsd.wordpress.com/early-history/>.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Todd C. Helmus & Russell W. Glenn, “Steeling the Mind Combat Stress Reactions and
Their Implications for Urban Warfare” RAND Arroyo Center (2005), online: RAND
Corporation <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG191.pdf>.
16
See e.g. Daniel Sagalyn, “Key Psychiatric Doctor Rejects Name Change for PTSD”
PBS Newshour (10 May 2012), online: MacNeil/Lehrer Productions
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/05/key-psychiatric-doctor-rejects-namechange-for-ptsd.html>: “A key leader in the psychiatric community has rejected the idea
of altering the name of a traumatic condition affecting an estimated tens of thousands of
U.S. combat veterans -- a move that effectively blocks growing efforts by a small group
of psychiatrists and military brass concerned about reducing patient stigma.”
7

approach in May 2012, suggesting that a multi-pronged approach, including combatting
stigma using Canadian initiatives, is preferable. 17
The historical evolution of combat mental injuries helps in understanding existing
problems and the modern definitions for our veterans’ “hidden wounds”.

1.1.2

Defining the Combat Injury Today
PTSD became a formal diagnosis in 1980, despite its likely existence since

combat began. 18 Today, it is commonly understood as an “anxiety disorder that develops
after exposure to a terrifying event or ordeal in which grave physical harm occurred or
was threatened.” 19 It has been recognized that military combat is a traumatic event that
may trigger PTSD. Common symptoms include “flashback episodes, memories,
nightmares, or frightening thoughts, especially when they are exposed to events or
objects reminiscent of the trauma.” 20 Other symptoms include emotional numbness, sleep
disturbances, depression, anxiety, irritability, outbursts of anger, and feelings of intense
guilt. Physical symptoms that may develop include “headaches, gastrointestinal distress,
immune system problems, dizziness, chest pain, or discomfort in other parts of the
body.” 21 The fear of experiencing the symptoms generally leads to “avoidance” of things
that remind sufferers of events that have caused the PTSD. Further, veterans often
17

See e.g. ibid: “By contrast, Friedman said, the Canadian approach is ‘brilliant’ and is
‘proof that stigma can be addressed successfully without changing the name of the
diagnostic label. So we can have it both ways. Keep the PTSD diagnostic term and have
it regarded as an injury.’"
18
Roxanne Dryden-Edwards, “Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)” MedecineNet.com,
online: MedicineNet, Inc.
<http://www.medicinenet.com/posttraumatic_stress_disorder/article.htm>.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
8

experience “hyperarousal” causing them to be extremely sensitive or anxious about
normal life experiences, such as driving a car. “Complex posttraumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) usually results from prolonged exposure to a traumatic event or series thereof and
is characterized by long-lasting problems with many aspects of emotional and social
functioning.” 22 Prolonged exposure is consistent with deployments into combat in excess
of twelve months during a three year period. 23 In fact, the United Kingdom has taken
steps to reduce deployment periods in order to minimize the risk of its soldiers
developing PTSD. 24
Along with the emotional and mental injuries that may occur in combat there are
also physical injuries. Some physical injuries, such as TBIs, are difficult to detect because
they cannot be seen and present more like a mental disorder. In addition to PTSD and
OSIs, TBIs are now also commonly associated with combat veteran mental injuries.
TBI’s more recent affiliation with injured veterans has been due to advancements in

22

Ibid.
Brian P. Marx et al, “Association of Time Since Deployment, Combat Intensity, and
Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms With Neuropsychological Outcomes Following Iraq War
Deployment”, online: (2009) 66:9 Arch Gen Psychiatry 996 at 1002 <http://archpsyc.
ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/66/9/996.pdf>: “Such a Pattern would be consistent with a stress
sensitization model of PTSD, 26-28 which purports that stress exposure leads to changes
in neurotransmitter and neurohormonal response that, in some cases, generate or
exacerbate PTSD symptoms. The PTSD symptoms, in turn, further promote increased
overreactivity of the nervous system.” [Emphasis mine]
24
Mark Phillips, “Britain Limits Deployment to Reduce P.T.S.D.” The New York Times
(20 March 2012), online: nytimes.com
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/20/would-a-draft-reduce-the-numberof-post-traumatic-stress-cases/britain-limits-deployment-to-reduce-ptsd>: “One study
found that personnel who deployed for 13 months or more in three years were more
likely to fulfill the criteria for P.T.S.D. Research has focused on the clear relationship
between the duration of deployment and poor well-being [….]”
23

9

radiology to allow for detection and diagnosis. 25 A TBI is defined as “nondegenerative,
noncongenital insult to the brain from an external mechanical force, possibly leading to
permanent or temporary impairment of cognitive, physical, and psychosocial functions,
with an associated diminished or altered state of consciousness.” 26 [Emphasis mine] The
mechanisms of injury of TBIs are consistent with combat related experiences including:
motor vehicle accidents, falls and gunshot wounds. 27 They are also linked to the use of
alcohol, a common secondary illness to PTSD. 28
Similarly, OSIs are “[i]njuries caused by operational stress and trauma.” 29 The
Canadian Forces refers to any persistent psychosocial problem that occurs as a result of a
military operation as an OSI. 30 This term seems to capture PTSD, C-PTSD and TBI,
along with any secondary injuries or illnesses associated with combat, such as depression
or addictions. This phrase was coined by the Department of National Defence in the

25

Segun T Dawodu, “Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) - Definition, Epidemiology,
Pathophysiology” Medscape Reference: Drugs, Diseases & Procedures (10 November
2011), online: WebMD LLC <http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/326510overview#showall>: “Differences in diagnostic tools and admission criteria also may
affect the above-defined severity classifications. In the past, the use of roentgenograms to
help diagnose skull fractures after head injury did not show much of any concurrent
intracranial lesions. These lesions were difficult to diagnose until the advent of CT
scanning, which is now the diagnostic imaging of choice in TBI cases.”
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid: “Work-related TBIs constitute an estimated 45-50% of all TBIs. Incidence varies
from 37 cases per 100,000 people for military employees (57% are related to
transportation) to 15 cases per 100,000 people for civilians (50% are because of falls).”
28
Ibid: “Alcohol is a major factor in many TBIs and often is associated with the leading
causes of TBI.”
29
“What Are Operational Stress Injuries?” The invisible wounds (2006), online:
Operational Stress Injury Social Support
<http://www.osiss.ca/engraph/what_e.asp?sidecat=1>.
30
“Cumulative Incidence of PTSD and Other Mental Disorders: Executive Summary”,
online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces <http://forces.gc.ca/healthsante/ps/mh-sm/osi-bso/sum-som-eng.asp>.
10

creation of Operational Stress Injury Clinics. Secondary illnesses caused by PTSD or
TBIs can be equally problematic, if left untreated.

1.1.3

Secondary Illness
The number of combat veterans who are diagnosed with secondary problems or

illnesses caused as a direct result of PTSD is significant. This psychological phenomenon
is often referred to as comorbidity. Among returning Iraq and Afghanistan veterans with
mental health problems, the majority had a comorbid diagnosis. More specifically, “29%
had 2 and one third had 3 or more different mental health diagnosis.” 31
Combat PTSD or OSIs are commonly associated with other mental health
disorders such as: depression, insomnia, substance abuse, anxiety, panic disorder, anger
management and suicidal tendencies – to name a few. 32 Often, a veteran experiencing
flashbacks from combat can become depressed because they are having these issues.
They may have nightmares and develop insomnia. They may turn to alcohol or drugs to
dull the pain of the memories and develop addictions or substance abuse problems. The
reduced sleep, the addictions and depression can lead to or exacerbate anger management
issues. Some of these secondary issues can also lead to conditions that cause criminal or
disciplinary behavioural problems. 33 The secondary illnesses are relevant because they

31

Karen H. Seal et al, “Trends and Risk Factors for Mental Health Diagnoses Among
Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans Using Department of Veterans Affairs Health Care, 20022008” (2009) 99: 9 Am J of Pub Health 1651 at 1652.
32
“Definition of Post-traumatic stress disorder” MedicineNet.com, online: MedicineNet,
Inc. <http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=18779>: “Depression,
alcohol or other substance abuse, or other anxiety disorders frequently co-occur with
PTSD.”
33
See e.g. Terence T. Gorski & John M. Kelley, Counselor's Manual for Relapse
Prevention with Chemically Dependent Criminal Offenders, (Rockville, Maryland: U.S.
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can be displayed without a formal diagnosis of an OSI and mask more serious injuries
related to combat. The resulting behaviours can also be mistaken for strictly disciplinary
or criminal conduct, seemingly unrelated to underlying illness, and thereby solely
engaging the military or civilian justice systems and related punitive or correctional
philosophies. Without treatment, the likelihood of veteran recidivism increases, thereby
creating a vicious cycle of increased punishment for misconduct without addressing the
root problem: the OSI. The correlation between OSI and justice involvement is now well
documented.

1.1.4

The Correlation with Justice
PTSD affects between a quarter and a third of combat troops. “Studies reveal that

[a PTSD] diagnosis is related to perpetrating more types of violence.” 34 For example,
Clark et al. suggest that “a significant proportion of Service members returning from
current wars either as a result of mental health problems or as a result of their military
training are at high risk for contact with the criminal justice system.” 35 Further,

Department of Health and Human Services, 1996) at 5: “Chemical dependency can cause
a person to commit crimes. People who are chemically dependant commit crimes related
to their use of alcohol or drugs (drunk driving, public drunkenness, assault, etc.), the
support of their addiction (selling drugs, committing crimes to get drugs or money for
drugs, etc.), and secondary consequences of drug or alcohol use (not paying child support
or court fines, failing to follow through with probation requirements, etc.).”
34
Supra, note 2.
35
Sean Clark et al, “Development of Veterans Treatment Courts: Local and Legislative
Initiatives” (2010) 7 Drug Ct Rev 171 at 174: “In summary, significant numbers of
America’s veterans are involved in the nation’s justice system or are at risk for such
involvement. Justice-involved veterans have been shown to have high rates of substance
abuse, mental illness, homelessness, and other chronic and infectious medical diseases.”
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“involvement in the criminal justice system is a strong predictor of future arrests and
incarceration for people with a psychiatric disability.”36
The assertions by academics that there is a correlation between OSI and justice
are not merely theoretical. In a recent American study involving more than ninety
thousand Marines who served from 2001 to 2007 revealed that soldiers with operational
deployment who had been diagnosed with PTSD “were over 11 times more likely to
engage in the most serious forms of misconduct than were combat deployed Marines
without a psychiatric diagnosis.” 37 [Emphasis mine] This quantitative study corroborates
previous military research “linking mental disorders with antisocial behavior and legal
problems […and] civilian literature indicating a strong overlap between psychiatric
problems and misconduct.” 38 According to Seamone, the 2009 Supreme Court of the
United States decision in Porter v. McCollum 39 suggests a recognized propensity of
criminality and disciplinary problems for veterans by stating that there has been a “long

36

David Loveland & Michael Boyle, “Inclusive Case Management as a Jail Diversion
Program for People with a Serious Mental Illness: A Review of the Literature” (2007) 51
Int’l L J Offender Therapy & Comp Criminology 130 at 132.
37
Robyn M. Highfill-McRoy et al, “Psychiatric Diagnoses and Punishments for
Misconduct: The Effects of PTSD in Combat-Deployed Marines”, online: (2010) 10:88
BMC Psychiatry 1 at 6 <http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1471-244X-1088.pdf>.
38
See also Stephanie Booth-Kewley et al, “Psychosocial Predictors of Military
Misconduct”, online: (2010) 198 J Nerv Ment Dis 91 at 97 <http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515104>. See also Claudia Baker & Cessie Alfonso, “PTSD
and Criminal Behavior” Traumatic Stress Treatment Center, online:
<http://www.traumatic-stress-treatment.com/artptsdandcriminalbehavior.html>:
“[S]ymptoms of PTSD can incidentally lead to criminal behaviour [.…] Some combat
veterans also may seek to recreate the adrenaline rush experienced during combat.
Feeling the need to be always "on guard" can cause veterans to misinterpret benign
situations as threatening and cause them to respond with self-protective behavior.
Increased baseline physiological arousal results in violent behavior that is out of
proportion to the perceived threat.”
39
130 S Ct 447 (2009).
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tradition of according leniency to veterans in recognition of their service, especially for
those who fought on the front lines.” 40
American agencies have publicly recognized the increased public safety problems
associated with having untreated mentally ill veterans in the community. The United
States Department of Homeland Security recently cited national security concerns
associated with terrorist groups trying to recruit veterans who have developed
psychological problems from combat.41
The increased risk of criminality or disciplinary issues among mentally ill
veterans often results in interaction with the criminal justice system. Depending on
whether the member is still serving, whether they are part way through their release
process, or when, where and how an offence is committed, they may find themselves in
either the military justice system or a civilian justice system. There are deficits for
military members in either system. In particular, military processes lack alternative
measures schemes found in the civilian justice system which may place veterans at a
disadvantage when compared to civilian counterparts. Similarly, civilian processes lack
the knowledge and military expertise to understand the offender’ values and to fully
exploit existing treatment, support and social programs in determining sentences or
40

Supra, note 2.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
“Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in
Radicalization and Recruitment” (7 April 2009) at 7, online:
<http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/rightwing.pdf>: “DHS/I&A assesses that rightwing
extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to exploit their
skills and knowledge derived from military training and combat. These skills and
knowledge have the potential to boost the capabilities of extremists—including lone
wolves or small terrorist cells—to carry out violence. The willingness of a small
percentage of military personnel to join extremist groups during the 1990s because they
were disgruntled, disillusioned, or suffering from the psychological effects of war is
being replicated today”. [Emphasis mine]
41
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alternative measures for military members. Currently, the approaches taken in these
concurrent Canadian justice systems have stark differences for military members and
veterans afflicted with OSIs.

1.2 THE CANADIAN JUSTICE PROCESSES
1.2.1

The Current Military Justice Process
In the Canadian military justice system, there are two forms of service tribunals:

the summary trial and the court martial. 42 Service tribunals have jurisdiction over regular
force 43 members almost completely. Military tribunals also have jurisdiction over
reservists 44 and civilians in limited circumstances, including for offences committed
while on defence establishments, in Canadian Forces vehicles, aircraft or vessels and
(regarding reservists) when in uniform. 45
1.2.1.1

The Summary Trial System

The summary trial system is administered by the unit or formation of the military
Member, and is normally presided over by a Commanding Officer 46 or their delegated
officer. 47 A legal advisor is often required to provide pre-charge advice to the charge

42

National Defence Act, RSC 1985, c N-5, s 2 [NDA]: “service tribunal” means a court
martial or a person presiding at a summary trial.”
43
Ibid, s 15(1): “There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the regular
force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for
continuing, full-time military service.”
44
Ibid, s 15(3): “There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve
force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for
other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service.”
45
Ibid, s 60.
46
Ibid, s 163(1-1.1). See also, Queens Regulations and Orders 108.06. [QR&O]
47
Ibid, s 163(4). See also, ibid. 108.10.
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layer. 48 The accused is provided with a Record of Disciplinary Proceedings (RDP) which
includes some basic disclosure. 49 The accused may or may not be provided with an
opportunity to elect court martial.50 Such an election would automatically entitle the
member to free legal counsel regardless of their rank or income. 51 Offences which do not
provide an election are often referred to as the “Baby Five” 52 and are considered minor
due to their maximum sentence of a fine in the amount of 25% of their monthly basic
pay. 53 Some of these offences include: Insubordinate Behavior 54 , Quarrels and
Disturbances 55 , and Drunkenness. 56 Not coincidentally, these offences are often
associated with veterans who have mental health disorders, particularly PTSD. 57 As

48

Ibid, 107.03 & 107.11.
Ibid, 107.09(1)(b) & 108.15.
50
Ibid, 108.17.
51
Ibid, 101.22: “Every accused who is to be tried by court martial is entitled to: (a) be
represented by legal counsel who is a barrister or advocate with standing at the bar of a
province; and (b) have an adviser to assist the accused, both before and during the trial, in
respect of any technical or specialized aspect of the case.” See also ibid, 109.04.
52
This terminology comes from my personal experience as a legal officer.
53
Supra, note 46, 108.17(1).
54
Supra, note 42, s 85. See also ibid, 103.18: “Every person who uses threatening or
insulting language to, or behaves with contempt toward, a superior officer is guilty of an
offence [….]”
55
Ibid, s 86. See also ibid, 103.19: “Every person who (a) quarrels or fights with any
other person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline, or (b) uses provoking
speeches or gestures toward a person so subject that tend to cause a quarrel or
disturbance, is guilty of an offence [….]”
56
Ibid, s 97. See also ibid, 103.30: “[…T]he offence of drunkenness is committed where
a person, owing to the influence of alcohol or a drug (a) is unfit to be entrusted with any
duty that the person is or may be required to perform; or (b) behaves in a disorderly
manner or in a manner that is likely to bring discredit on Her Majesty’s service”.
57
Supra, note 37 at 6: “[T]he experience of combat has also been shown to be related to
both distinct PTSD symptom profiles and increased aggressive behaviour, both of which
could explain the increased behavioral problems in the war-deployed cohort.” See also
supra, note 34 at 91: “[Studies] observed a significant association between exposure to
atrocities during the Vietnam war and interpersonal violence. […] PTSD may play a role
in associations between combat and misconduct [….] In a sample of Vietnam veterans,
[i]nternalizers had high rates of depression and panic, whereas externalizers had high
49
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previously indicated, combat PTSD or OSIs are often associated with substance abuse,
aggression, interpersonal violence and anger management problems. 58
Once the file proceeds to summary trial, often the accused is “paraded out” in
front of his unit and peers to face the Presiding Officer. This can be extremely difficult
for a veteran with combat related PTSD or OSIs. According to various academics,
“sometimes a PTSD reaction is so severe and pervasive that the client may have trouble
attending court or participating in the legal case.”59 During the summary trial, evidence
will be called by the unit to make out the elements of the offence(s) and the accused will
have an opportunity to make representations. 60 They may call upon their appointed
assisting officer, who is not legally trained, in order to help them. 61 The accused may
request that a lawyer paid by her be allowed to ask questions; however, the Presiding
Officer may refuse this request. 62 The Presiding Officer, the Delegated Officer and the

rates of antisocial personality traits and alcohol-related problems. There were similar
results in a mixed sample of veterans from Vietnam and other conflicts.” See also
“Topics in Brief: Substance Abuse among the Military, Veterans, and their Families”
NIDA: National Institute on Drug Abuse (April 2011), online: U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services
<http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/topics-in-brief/substance-abuse-amongmilitary-veterans-their-families>: “Alcohol abuse is the most prevalent problem and one
which poses a significant health risk. A study of Army soldiers screened 3 to 4 months
after returning from deployment to Iraq showed that 27 percent met criteria for alcohol
abuse and were at increased risk for related harmful behaviors (e.g., drinking and driving,
using illicit drugs).”
58
Supra, note 32.
59
Lyn Cobin Gullette & William R. Gullette, Difficult Clients: Dedicated Attorney:
Practical Psychology For Effective In-The-Trenches Representation (Denver, Colorado:
Bradford Publishing Company, 2005) at 122.
60
Supra, note 46, 108.20.
61
Ibid, 108.14.
62
See note B to ibid, 108.14: “An accused person does not have the right to be
represented by legal counsel at a summary trial. However, if an accused requests such
representation, the officer having summary trial jurisdiction has the discretion to: (i)
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Assisting Officer will have been provided with a 2-3 day course or an on-line
recertification in order to perform their important disciplinary functions. 63 There is
currently little or no legal training related to mental health screening or detection.
Still, by virtue of their military training, every CF member is trained to look for
signs of combat acute stress during first aid training, which is recertified on a regular
basis. The ineffectiveness of this training as a means to allow unit leadership to identify
and appropriately treat all PTSD and mental health cases is highlighted in allegations of
underreporting 64 and the dramatic increase in suicides by service members. 65 In fairness,
PTSD, other mental health disorders associated with combat and TBIs are often referred

permit representation by legal counsel; (ii) proceed without representation by legal
counsel; or (iii) apply for disposal of the charges against the accused by court martial.”
63
Ibid, 101.09. See also Judge Advocate General, JAG Annual Report 2009-10 (Ottawa,
National Defence, 2012) at 13, online: National Defence
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/office-cabinet/annrep-rappann-09-10eng.pdf>: “3.2 Service Tribunals - Summary Trial and Court Martial”: “Military
commanders who preside at summary trials must be trained and certified by the JAG as
being competent in their duties as presiding officers, and must maintain that currency by
re-certifying every four years [….] Note also that every four years, qualified presiding
officers require re-certification, which is done online through Presiding Officer Recertification Test (PORT).”
64
Becky Rynor, “Veterans stepping forward for treatment of operational stress injuries”,
online: (2010) 182:7 CMAJ E281
<http://www.cmaj.ca/content/182/7/E281.full.pdf+html>: “Boivin adds that it is likely
posttraumatic stress disorder is underreported as a consequence of barriers and attitudes
within both the military and general populations.[…] But many others struggle to cope
with operational stress injuries on their own or refuse to admit they need help, he adds,
noting that PTSD sufferers are six times more likely to have thoughts of suicide.”
65
David Pugliese, “As soldier suicides rise, National Defence slashes suicide prevention
staff” canada.com (2 May 2012), online: Postmedia Network Inc.
<http://www2.canada.com/topics/news/national/story.html?id=6556357>: “Statistics
released Monday by DND show that the number of suicides among Canadian Forces
personnel increased last year. Twenty soldiers died of suicide in 2011 - 19 men and one
woman, the department reported. Just 12 soldiers took their lives in 2010, all of them
male.”
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to as hidden wounds of war 66 which are often overlooked, misdiagnosed or not well
understood even by front-line family physicians. 67
If an election is provided, and the member chooses to be tried by summary trial,
the accused could be sentenced to thirty days detention in the Canadian Forces Service
Prison and Detention Barracks (CFSPDB) depending on their rank.68 There is no ability

66

See e.g. Stan Alcorn, “PTSD and the Hidden Wounds of War” Dart Center for
Journalism & Trauma (9 December 2010), online: Trustees of Columbia University in
the City of New York <http://dartcenter.org/content/ptsd-and-hidden-wounds-war>:
“Everyone has heard of PTSD, but veterans, clinicians and scientists say most people
misunderstand not only the disorder, but the other ways that war affects individuals and
families”. [Emphasis mine] See also Angela Mulholland, “Many military suicides likely
getting missed” CanadaAM (4 October 2011), online: BellMedia
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CanadaAM/20111004/suicide-military-canada-am-series111004/>: “We've long known of the physical toll the battlefield can exact. But in recent
years, the invisible mental wounds of war have finally been getting more attention [….]
The Canadian Forces say the programs are working, and emerging mental health
woes are being nipped in the bud early. But there are still many who slip through the
cracks [….]”
67
See e.g. Angela Mulholland, “Brain injuries among soldiers often overlooked” CTV.ca
News (5 July 2011), online: BellMedia
<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/Afghanistan/20110630/afghanistan-kandahar-braininjuires-ptsd-110705/>: “Dr. Donna Ouchterlony, the head of the brain injury clinic at St.
Michael's worries that PTSD is being overdiagnosed in soldiers who actually have brain
injuries from explosions. The problem is that many of these soldiers may not realize they
have a head injury, particularly if they never experienced a blow to the head, and so
they're being sent for the wrong kind of treatment.” [Emphasis mine]. See also “Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder: Out of Sight, Not out of Mind” Mood Disorders Society of
Canada (March 2012), online:
<http://www.mooddisorderscanada.ca/documents/Advocacy/PTSD_Report_EN.pdf>:
“Canada has approximately 76,000 family physicians. 85% of Canadians dealing with
mental health problems approach their family physician first. Unfortunately, many
healthcare providers, including physicians, have stigmatizing attitudes towards patients
presenting with possible mental health problems including PTSD. Furthermore,
physicians have not received appropriate training and education about mental health or
mental illnesses.” [Emphasis mine]
68
Supra, note 46, 108.24.
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to impose treatment as part of a sentence, nor is there a probation system in the Canadian
Forces. 69
The summary trial structure accounts for approximately 97% of all military
tribunals. 70 These tribunals are not equipped to deal with complex legal arguments or
matters. In fact, a Presiding Officer would be advised to refer a complex legal matter,
such as the requirement for expert medical testimony, to a court martial. 71
The summary trial system proper currently has insufficient systematic safeguards
to ensure military members with combat mental disorders are adequately screened or
diverted to treatment. 72 Further, the accused has no legal representation, which ordinarily
may canvass possible defences or mitigation associated with combat stress or related
disorders. The result of a conviction at summary trial can be a criminal record,73 a

69

Supra, note 42, s 139.
Supra, note 63 at 95.
71
See note C to supra, note 46, 108.14: “In the exercise of the discretion [regarding the
right to be represented by legal counsel at a summary trial], the officer having summary
trial jurisdiction should consider at least the following: […] (ii) the complexity of the
offence [….]”
72
Ibid, 108.06: “A commanding officer may try an accused person by summary trial if all
of the following conditions are satisfied: […] the commanding officer does not have
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused person is unfit to stand trial or was
suffering from a mental disorder at the time of the commission of the alleged offence.” It
should be noted that provision presumes that there are adequate systematic methods to
screen or detect the mental disorder.
73
See e.g. Criminal Records Act, RSC, 1985, c C-47, ss 2(1): “service offence” has the
same meaning as in subsection 2(1) of the National Defence Act [….] See also supra,
note 42 ss 2(1): “‘service offence’ means an offence under this Act, the Criminal Code or
any other Act of Parliament, committed by a person while subject to the Code of Service
Discipline” [….] It is noteworthy that the term “Criminal Record” is not defined within
either Act. Still, if one requires a record suspension, one must logically have a “record” to
begin with. See also Criminal Records Act, RSC, 1985, c C-47, ss 4(1): “A person is
ineligible to apply for a record suspension until the following period has elapsed after the
expiration according to law of any sentence, including a sentence of imprisonment, a
period of probation and the payment of any fine, imposed for an offence: (a) 10 years, in
the case of an offence that is prosecuted by indictment or is a service offence for which
70
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permanent entry on a conduct sheet and negative career implications, including delayed
promotions, postings and related benefits. If the misconduct giving rise to the summary
trial was the result of a mental injury from combat, this may not be fair. As will be
argued, added systematic or procedural protections may reduce the likelihood of potential
unfairness for offenders with hidden war wounds. The court martial system does
currently provide some additional protections.

1.2.1.2

The Courts Martial System

The court martial system is an ad hoc system 74 in which the military service
tribunal is convened by the court martial administrator following preferral by the Director
of Military Prosecutions (DMP). 75 This is normally prompted by the Commanding
Officer referring the matter to her referral authority due to, among other things: the
offence(s) charged 76 , the rank of the accused 77 or the gravity of the offence and likely
sentence. 78 The referral authority then asks the DMP to proceed to court martial where
appropriate. 79 Once in the hands of the DMP, a prosecutor will request full disclosure
from all relevant parties, including the police, unit, referral authority, legal advisor, etc.
the offender was punished by a fine of more than five thousand dollars, detention for
more than six months, dismissal from Her Majesty’s service, imprisonment for more than
six months or a punishment that is greater than imprisonment for less than two years in
the scale of punishments set out in subsection 139(1) of the National Defence Act; or
(b) five years, in the case of an offence that is punishable on summary conviction or is a
service offence other than a service offence referred to in paragraph (a). [Emphasis mine]
74
As opposed to a permanent court structure. See e.g. Jason Samson & Mike Madden,
"Entrench the Bench! Canada's Pressing Need for a Permanent Military Court" (2009) 55
Crim LQ 215.
75
Supra, note 42, s 165.191-165.193.
76
Supra, note 46, 108.07.
77
Supra, note 42, s 163(1)(a). See also ibid 108.06.
78
Ibid, s 163(1)(b). See also ibid.
79
Ibid, 109.05(1).
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Once received, she will complete a post charge review to ensure that all elements of the
offences charged are founded in evidence. She will also examine any relevant defences
and Charter applications that could impact the reasonable prospect of conviction
standard. 80 This would include any issues related to fitness 81 and/or a defence of mental
disorder. 82
Simultaneously, the accused will be assigned a military defence legal officer from
the Directorate of Defence Counsel Services (DDCS). This officer will request full
disclosure from the prosecutor and begin to build her defence. The defence counsel will
ordinarily have access to psychiatric assessments, social work evaluations and other
relevant evidence in order to determine whether a defence of mental disorder83 , a fitness
hearing 84 , or a partial mental health defence to mitigate sentence is warranted. There is
no formal pre-sentencing report prepared 85 ; however the defence may call evidence that
would be akin to this information. Because the prosecution would not have access to the
accused’s medical file, the defence counsel is in the best position to ensure that relevant
medical information is brought to the court’s attention. Still, this requires the consent of
the accused, which may not be forthcoming due to stigma and career implications. 86

80

“Director of Military Prosecutions Policy Directive 003/00: Post-Charge Review” (18
March 2009), online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces,
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/cmps-scpm/policy-politiques-003-eng.pdf>.
81
Supra, note 42, s 198.
82
Ibid, s 202.13.
83
Ibid.
84
Ibid, s 198.
85
Notwithstanding the absence of a formal pre-sentencing report, the Prosecutor shall
provide the court with sentencing information. See supra, note 46, 112.51 and 111.17.
86
See e.g. Greg Passey, “Mental health, a mounting priority in the Canadian Forces”,
online: (2009) 5:1 Canadian Psychiatry Aujourd’hui <http://publications.cpaapc.org/browse/documents/448>: “The fear of discrimination, career implications, and
lack of insight resulted in significant numbers of military personnel never coming
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In addition to counsel, the military judge will also assess whether the accused is
fit to stand trial during their interactions in court. 87 The court may also ask questions with
respect to matters that touch on the accused’s mental health, whether this would be
related to fitness, responsibility or mitigation.
Once an accused is sentenced or acquitted, the military tribunal ceases to exist. It
currently does not assume a supervisory function, like a civilian PSC. 88 Often, offenders
with PTSD are sent to the CFSPDB.

1.2.1.3

Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks

If an offender is incarcerated, they may serve part or all within the CFSPDB or a
civilian prison. 89 Both prison systems offer psychological counselling; however the
CFSPDB staff arguably should have more expertise in dealing with veterans suffering
from combat related mental disorders. 90 Ordinarily, the CFSPDB uses military
psychiatrists from CFB Edmonton to treat its inmates.

forward for assessment or treatment. Attempts to screen for Operational Stress Injuries (a
military term for all mental health diagnoses related to military duty, but mainly point to
PTSD and depression) were not as successful as possible because personnel would often
not answer truthfully for obvious reasons.”
87
Supra, note 42, s 198(2).
88
Office of Justice Programs, “Specialized Courts” National Institute of Justice (2 May
2012), online: <http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/specialized-courts.htm>: “The scope of
criminal court research and evaluation has grown with the advent of specialized or
problem-solving courts. Examples of specialized courts include drug courts, mental
health courts, domestic violence courts and reentry courts. Specialized courts differ from
traditional courts in that they focus on one type of offense or offender. Usually the judge
plays an intensive supervisory role. Other criminal justice components (e.g., probation)
and social services agencies (e.g., drug treatment) are involved and collaborate closely in
case processing.” [Emphasis mine]
89
Supra, note 42, s 220. See also supra, note 46, ch 114.
90
The Canadian Press, “Victim's family wants soldier jailed, dismissed” CTV News (28
September 2009), online: BellMedia
23

Unfortunately, if the offender is undergoing treatment for OSIs, incarceration will
result in an interruption in the continuity of care, unless the member is with an
Edmonton-based unit. There is significant debate on the propriety of changing healthcare
providers during OSI management and its impact on treatment progress.91
Further, the CFSPDB regime is much stricter than civilian prisons and induces
stress harsher than basic training. 92 Basic training is geared towards inducing stress to
prepare for combat. For those suffering from combat induced PTSD or an OSI,
incarceration at CFSPDB may be problematic and further complicate the medical
condition. 93 Corrections studies have shown that boot camps and control or punishment

<http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/CTVNewsAt11/20090928/wilcox_sentence_090928/>: "
‘All inmates at the Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks are provided
with professional and timely medical and mental health care,’ the spokesman said in an
email. […] ‘In addition to these services, all inmates also receive regular visits, twice
weekly, by the base chaplain to provide for the inmates' spiritual counselling needs.’"
91
See e.g. John P. Wilson, Matthew J. Friedman, & Jacob D. Lindy, eds, Treating
Psychological Trauma and PTSD, (New York: The Guilford Press, 2001) at 270: “It is
important that psychiatrists or therapists taking the history provide an ongoing
relationship. There is no place for separation of evaluation and treatment. There is no
safety in telling a difficult story to one provider only to be switched to another. The
therapist must be consistent throughout the treatment.” [Emphasis mine]
92
Mary Ellen Lamb, “Prison rehabilitates soldiers gone astray” Canadian Army (7
August 2006), online: National Defence <http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/newsnouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=1190>: “The Canadian Forces Service Prison and
Detention Barracks are not like regular prisons. Prisoners do not have an easy lifestyle;
they are busy performing drills, training and receiving counseling from dawn to dusk.
When they first arrive, they are allowed basic rights such as eating and sleeping, but no
extra privileges such as talking, interacting with fellow prisoners, smoking, watching
television, reading, or making phone calls are allowed. […] It's a very controlled military
atmosphere [….] The worst behaviour usually seen is a prisoner refusing to do the work.
If this happens, the prisoner is sent to solitary confinement.”
93
Supra, note 38: “[B]eing in prison requires a person to be constantly vigilant regarding
the threat of violence, an individual with PTSD who is in prison can be profoundly
retraumatized and his or her PTSD symptoms may be exacerbated to the point where he
or she will act out with violence. […] In fact, because prison life may retraumatize a
person, a lengthy incarceration will likely seriously exacerbate PTSD symptoms and
cause the person's level of functioning to deteriorate.”
24

oriented programs do not work for the general population in reducing recidivism or
criminogenic factors.94
There are currently no diversion, alternative measures or PSC available within the
military justice system that would create treatment options as opposed to incarceration.
The judicial supervision required of a PSC may be difficult in an ad hoc court martial
system that requires the convening authority to convene courts under a strict regulatory
process. Still, this issue could be resolved by moving to a permanent court system. 95
Regardless, the problem is not insurmountable and a solution should be canvassed to
ensure both serving and released veterans are treated fairly and equally. Currently, a
veteran before the civilian justice system may have additional options, including
treatment focused judicial monitoring.

1.2.2

The Released Members’ Experience
A mentally ill member who is released from the Canadian Forces will no longer

be subject to the Code of Service Discipline. 96 However, their OSI-fuelled behaviour will
be still subject to the jurisdiction of the civilian courts of the province or territory in
which they find themselves. Further, the legislative regime governing their conduct
differs from the NDA.

94

See e.g. “IPP - Criminogenic Needs” Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (16 March 2006), online: ohio.gov,
<http://www.drc.ohio.gov/web/ipp_criminogenic.htm>.
95
See e.g. supra, note 74.
96
Supra, note 42, s 60.
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1.2.2.1

Legislation Governing Civilian Courts

There is currently no specific civilian legislation related to defences or alternative
measures for OSIs. There are general provisions provided for mental illness which cover
the spectrum of no responsibility to mitigation. There are also provisions for alternative
measures. A brief discussion on the options in civilian legislation is helpful to understand
how veterans with OSIs are treated by civilian courts.
The law and procedures available to an accused person who has experienced a
mental disorder at the time of the alleged offence are legislated in the Criminal Code. 97
For the most part, these provisions relate to fitness and criminal responsibility and mirror
similar provisions in the NDA. 98 The legislation is premised on a common law rule from
the famous M'Naghten's case 99 which has been part of our legal culture for almost 170
years.
In particular, the term mental disorder is defined in the Criminal Code as “a
disease of the mind [and] imports the terminology used to define insanity under previous
provisions of s. 16”. 100 Subsection 16(1) of the Criminal Code expressly states that “No
person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while
suffering from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the
nature and quality of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong”. 101 [Emphasis
mine]
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The Criminal Code also sets out in detail the administrative procedure in dealing
with offenders who committed the act, but are not to be held criminally responsible or
those who are not fit to stand trial. These legislative provisions may be relevant to
veterans with PTSD or OSIs who are tried in the civilian system by civilian judges.
The leading civilian case on combat induced PTSD in Canada comes from a
unanimous decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. Borsch. 102 This was a case
where a soldier who had served in Bosnia between 1991 and 1994 was diagnosed with
PTSD. He reported having witnessed the rape of a young girl and having killed the
aggressor during combat. He was plagued with nightmares associated with this
experience and others associated with his tour of duty. He was exposed to “ethnic
cleansing”, and was under constant threat of death from snipers and artillery fire. He had
been divorced twice since returning from deployment and had a comorbid diagnosis
which included addictions. On July 27th, 2004, he broke into a house in his
neighbourhood and sexually assaulted a 13 year old girl at knife point. During the attack,
he threatened to kill her. At trial, numerous experts were called, with varying positions as
to whether or not the accused was in a dissociative state at the time of the offence.
Ultimately, the trial judge found that he was not criminally responsible because he was in
a dissociative state related to his combat induced PTSD. On appeal, the decision was
overturned and a new trial was ordered because the trial judge failed to provide adequate
reasons.
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The Manitoba Court of Appeal found that PTSD is a mental disorder as defined in
s. 2 of the Criminal Code. 103 Further, they found that PTSD can cause a dissociative
state. They wrote that “a person committing a wrongful act while truly in a dissociative
state caused by PTSD, […] would generally not appreciate the nature and quality of the
act being committed or know it was wrong”. 104 The Court clarified that the majority of
persons suffering from PTSD would likely never enter into dissociative states; thereby
suggesting it was rare – but possible. 105
Leave to appeal was sought to Canada’s top court; however, this was denied. 106
The legacy of the Borsch decision seems to be formal recognition that an NCR defence
for combat related PTSD is possible when an accused is found to be in a dissociative
state. Arguably, fitness could equally be impacted by combat induced PTSD. 107 The
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military and civilian processes with respect to fitness and NCR are almost identical.
Where the gaps between the two begin, as will be seen, is in treatment based approaches
to mental illness.
The Borsch case highlights how inadequately-treated veterans with OSI can
become caught up in civilian justice processes and how the system may deal with it.
Using NCR and fitness legislation to acquit is one mechanism that may be used by
Canadian justice officials. Unfortunately, this does little to address the root cause.
In addition, the Criminal Code provides for alternative measures in dealing with
offenders who have mental disorders or some secondary disorders related to combat.
Alternative measures are defined as “measures other than judicial proceedings under this
Act used to deal with a person who is eighteen years of age or over and alleged to have
committed an offence”. 108 There is no such provision in the NDA. In fact, neither the
words “diversion”, nor “alternative measure” exist in the Code of Service Discipline. This
gap or omission in the justice process creates a significant disparity in how a released and
serving veteran suffering from PTSD, OSI and/or TBI is dealt with. The most significant
civilian alternative measures available to a mentally and emotionally injured veteran
include diversion to a MHC or DTC.
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1.2.2.2

Mental Health and Drug Treatment Courts

Civilian MHCs and DTCs are based on therapeutic principles. 109 The aim is to
break the cycle of crime and reduce recidivism by addressing the root problem of the
criminal behaviour. 110 Reducing recidivism and instilling discipline is a primary purpose
of military justice.111
The first Canadian DTC was established in Toronto, Ontario on 1 December
1998. 112 “There are [now] 6 federally-funded DTC pilot sites operating in Canada:
Toronto, Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Ottawa and Regina”. 113
Similarly, MHCs have also been established in various jurisdictions throughout
Canada. 114 While they have varying degrees of criteria for eligibility, the focus is the
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same: treatment rather than proliferating cycles of incarceration. 115 In 2010, the Standing
Committee on Public Safety and National Security was concerned about “what appears to
be an insufficient use of mental health courts and its impact on the provincial and federal
correctional systems”. 116 The Committee suggests that offenders with mental health
problems serve more time because of the difficulty of adapting to the prison environment
and are at increased risk to exhibit inappropriate or violent behaviours. 117 The report
recommends “that the federal government support the creation and funding of more […]
mental health courts to divert those with mental health needs to appropriate services”. 118
Both DTCs and MHCs use a collaborative approach in dealing with offenders.
The multi-disciplinary team consists of the judge, the prosecutor, the defence lawyer(s),
social workers, mental health nurses, probation officers, psychiatrists, physicians, and
other treatment providers all working together with a coordinated strategy in order to
ensure the offender complies with the treatment plan, while ensuring public safety.
Counsel do not act in an adversarial fashion, but rather act collaboratively in the interests
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of treatment, the goal being to address the root cause of criminality. The judge moves
from a detached impartial role to one of an empathetic counsellor. 119
The requirements for participation in and administration of alternative measures
are set out in the Criminal Code. 120 Most importantly, there must be informed consent by
an accused. This ordinarily requires ongoing consent for court officials to access offender
medical information until they “graduate” from the program. Referral to an MHC or DTC
can be made by a judge, prosecutor, probation services, police, community services
official or at the request of the defence. Ordinarily, the Prosecution must consent to
transfer to these courts. This allows for the Crown to weigh the public interest and safety
in a given case.
Eligibility for these courts varies by jurisdiction. In Nova Scotia, for example, the
Nova Scotia MHC is a voluntary based program for adults. In order to access this court,
the offender must have a mental disorder and there must be a significant connection
between the disorder and the offence. Further, the offender must voluntarily undergo a
clinical psychiatric assessment and accept responsibility for the offence. Further, the
Crown Prosecutor must consent to the offender’s access to this program. 121
There are various phases that an offender must go through before being accepted
and graduating the PSC programs. For example, a Nova Scotia released veteran (or
anyone) who is referred to the MHC will go through four phases: the appearance, the
screening, the assessment, and the program. The appearance occurs when the originating
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judge is advised of potential eligibility and decides to refer to the MHC. At that point, the
information notes the referral and the matter is adjourned for a couple of weeks while the
accused consults with counsel. If the accused agrees, she will endorse consent and release
documents in order for the MHC team to review their personal information. 122 It should
be noted that often the forms are only endorsed after a first appearance before the MHC.
At this point, the collaborative team will screen the candidate for eligibility and informed
consent. Further, at this stage, the prosecution can veto an eligible consenting
candidate. 123 Should the accused be ineligible or choose not to participate, she may
choose to be sentenced by the Provincial Court judge in order to expedite the process or
she may choose to be referred back to the originating court. The legislated jurisdiction of
the civilian judge 124 allows her to maximize efficiencies by flexibly moving from
alternative measures to sentencing when appropriate, without the convening orders and
related bureaucratic processes required in the military justice system.
Should an accused be eligible and provide the requisite consents, they will be
assessed by MHC treatment professionals on the multi-disciplinary team in order to
determine their needs. Following the assessment, an individualized treatment program is
developed and implemented under the close supervision of the MHC. The frequency of
appearances is tailored to the participants. The supervision of the court allows the
sanctioning of participants who do not follow the treatment plan. Sanctions can include
increased supervision, conditions, detention or expulsion from the program. Successful
completion of the treatment intensive program would usually mean that the accused
122
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would have outstanding charges withdrawn. 125 This would allow the individual before
the court to avoid having a criminal record, which could have otherwise further limited
employment opportunities and successful reintegration into civilian society.
Studies of both the Canadian and American experience suggest that the benefits of
participating in a MHC or DTC include: increased access to mental health and addictions
services; 126 improved ability to function independently; reduced substance abuse, 127
decreased use of crisis intervention services 128 and improved quality of life. 129 Overall,
studies suggest that there is a lower rate of recidivism. 130 These lower rates appear to be
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even better for veteran offenders provided with specific combat related PTSD, OSI and
TBI treatment and programs. 131
In summary, a civilian, a released member or a serving member who is engaged
by the civilian justice system may reap the benefits of the diversion to a mental health or
drug treatment court. A similar diversionary process is not currently available in the
military justice system. These courts provide substantial benefits to civilian and released
veteran offenders, including treatment, rehabilitation and strategies to avoid criminal
behavior and a criminal record. The benefits are further maximized when veteran-specific
treatment is used. In addition, the civilian justice system also has other relevant
alternative measures for civilians and released veterans suffering from PTSD, OSIs and
TBIs.
131
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1.2.2.3

Other Alternative Measures

Other PSC or alternative measures that may be available to civilians or released
veterans in the civilian justice system include: domestic violence courts (DVC) 132 and
adult alternative measures agreements. 133
DVCs are PSCs that try to treat the root problem of domestic or family violence,
as opposed to incarcerating offenders. “The victim wants the violence to stop but might
want everything else to continue and a specialized court model can address those
issues.” 134 There are currently DVCs in Manitoba, Ontario, Alberta, Yukon,
Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia.
“Different jurisdictions have chosen different models of specialized courts. […S]ome
models allow early intervention for low-risk offenders, some use a therapeutic court
option, and most prosecute severe and repeat offenders vigorously”. 135
Studies suggest that veterans diagnosed with PTSD, OSIs or TBIs are more at risk
to commit domestic violence. 136 The Canadian military justice system will ordinarily
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refer cases of domestic violence to civilian courts, when possible, because it does not
have sufficient victims’ services to deal adequately with this issue. Regardless, it is
important to point out that some released members who are at higher risk of committing
domestic violence due to their injuries may have access to DVCs, which could
specifically treat the injured offenders as opposed to incarcerate them. As previously
mentioned, incarcerating these injured veterans may simply aggravate symptoms.
Further, there are calls by veteran advocates to incorporate DVCs into the “Veterans
Treatment Courts” (VTC) now in numerous jurisdictions within the United States. 137
Unfortunately, the civilian Canadian DVCs also currently lack the context of military
service and related veterans’ programs that may be beneficial in designing treatment
plans for offenders and their families. Specific programs related to combat veteran
treatment have demonstrated results in lower recidivism rates regardless the offence. 138
Similarly, Adult Alternative Agreements or Programs are also a diversion process
available to members or veterans that find themselves before Canadian civilian justice.
These are designed to “promote reparation and reconciliation. […It] provides the
opportunity for young persons/adult offenders to acknowledge what they have done and

consequences on families and children [….] Community responses to domestic violence
must be adapted to respond to the increasing number of veterans with PTSD.”
137
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themselves safe without forcing them to betray or harm their veterans. The Veteran's
Courts would have the option of giving the veteran an ultimatum to seek treatment for
PTSD or choose to go to jail. The option of seeking treatment can empower a spouse to
help their veterans. Shawn said if Veteran's Courts had been established for Domestic
Violence cases Justin may have received treatment years earlier and saved much
heartache for her family.”
138
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to work at making amends, thereby avoiding a criminal record.” 139 There is no such
opportunity for serving veterans in the military justice system. Ordinarily, matters such as
remorse, restitution or other forms of reparation are only taken into account postconviction at sentencing.
In the first Canadian Mental Health strategy, 140 one recommendation for action
was increasing “the availability of programs to divert people living with mental health
problems and illnesses from the corrections system, including mental health courts and
other services and supports for youth and adults.” 141 Without these programs of
diversion, many mentally ill veterans will be convicted and sentenced, whether by the
military or civilian justice system.

1.2.2.4

Sentencing

The sentencing regime in the civilian system is currently much more flexible in
dealing with mentally ill offenders. The existing justice infrastructure provides judges the
ability to impose probation to ensure appropriate conditions, monitoring and supervision.
Probation allows the court to impose conditions on an offender while she is in the
community. 142 This permits reasonable controls over the offender in the interests of
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public safety and/or rehabilitation. In addition, there is a further civilian court ability to
impose an absolute discharge for some deserving offenders. Neither of these options is
currently open to serving members in the military justice system. It should be noted that
there is currently legislation before Parliament to provide for absolute discharges and
restitution. 143 The restitution component is part of a sentence post-conviction and the
absolute discharge legislation provides no authority to the military judge to order or
monitor treatment.
It should also be pointed out that in order for civilian probation to be effective,
there must be adequate treatment options for veterans with PTSD, OSI and/or TBI. These
offenders often suffer from a comorbid diagnosis which includes addictions. According
to the BC Court of Appeal, “[w]ithout treatment to back up the admonitions, such orders
will often do the opposite to what is intended -- create a simple path to reoffending
[….]” 144 The same is true for absolute or conditional discharges.
Veterans require access to mental health services tailored to their specific needs.
There are currently support groups and other related services available through Veterans
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Affairs. 145 Civilian justice officials need to know about the treatment and community
based programs available in order to craft appropriate probation orders optimally tailored
to veterans. Further, civilian justice officials would benefit from knowledge of programs
and interface with military and/or Veterans Affairs officials in preparing pre-sentencing
reports.
Sentencing before a military tribunal is strictly governed by statute and
regulations. At summary trial, the available punishments are listed in the regulations and
vary depending on the Presiding Officer and other factors, including monthly pay.146 At
courts martial, the range of punishments is listed in the NDA. 147 Possible punishments
range from dismissal with disgrace, dismissal, incarceration, reduction in rank, forfeiture
of seniority, severe reprimand, reprimand, fines, or minor punishments. Minor
punishments include things such as extra work and drill or confinement to barracks or
ship and stoppage of leave. 148 The available punishments under the Code of Service
Discipline seem to work from the premise or assumption that no offender will need to be
followed with treatment or community services – something probation might assist
with. 149 The “able-bodied assumption” is consistent with the stigma attached to disability
in the military – particularly mental disability. 150 Despite the best efforts by military
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judges to use their sentencing toolbox to craft appropriate sentences for a growing
number of OSI stricken offenders, the differences for individual veterans before civilian
or military courts can be significant.
Bill C-15 is currently before the legislature. If passed, it would clearly articulate
the objectives of sentencing in the military justice system. This would include
rehabilitating offenders and assisting them to reintegrate into military service.151 Still,
there are no provisions that tangibly ensure treatment for mentally ill offenders in order to
address the root cause of misconduct. According to Seamone, the absence of a
diversionary treatment based process within the military justice regime “undermines the
stated sentencing philosophy of rehabilitation of the offender”. By contrast, the civilian
justice system has taken more tangible steps to put the stated philosophies into action.

1.2.3

Comparing the Differences and its Impact
While the differences between the military justice system and the civilian system

may appear minor on the surface, there remain some stark contrasts for many mentally ill
offenders. As highlighted above, the most significant variance includes the absence of
alternative measures within the military justice system that would allow a veteran to
focus on treatment as opposed to possible incarceration.

Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 1 at 13:
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Veterans have made numerous sacrifices for the Canadian Forces, but some were
seriously injured in the process. Their injuries have caused some to have behavioural
problems, which are known secondary effects of the injuries.152 These behavioural
problems have attracted disciplinary or criminal attention. Despite being promised that
they would be taken care of if injured from recruiting through to departure, 153 they are
now being prosecuted in front of their peers, demoted, reprimanded, fined and facing
incarceration. The impact on trust and morale for the individual affected and close
colleagues can be devastating.
More importantly, when soldiers see other veterans not being looked after as
promised, this can have a negative impact on morale, efficiency, discipline and ultimately
operations. As a result, the objective of swift military justice to maintain discipline,
morale and efficiency can actually do the exact opposite if disabled veterans are
perceived to be treated unfairly by military tribunals as opposed to their civilian
counterparts. Even the perception of unfair treatment can be devastating. If a military
purpose exists to justify excluding diversion and treatment based sentences, then it needs
to be clearly articulated and understood, so as to avoid impact to morale.
In order to better understand the stark differences in how veteran offenders are
dealt with by the military justice system and the civilian justice system and the
152
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subsequent impact on the individuals, a few hypothetical examples are helpful to provide
context to the differences highlighted above.154
Corporal (Cpl) A and B live and serve in Nova Scotia. Both have been deployed
to Afghanistan and were diagnosed with PTSD. Both have secondary problems and are
reporting blackouts, alcohol and drug addiction, anger management issues, flashbacks to
combat, insomnia and depression. Prior to their deployment, they had no criminal or
disciplinary record or mental issues. Post deployment, they became increasingly agitated.
They were sent on anger management courses and addictions counselling. Both began
having difficulties with their relationships and became administrative burdens within the
unit. Leadership began to take administrative action against the two, as required under the
regulations. Cpl A was posted to the Joint Personnel Support Unit/ Integrated Personnel
Support Centres (JPSU/IPSC) because he could no longer work. Cpl B was allowed to
continue working because her trade was in high demand.
Cpl A began to live with his mother. He could not manage his finances due to his
addictions. His wife left him and he now pays child support. Within two months he was
arrested for public intoxication. While being arrested on the second occasion, he kicked
out the window of the police car and was charged with wilfully damaging property. As
the blackouts progressed, so did his drinking. He attempted suicide on several occasions.
On one evening, while at a friend’s house, he was playing a computer game and “blacked
out”. He was not drinking at the time. When he woke up, he was in a police cruiser. He
was advised that he began yelling and screaming while brandishing a weapon. When the
police came, he threatened to kill them and himself. He was charged with multiple
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43

offences, including uttering death threats to a police officer. He was remanded into
civilian custody and referred for a forensic psychiatric examination. He was found fit to
stand trial and was released on bail with conditions. His lawyer had the matter transferred
to the MHC.
Once referred to the MHC, an intake assessment was completed by a mental
health nurse. He also met with a probation officer and a social worker. All worked with a
prosecutor and defence lawyer in order to devise an appropriate treatment plan in order to
allow Cpl A to reintegrate into society, while keeping the public and himself safe. He was
compelled to appear before the mental health court judge once every two weeks for six
months and monthly thereafter for an additional year. On each occasion the judge would
ensure treatment was followed, behaviour was acceptable and the risk to reoffend was
acceptable. Cpl A attended psychological counselling, Alcoholics Anonymous, a PTSD
peer support group and maintained constant contact with members of the multidisciplinary team. He received employment retraining and housing assistance in
conjunction with Veterans Affairs and the Department of Community Services. After 18
months, he graduated the MHC. He is currently employed in another profession and has
no criminal record as a result of the incident. He has not reoffended.
Cpl B also became separated from her spouse. Her finances were also in a mess
due to her addiction to cocaine. She began living on the base in single quarters. One day,
during a routine checkpoint stop, she was arrested by the Military Police for possession
of cocaine. Administrative measures were immediately started and release was being
threatened. As a result of her addictions and nightmares, she was not sleeping properly.
She continuously would show up 5-50 minutes late for work over a six month period. She
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was tried summarily for Absence Without Leave on five separate occasions within four
months. On the last occasion, she was sentenced to 2 days detention. On release from
detention, she disappeared for one month and was reportedly living on the street. Cpl B
was eventually picked up by the Military Police on a Commanding Officer’s Warrant. 155
She assaulted the arresting officers and brandished a knife saying that she wanted them to
shoot her. She was held in cells pending her court martial. During the trial, the accused
admitted most particulars, but ran an NCR defence. 156 She was convicted and sentenced
to imprisonment for ninety days and dismissed from the Canadian Forces. She now has a
criminal record for multiple offences and has been released into the community with very
little treatment. Her condition has reportedly worsened since incarceration, during which
she underwent minor punishments for non-compliance within the CFSPDB. Upon
release, she returned to the street, where she continues to reoffend. She was subsequently
charged with assault with a weapon and is in a provincial holding facility facing a long
period of incarceration. Her victim is in critical condition.
These two examples highlight the stark outcomes that can occur between civilian
and military justice systems. Having a military justice PSC would help to bridge the gap
between the two approaches and ensure that veterans are treated where appropriate as
opposed to being punished for problems stemming from their combat injuries. The
existing systematic punishment or corrections approach in military justice fosters
recidivism for traumatized veterans. While the rates of recidivism may be statistically
low within the military system due to rapid administrative release measures, the veterans
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who are left untreated become the burden of the civilian justice system – ultimately
placing public safety at risk. 157
Further, the civilian justice system lacks the expertise and knowledge required to
deal with the unique circumstances that veterans may find themselves in. As mentioned
above, existing civilian PSC multi-disciplinary teams have little knowledge of military
programs that are available through the military, Veterans Affairs, or other veteran nonprofit organizations. It is imperative that key civilian justice players are provided with
that information along with their key contacts so that they can properly tailor treatment
programs, sentences or decisions for veterans - with an adequate understanding of their
problems, backgrounds and the assistance available to them. This action needs to be
taken now as there are currently more and more Canadian veterans who are struggling
with the mental scars of war.
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CHAPTER 2

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

This chapter will develop why this issue is relevant now by describing the scope
of the problem for the Canadian Forces and the current challenges in detection and
prevention of activities attracting military penal consequences. In addition, it will show
that there are significant numbers of veterans anticipated to be suffering from OSIs and
the correlative disciplinary or criminal behavior. It will also provide some relevant
recommendations on improving the current justice systems for veterans.
In particular, the first section will examine the scope of the problem for the
Canadian Forces by examining the current available numbers. This section will make two
main arguments: conditions common to mental disorders are more likely to be found
among those who have served in the military than in the general population, and those
conditions are even more common among released veterans than among serving
members. The section will also examine military culture. This is relevant because the
existing culture in the Canadian Forces is impeding treatment and disclosure of mental
illness among veterans; thereby exacerbating the problem. Finally, the last part of the first
section will discuss military detection issues. The lack of effective systematic processes
to detect mental illness among traumatized veterans adds to the problem.
The second section of this chapter will examine the impact of inadequately treated
veterans on civil society. In particular, it will discuss the problem as it relates to public
safety. Further, it will examine increased social problems that are associated with
untreated traumatized veterans. In addition, this section will examine the impact of
untreated veterans on civilian courts and prisons. Also, this section will try to quantify the
actual cost of traumatized veterans on Canadian society.
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Finally, a brief summary of relevant recommendations that have been generated
by examining the scope of the problem will be provided at the conclusion of Chapter 2.
These recommendations include: better data collection, tracking and analysis for
veterans; more stringent policies that address mental health discrimination within the
Canadian Forces; more extensive earlier training on OSIs for all military members; more
specific training for military justice participants; the provision of elections to court
martial regardless of the charge for mentally injured members; specific policy direction
from key military justice officials on how subordinates are to deal with circumstances
where mental illness is suspected, alleged or proven; the quantification of the actual costs
of mentally injured veterans; and better focused treatment options within Canadian jails
and prisons tailored to veterans who need to be incarcerated. These recommendations are
collateral to the primary argument for a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures
Process as detailed in Chapter 4.

2.1 THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE CF
Traumatized veterans have existed since the beginning of conflict, but the current
scope of the problem is significant for the Canadian Forces. Following more than a
decade of combat and support operations in Afghanistan there are more and more soldiers
complaining of PTSD, OSIs or TBIs. Further, the Canadian Forces has been actively
engaged in other dangerous deployments during that timeframe. 158 This section will
detail the contemporary problem, in order to argue that immediate action is needed.
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This problem (deemed a “crisis” by some) 159 was in play early in the Afghanistan
campaign. Military officials were acutely aware of the issue, having dealt with
traumatized veterans following Rwanda, Bosnia and Korea – to name but a few.
Notwithstanding this knowledge, many soldiers diagnosed with PTSD were redeployed
multiple times in order to fill the significant demand for their limited expertise in a war
zone. 160 Unfortunately, this often exacerbates previous wounds and can create a more
significant illness.161 In fairness, during an ongoing conflict there are only limited
resources. When a large portion of a trained fighting force becomes wounded, the armed
forces cannot keep up the operational tempo demanded of the government without more
personnel. Personnel cannot simply be hired off the street in order to go into battle. 162
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Without the extensive training required of normal forces, casualties will increase. Further,
actual combat experience is invaluable. The Canadian Forces was merely trying to make
do with what they had. Unfortunately, this required putting people in harm’s way and
some soldiers getting traumatized.
Most soldiers jump at the opportunity to help Canada despite serious personal
risk. Part of the reason for their willingness to do so is the belief that Canada will take
care of them, and their injuries, when they return. 163 Unfortunately, statistics suggest that
despite the best efforts of the government, there is a perception that a number of veterans
are falling through the cracks. 164 The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) agrees that more
needs to be done. 165 Examining the current numbers may assist in deciphering the actual
scope of the problem.

defence committee on Nov. 3. “If you want a sergeant with 10 years of experience, it
takes 10 years.’”
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2.1.1

The Current Numbers
This section will make two main arguments: conditions common to mental

disorders are more likely to be found among those who have served in the military than in
the general population, and those conditions are even more common among released
veterans than among serving members. The distinction between the two is important in
determining solutions, as both are subject to different justice processes.
While examining recent statistics will be helpful in understanding the impact of
veteran mental illness in the justice systems, “[t]he biggest challenge is not here and
today. It's in five years and 10 years.” 166 Notwithstanding this reality, it is important to
determine how serious this problem is now, after more than a decade of recent conflict.
Further, the existing numbers still substantiate the above arguments.
According to the Department of National Defence, more than 2,000 soldiers were
injured during the 10-year Afghanistan combat mission. This figure does not incorporate
“the thousands of Canadian soldiers who are suffering from [PTSD] and other
psychological damage. A recent Defence study predicted as many as 13.2 per cent of the
40,000 Canadians who served in Afghanistan could be suffering from Afghanistanrelated mental injuries.” 167 Using their own figures, this suggests that approximately
5,280 servicemen and women could be dealing with combat related mental injuries. “A
recent parliamentary study estimated that almost 3,000 of the soldiers who served there
can be expected to suffer from a severe form of post-traumatic stress disorder and 6,500
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will suffer from mental health issues”. 168 [Emphasis mine] It is noteworthy that when
compared with physical injuries, the most common combat injury is mental in nature.
Another study by the Department of National Defence indicated that
approximately 30% of Canadian Forces members have received specialty mental health
services. Approximately 8% were diagnosed with Afghanistan-related PTSD. 5.2% of
soldiers were diagnosed with “other Afghanistan-related OSI's, such as depression
(2.2%), adjustment disorders (2.0%), or anxiety disorders other than PTSD (1.9%)”. 169
Rates of OSIs among soldiers were highest for those who deployed to Kandahar
(17.1%) and to Kabul (14.5%). This is significantly higher than rates for those deployed
to the Arabian Gulf (6.5%), Camp Mirage or elsewhere in Southwest Asia (3.3%). 170
This is consistent with a recent Canadian study suggesting a correlation between
exposure to actual combat or risk and OSI prevalence. In particular, recent data suggests
higher rates of PTSD among “front-line” soldiers. According to Major Paul Sedge, a
military psychiatrist, “based on 792 soldiers from CFB Gagetown who experienced high
levels of combat during their deployments in 2007 […] nearly a quarter of the soldiers —
23.1% — suffered with some form of mental problem. Further, PTSD was reported in
more than 20% of the cases”. 171 This is more than double the normal rates for the
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Canadian Forces population segment and significantly higher than the 13.2% suggested
by the Department of National Defence.
Despite these figures, it is important not to correlate mental injury severity with
the location of a deployment or the nature of the mission. There are too many variables
that must be considered. In fact, PTSD “represents a common, if not the most prevalent,
mental health problem in community studies in post-conflict areas”. 172 In Rwanda, for
example, in 1994 there were crimes of genocide where approximately 800,000 people
were killed. Of the approximately 7.7 million people in that country, 4 million were
displaced. 173 The survivors witnessed violence, corpses and other terrors associated with
war. Studies of the Rwanda survivors suggest that approximately 1 in 4, “(24.8%) met
symptom criteria for PTSD”. 174 Senator Romeo Dallaire, who led the United Nations’
mission in Rwanda, stated in a “Fifth Estate” interview that out of the dozen people that
reinforced him during that mission, approximately 70% have had varying levels of PTSD.
One was diagnosed 12 years after the incidents and one committed suicide 14 years after
the incident. Senator Dallaire indicated that he remains vulnerable to suicidal tendencies
and is currently undergoing therapy. 175
Similarly, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the site of a major Canadian Forces
deployment in the 1990s, there are reports that as many 1.75 million citizens may be
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suffering symptoms of PTSD. According to data, studies suggest that 30% of war
veterans in Serbia and 40 % in Bosnia are afflicted with the mental disorder. 176 This is
consistent with Canadian figures which suggest that “at least 30% of soldiers involved in
combat operations risk suffering from PTSD or major depression during their
lifetime”. 177 Similarly, in a Doctors Without Borders study on the general population of
Freetown, Sierra Leone following years of civil war, “high levels of traumatic stress
[were] evident, […25% were suffering] from severe traumatic stress or even PTSD”. 178
The same study also demonstrated that “[d]eliberately or not, witnessing at least once
event such as torture (54%), execution (41%), (attempted) amputations (32%), people
being burnt in their houses (28%) and public rape (14%) often results in traumatic stress
or even PTSD”. 179 Canadian Forces soldiers have seen many of these types of atrocities
in the course of their service in many parts of the world – whether in actual combat, on
peace-keeping missions or other missions.
The average PTSD rate expected of the general population is approximately
8%. 180 “The estimated lifetime prevalence of PTSD among American veterans […] is
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30.9% for men and 26.9% for women”. 181 Whether there are any cultural considerations
to be incorporated and how to do so in diagnosis remains inconclusive. 182 Still, statistics
do indicate that “women are twice as likely as men to develop PTSD”. 183
In addition to the consequence of suicide and homelessness, the risk of
criminogenic behavior increases with OSIs. Recent reports suggest that there has been a
steady increase in inmates at the CFSPDB since 2001. In fact, statistics show that rates
have doubled during the Afghanistan campaign. According to University of Alberta
professor Andy Knight, "there's a link to Afghanistan, (but) I don't think you'll ever get
the military to say this […] adding the number of soldiers sent to prison could indicate
difficulty adjusting to life after war”. 184 Similarly, University of British Columbia
political science professor Michael Byers “believes the […] mission in Afghanistan may
have taken a psychological toll on some soldiers. […] Deployment increases the
opportunities and, essentially, the circumstances within which criminal activity takes
place". 185

and 1992, estimates that the lifetime prevalence among adult Americans is 7.8%, with
women (10.4%) twice as likely as men (5%) to be diagnosed with PTSD at some point in
their lives. These figures represent only a small proportion of adults who have
experienced at least one traumatic event—60.7% of men and 51.2% of women
respectively”.
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An examination of reported Canadian courts martial decisions for the year
2010 186 reveals that of the 65 decisions, 57 of the cases were resolved by guilty plea.
Eight courts martial involved operational offences and 15 reported mental health issues
with an additional 8 not being clear. Conditions and symptoms reported included: anger
management in 3 cases; schizophrenia in 1; addictions in 4; post-traumatic stress in 4;
depression in 1; and suicidal thoughts in 2. Of the 15 issues, 3 were found directly related
to combat while 7 were unclear. Based on this data, and making the unlikely assumption
that there was no under-reporting of symptoms, at least 15 of 65 or 23% of military
offenders tried by court martial are dealing with a mental health issue. Further, at least 4
of 65 or 6% of offenders tried and convicted had PTSD and a little less than 5% had an
OSI directly related to combat.
These numbers do suggest, at a minimum, the need for better data collection,
tracking and analysis on this important issue. Arguably, this information should be
provided and reviewed in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) annual report as it relates to
military justice. The Department of Veterans Affairs, with assistance from Attorney
Generals, should analyze the information related to civilian justice.
The above statistics demonstrate that conditions similar to mental disorders are
more likely to be found among those who have served in the military than in the general
population. I now turn to the second argument that those conditions are even more
common among veterans than among serving members.
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Academic studies have determined that there is a link between the OSIs and the
number of suicides among Canadian Forces members. 187 “According to statistics
provided by the military, 187 soldiers have committed suicide since 1996”.188 It is
noteworthy that this number is more than the total casualties from the Afghanistan
combat mission proper. 189 It has been recognized that “[s]uicide is among the most
common causes of death in the military [….and] the third leading cause of death in
Canadian forces members over the past 25 years”. 190 While studies suggest that soldier
suicide rates are lower than in the civilian population, “[r]esearch suggests that […]
veterans are 1.4–4 times as likely to die by suicide compared with nonveteran
civilians”. 191 [Emphasis mine] The 1.4 starting point related to a study of Norwegian
peacekeepers 192 and seemed inconclusive on OSI correlation to suicide. More specific
studies of combat troops included a study of Vietnam era vets which showed that “PTSD
veterans were more likely than the non-PTSD veterans to die from suicide (relative risk =
3.97, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 2.20-7.03)”. 193 More recently, a broader population
study looking at a twelve year period found that “[v]eterans were twice as likely (adjusted
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hazard ratio 2.13, 95% CI 1.14 to 3.99) [corrected] to die of suicide compared with nonveterans in the general population.” 194 Notwithstanding these studies, it is acknowledged
that “there remains significant controversy as to whether soldiers are at increased risk for
suicide compared with civilians”. 195
It is important to differentiate the statistical data between soldiers and veterans.196 
“[B]ecause the military environment and services provided by the CF differ from the
civilian life of veterans and the services provided by VAC, the findings of studies for one
of these groups do not lend themselves to extrapolation to the other”. 197 Still, in
comparing both groups, “the prevalence of mental health disorders appears to be much
higher among veterans than among serving members”.198 This is likely exacerbated by
numerous military factors, including untreated mental disorders due to perceived stigma
and adverse career implications, which is discussed below.
An examination of those receiving veterans’ benefits approved after 2006
suggests that known diagnosed OSI prevalence is approximately 60%. This figure is
substantially higher than previous prevalence rates for pension beneficiaries. 199 Further,
this does not capture those veterans who have not applied for benefits despite
eligibility.200
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The aforementioned numbers suggest that once soldiers are released with medical
pensions into the community, they are more likely to be suffering from OSIs than serving
members, who some suggest already have elevated prevalence rates when compared to
the civilian population. Unfortunately, it is difficult to monitor veterans with existing
processes and infrastructure. “Existing databases […] do not allow for the systematic
monitoring of the state of health and occupational progress being made by those veterans
who do not request VAC services”. 201 Many of these ill veterans are at increased risk of
“absenteeism, unemployment, interpersonal and family problems, alcoholism and drug
addiction, trouble with the law, homelessness and suicide”. 202 Better systematic processes
to track, monitor and assist released veterans may help ensure a safer transition to civil
society.
The statistics and numbers highlighted demonstrate the current scope of the
problem. Still, much of the problem is fueled by the existing military culture which
contributes to stigma and untreated mental disorders.

2.1.2

Military Culture
Military culture has been described as the “bedrock of military effectiveness

them. This increases health risks for them, because early intervention is the most
important factor in healing. Moreover, the symptoms of operational stress injury may
appear only several years after the event that gave rise to the trauma, which is often many
years after the person left the CF.”
201
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202
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[…and]the essence of the Canadian, or any other, military”. 203 Discipline and morale are
equally intrinsically linked to military culture. In fact, discipline, cohesion and esprit de
corps are essential components of military culture. 204 Both cohesion and esprit de corps
are major factors in the development of high morale. 205
Unfortunately, the military culture’s attitude towards mental illness and PTSD has
been one in which any injury is a weakness. 206 Weakness is not acceptable in the
military. In particular, mental illness was perceived not to be a real injury and therefore
anyone purporting to have such an injury was a faker, liar, malingering or had some other
negative persona. 207 According to the former Ombudsman for the Canadian Forces,
“[t]he symptoms (of stress injuries) are bad enough but the culture of shame and
suspicion is worse [….] It is considered a badge of dishonour for soldiers to get
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psychological treatment”. 208 Either way, to admit they are suffering would result in them
being cast aside professionally and socially.
This culture and negative attitude towards mental illness created stigma. Stigma is
a barrier to effective diagnosis and treatment, which can lead to the exacerbation of a
mental health condition. The stigma within the military follows veterans on release.
“Many [civilian] employers are hesitant to hire veterans with a combat background
because of perceived mental health issues [.…] 46 percent of employers considered
PTSD a significant obstacle to hiring employees with military experience”. 209 This
stigma has real results, with American statistics demonstrating a substantial increased rate
of unemployment among male veterans ages 18 to 24 as compared to civilian
counterparts. 210
In fairness, the Canadian military is not alone in struggling with stigma related to
mental health. Notwithstanding strong levels of societal awareness, there continues to be
stigma associated with mental illness among the overall Canadian population, particularly
regarding serious cases, 211 which inhibits complete acceptance.
According to the Canadian Medical Association, only half of Canadians would
tell friends or co-workers that they have been diagnosed with a mental illness, which is
208
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far below rates for other serious illness such as cancer or diabetes. Further, one in five
Canadians indicated they did not seek treatment despite experiencing symptoms of
mental illness in the last year. 212 Also, 27% of Canadians would be fearful if they had to
be around someone with a mental illness. In addition, almost two in five Canadians are
uncertain if they would socialize with someone who had a mental illness. Further, more
than half suggested that they would be unlikely to enter into a spousal relationship with
someone who has a mental disorder. In addition, the majority of Canadians would be
unlikely to hire a person suffering from a mental illness, including a lawyer, a doctor, a
financial advisor or a health care worker. More importantly, nearly half of Canadians
believe that people use the term mental health as an excuse for bad behavior. 213
The Canadian Alliance for Mental Illness and Mental Health has suggested that
addressing mental health stigma and discrimination is one of the most pressing priorities
for Canadian mental health officials. They call for an education strategy to increase
acceptance and improve understanding. They also call for more stringent policies that
address mental health discrimination to assist in expediting change. 214 I agree.
In the recent National Mental Health Strategy there are calls to “[f]ight stigma by
including opportunities in promotion, prevention and early intervention initiatives to meet
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and talk with people living with mental health problems and illnesses”.215 Part of the
proposed action includes a 10 year program called “Opening Minds” targeting contactbased education to change behaviors. 216
The Canadian military has equally taken steps to eliminate stigma associated with
OSIs. In 2009, the Canadian Forces launched a “Be the Difference” awareness program
that was designed to help members “meet and overcome any mental health challenges
that they may encounter – in the course of their military career, and after”. 217 This effort
was also referred to as the "all right to hurt" campaign. 218
PSCs within the military and post-release that are tailored to veterans would assist
in reducing stigma through institutional acceptance that treatment, as opposed to
punishment, is required. By publicly punishing those who offend due to PTSD or OSIs,
through incarceration or other significant modes, a public perception is perpetuated that
there is increased fault and blameworthiness associated with the mental disorder and
related symptoms. Conversely, a rehabilitative message to injured veterans would create
a perception of less personal responsibility. This may assist in changing the military
culture as the CDS hopes.
A treatment based approach to justice proceedings does not allow an accused to
evade accountability. As explored in Chapter 1, the practice in PSCs is to ensure
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accountability through the admission of the underlying particulars of the offences
charged. Further, the explanation of clemency or treatment-based approaches in the
decisions of learned judges when transferring offenders to PSCs fosters education of
mental illness in the public domain. Any increased awareness should assist in reducing
stigma.
While significant effort has been put into defeating stigma related to OSIs and
PTSD, more is required. In my view, military policy statements require “teeth” to be
effective. Some improvements may include: better safeguards on employment through
accommodation, a specific offence related to OSI harassment and increased privacy
safeguards. 219 Military justice can also do its part.
Obviously, stigma related to mental illness will not disappear from the military
overnight. Still, it can be eliminated if there is a real willingness from the top. The
military has adapted to once highly controversial cultural views related to the inclusion of
women in combat 220 and issues related to sexual orientation. 221 While there is more to be
done, it is clear that much ground has been covered. According to Commodore Jung, the
previous Surgeon General for the Canadian Forces, "[t]he stigma will never go away
219
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without changing views and values about mental health and that means 'cultural change,'
which takes years. It has taken us 10 years to get here, and I'd say the major progress will
be in the 10 years ahead. It is so ingrained in the culture".222 While it is clear that there is
movement on the issue, all facets of military culture, including military law, must adapt
with the cultural evolution and the Commander’s intent. That intent is clear. The CDS has
stated “I expect leaders at all levels to create a command climate that allows those who
need help to get it. I also expect all CF personnel to foster a social climate of
understanding, acceptance and support [….L]et’s make sure we take action.” 223
If the military does not “foster a social climate of understanding, acceptance and
support” 224 for offenders with OSIs before service tribunals, how can anyone expect civil
society to do so on behalf of their veterans? The military must lead on this issue and the
JAG, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal (CFPM), the Surgeon General of the
Canadian Forces and other military leaders must be on the front lines. 225 Chapter 4,
below, will offer specific proposals.
One of the by-products of stigma associated with the existing military culture is
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inhibited detection. 226 The existing military culture compounds an already daunting task
of detection in the Canadian Forces, made difficult by “hidden wounds” 227 that are
difficult to identify.

2.1.3 Detection Issues
Academics and practioners agree that early detection is essential in the treatment
of PTSD, OSIs and TBIs. 228 Many western militaries have continually sought to develop
screening or detection mechanisms in order to assess if military personnel returning from
deployment are psychologically injured.229 The Canadian Forces is not alone in being
unable to develop a totally effective screening mechanism that ensures early detection for
members. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police are also grappling with PTSD and OSI
detection and treatment. 230
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The solution to increased detection includes more extensive training on OSIs from
the moment of recruitment. It also includes attacking the stigma and culture of repressing
mental health problems during basic training. This education process must be directed at
all rank levels. 231 While it may take a generation to eliminate the cultural bias and
discrimination, it will eventually reduce stigma, provide better coping strategies and
foster earlier detection.
Without detection, mentally injured veterans can become ticking time-bombs.
They may engage in criminogenic behaviors attracting the attention of the military justice
system. 232 As a result, the justice systems often become tripwires for undiagnosed and
inadequately treated veterans with mental illness. It is essential that military justice
participants are trained to detect mental illness and identify when there is a relevant
correlation to the offences charged. In a December 2010 Report of the Standing
Committee on Public Safety and National Security, it was suggested that justice officials
needed more training on the symptoms of mental illness, mental health problems and
addictions to ensure appropriate diversion and referral. 233 I agree.
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Notwithstanding this report, the military justice system currently has no diversion
process and many civilian PSCs are in their infancy. How can military justice participants
be trained on detection for diversion, when no diversion processes exist? The problem is
not exclusive to the Canadian Forces. The United States is substantially ahead of its
Canadian counterparts in civilian PSCs for veterans; however, its military justice system
is under fire for lagging behind in diversion options. 234 "When PTSD is acquired through
service, and combat caused PTSD increases aggression, drug abuse, and violence, […]
the most basic concepts of justice require the military to effectively treat PTSD rather
than punish it". 235
Similarly, there is a need for justice processes that will facilitate self-identifying a
mental illness in order to commence treatment. Detection through self-identification is
inhibited not only by a perceived punishment or correction-based ethos, but also the
stigma and administrative consequences of being mentally ill in the military. This
military justice climate causes courts martial to become what Seamone calls a “problem-
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about.” [Emphasis mine]
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generating court”. 236 Conversely, access to diversion options like civilian PSCs facilitates
treatment and detection.
In addition to education and training on detection, policy direction from key
military justice officials would help reinforce the CDS’s higher intent of creating a
“command climate that allows those who need help to get it […and fostering] a social
climate of understanding, acceptance and support”237 for mentally ill veterans. This
would include specific policy direction from military justice leaders on how subordinates
are to deal with circumstances where mental illness is suspected, alleged or proven.
Currently, there is no readily available specific policy on how to deal with
suspected mentally ill offenders from the CFPM 238 , DMP 239 and DDCS. 240 A specific
policy would enhance consistency in veteran treatment by justice officials, increase
awareness, reduce stigma and foster detection. More importantly, it would ensure the
Commander’s intent is communicated appropriately to front-line police officers and
counsel dealing with veterans afflicted with mental illness.
Within the unique summary trial process, specific training on detection needs to
be incorporated into accreditation processes for presiding and assisting officers. Specific
regulations to ensure consistency of treatment may assist in improving detection by the
military justice actors. Further, providing elections to court martial regardless of the
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charge for psychologically injured members may assist in ensuring that no mentally ill
veteran falls through the cracks. Failing to treat veterans while they serve only creates a
bigger problem for the civilian system when they are released. 241

2.2 THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM FOR CIVIL SOCIETY
This section of this chapter will examine the impact of inadequately treated
veterans on civil society. In particular, it will discuss the problem as it relates to public
safety. Further it will examine increased social problems that are associated with
untreated traumatized veterans. In addition, this section will examine the impact of
untreated veterans on civilian courts and prisons. Also, this section will try to quantify the
actual cost of traumatized veterans on Canadian society.

2.2.1

Public Safety
It may seem obvious to anyone that having an untreated mentally ill person with

elevated risks of criminogenic behavior in the community is a serious issue that requires
the attention of civilian authorities. Clearly, having these individuals untreated in the
community creates risk for public safety.242 The risk logically becomes even more
substantial when the mentally ill offender has received advanced military training and has
experience in how to kill and injure other human beings.
Often military personnel at the very basic training levels will be taught basic
weapon handling and desensitization to violence. They will learn how to endure personal
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sacrifice and hardship in order to accomplish missions at great personal risk and
suffering. Canadian Forces members will learn escape and evasion techniques as well as
camouflaging tactics. All learn how to kill the enemy efficiently while preserving their
own life. At more advanced levels of training, many learn offensive and defensive tactics,
advanced weapons training and increased efficient ways to inflict violence on the enemy.
Further, over the course of a career, a service member will likely have multiple
deployments to conflict areas. Many will have orchestrated, assisted in, been ordered to
and personally committed acts of extreme violence on fellow human beings. They will
have experience in the management and infliction of violence on the enemy. When all of
this experience and training is combined with an untreated mental illness, the risk to
public safety is exponentially increased. 243
The operational tempo in recent operations has seen the increased use of reservists
in front line operations. 244 This essentially involves having a militarily trained civilian
joining the military effort for a deployment, and then immediately returning back into
civilian life. Unfortunately, there is little systematic monitoring to follow the soldier,
sailor or air crew reservist post-deployment. Further, reservists are often from locations
of great distance from major bases where specialized mental health support is
provided. 245 Both Canada and its allies report higher rates of reservist mental injury post
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deployment due to reported ill-preparedness and reduced access to specialized
treatment. 246
The danger of not treating veterans with PTSD or OSIs is their propensity to
commit violence. In a study of inpatient Vietnam veterans with PTSD which examined a
propensity for violence as compared to non-veteran inpatient patients, it was found that
PTSD inpatients engaged in more types of violent acts such as “property destruction,
threats without a weapon, physical fighting, and threats with a weapon”. 247 The study
showed a correlation of increased violence with symptom severity and substance
abuse. 248 Similarly, studies have shown PTSD can cause veterans to become more
aggressive in their interpersonal relationships. Contrary to urban legend, exposure to war
zones does not (in and of itself) cause increased aggressive behaviors. “Rather, the
primary determinant of whether one is at heightened risk for […] violence following
deployment appears to be the development of trauma-related psychopathology”. 249
Having untreated trained military personnel with propensities toward aggression
and violence in the community places the public at risk. Further, if these members are
still serving, they often have access to weapons and ammunition. This increases the
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potential dangers. In addition to public safety, veteran OSIs can lead to serious social
problems, including public health complications.

2.2.2

Social Problems
Military families are most in jeopardy to increased social problems as they have

to deal directly and regularly with the traumatized veterans. It is not only spouses who are
in peril, but children as well. OSI sufferers often experience flashbacks or re-experience
traumatic events at seemingly random moments which cause a significant negative
emotional response. Children begin to worry about their parents and may feel insecure
about their parent’s capacity to care for them. Other symptoms of PTSD include
avoidance and emotional numbing. If veterans withdraw from their children, are irritable
or show little or no emotion towards them, children can interpret this as not loving them.
“Researchers have observed a direct relationship between each of the parent's PTSD
symptoms and the children's responses. […These include] secondary traumatization, […]
depression and anxiety, and relational problems later in life”.250 In addition, studies of
Vietnam veterans demonstrated that “children of veterans with PTSD are at higher risk
for behavioral, academic, and interpersonal problems […and] are at higher risk for being
depressed and anxious than non-combat Vietnam era veteran's children”. 251 Despite
limited data collection on Canadian military family violence, there appear to have been
increases within the Canadian Forces in the aftermath of multiple combat deployments to
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Afghanistan. 252 Family violence is a serious social problem 253 that needs to be addressed
by the Government of Canada. Military families suffer enough during deployments when
they worry about whether their loved ones will return at all. 254 If the management of
mentally injured veteran offenders who commit family violence requires incarceration,
the family is further adversely affected. 255 Military families will continue to make
sacrifices alone, long after the actual fighting has ceased. Medical treatment through
diversion would assist in reducing the social problems for veteran families associated
with veteran OSIs.
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The potential impact of secondary traumatization on children creates a ripple
effect which can echo for a generation. This can include increased public health costs due
to the psychological scarring of children and income inequality – a known social
determinant of health. 256 Further, there may be future social and economic impact via
child underachievement that might not occur with timely, adequate family unit
interventions.
The social consequences of not treating PTSD extend beyond the realm of the
family unit. Aside from public risk related to violence, there is a serious public health
issue. In particular, the comorbid nature of PTSD increases the risk that veterans will
develop addictions. In fact, “[t]he co-morbidity rates of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and substance use disorders are know[n] to be substantial.” 257 A review of the
literature suggests rates of co-morbidity between PTSD and substance use disorders to
range anywhere from 20% to 75%. 258 Further, the impact and intensity of the addiction
can intensify if the underlying medical condition goes untreated.259 Addictions are widely
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accepted as a significant social problem. According to the United Nations, drug abuse can
perpetuate crime, destroy families, impair community health, and adversely impact
economic growth through reduced productivity. 260 Some suggest that untreated PSTD
and OSIs among veterans may be a “crisis in public health”. 261 Not only can OSIs create
social problems, but social problems can exacerbate OSIs, causing a vicious cycle of
misery for veterans and their families.
In addition, social problems, such as substance abuse, unemployment or poor
employment skills, family dysfunction, homelessness, anti-social attitudes and related
behaviors are known criminogenic factors. 262 If crime is committed and incarceration is
imposed, further social problems often occur for the veteran family unit. If the member is
released or if military jurisdiction is not exercised, civilian courts will be required to deal
with veteran offenders and the related social consequences.

2.2.3

Civilian Courts
Throughout history, civilian Canadian courts have had to deal with offenders

suffering from combat related PTSD, TBIs and OSIs. Some cases have put OSIs forward

260

See e.g. “The Social Impact of Drug Abuse” United Nations International Drug
Control Programme (1 March 1995), online: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<https://www.unodc.org/pdf/technical_series_1995-03-01_1.pdf>.
261
Supra, note 2 at 29: “While failure to treat mentally ill offenders may very well
amount to a crisis in public health [….]”. [Emphasis mine] See also Charlene Rubush,
“Changes Underway at the VA May Mean Better Treatment for Thousands of Veterans
with PTSD” Win Over PTSD (17 April 2010), online:
<http://winoverptsd.com/wp/changes-underway-at-the-va-may-mean-better-treatmentfor-thousands-of-veterans-with-ptsd/#more-361>: “The Department of Veterans Affairs
has struggled to address this mental health crisis, and thousands of veterans have suffered
as a result.” [Emphasis mine]
262
Supra, note 94.
76

as a defence. 263 Currently, serving veterans found driving impaired in Canada are
generally dealt with by civilian courts – even when charged by the military police.
Similarly, despite having concurrent jurisdiction, the Canadian Forces does not generally
prosecute cases of domestic violence due to the absence of specialized victims’ services
that civilian counterparts can offer. Both addictions and domestic violence for veterans
can be indicators of an OSI. 264 If civilian justice officials are not trained in OSI detection
and appropriate veteran diversion, then veterans will simply be punished as opposed to
receiving treatment. This can exacerbate the illness and create a revolving door for
veterans within traditional civilian courts.265 This does little to facilitate the necessary
safe transition of the veteran from the battlefield to garrison or back into civilian society.
In addition to R. v. Borsch 266 , other veterans suffering from PTSD have been
brought before courts across the country to face criminal charges for behaviour consistent
with OSI symptomology. Judicial treatment varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
While most veterans’ cases before civilian courts are unreported, an examination of some
recent examples of these cases shows that civilian courts are often called upon to deal
with the aftermath of traumatized service members, despite having little training on
263
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military culture, life, experiences and OSIs. The sample cases below involve actual
situations of veterans who fought for their country and were psychologically injured.
They demonstrate the current scope of the problem for civilian courts.
In 2011, Corporal Berube was 30 years old. His best friend, Corporal Dyer, was
killed in an Afghanistan blast in 2002. He was diagnosed with PTSD in 2007. Despite
undergoing treatment in Comox, a theft of his military medals in May 2010 caused him to
regress. He began uttering threats and possessed a firearm that he intended to use to kill
himself. Corporal Berube initially pled guilty to weapons charges in Provincial Court and
was facing a possible lengthy prison term. Fortunately, British Columbia Provincial
Court Judge Peter Doherty stayed the proceedings stating that incarcerating Berube,
"might strike thoughtful Canadians as manifestly unjust." 267 Ironically, despite his having
received a stay and getting better treatment, the bank commenced foreclosure on his
home shortly after. 268
Conversely, Craig Turcotte, aged 39, a Canadian Forces combat officer, was
incarcerated for 30 days and further sentenced to 18 months on probation by a civilian
court for twice failing to comply with bail release terms to not communicate with his
wife. The prosecution and the court were aware that the soldier had severe PTSD from
high stress deployments in Rwanda and Afghanistan. He also had a comorbid diagnosis
that created a drinking problem. Other similar charges, from separate incidences, were
put through mental health diversion, but Turcotte’s defence counsel agreed with a period
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of incarceration. Additional charges were outstanding that included uttering threats.269
While this case took place only four years ago, it is clear that court officials were of the
view that punishment was required in addition to treatment. This differs from Corporal
Berube, who received a complete stay. It is acknowledged that domestic violence is a
legislated aggravating factor; 270 however, should an untreated veteran suffering from
mental combat wounds be held to the same standard as other non-traumatized offenders?
In the words of British Columbia Provincial Court Judge Peter Doherty, such a position
"might strike thoughtful Canadians as manifestly unjust”. It is acknowledged that spousal
abuse is a horrendous unacceptable crime and many may feel that this example does not
advance an argument for diversion which would be broadly accepted. Still, if NCR
verdicts and subsequent treatment based approaches for combat related PTSD are
possible for murder; one has to look at all crimes in a careful manner and determine if
treatment is the best option. While a visceral reaction to punish may be automatic due to
the nature of the offence, reflection as to eliminating the root cause is best for everyone in
the long run. Education is paramount in fostering acceptance to this premise.
In another example, Jonathan Woolvett was a combat soldier who did two tours in
Afghanistan totaling 13 months between 2007 and 2009. In 2009, he began experiencing
“chronic night terrors, profuse sweating and recurring nightmares. In one, he is drowning
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in sand. In another, he is forced to stand helpless as people around him are being
killed”. 271 His sleeplessness was attributed to the deaths of friends and colleagues he
deployed with, being ambushed by sustained heavy enemy fire, killing enemy insurgents,
and continued exposure to atrocities. He used drugs and alcohol to deal with the
symptoms of PTSD. Shortly after returning home, he was divorced. He was then later
charged for threatening a woman he had been dating. The court gave him a conditional
discharge. It should be noted that reports suggest that approximately “60 Petawawa
soldiers are currently on probation for offences related to PTSD” 272 from civilian courts.
The few examples of civilian initiated prosecutions demonstrate that serving
military members and veterans suffering from OSIs are being charged and convicted of
criminal offences in civilian courts. Their sentences range from probation to conditional
discharge to incarceration. The inconsistent approaches demonstrate that diversion is not
always used. When a punishment based ethos is used to deal with mentally ill offenders,
the results do not necessarily result in reduced recidivism rates. To understand the impact
of this judicial approach, it is helpful to examine the veteran experience in civilian
prisons.

2.2.4

Civilian Prisons
Civilian incarceration rates of Canadian veterans are not currently tracked by

Corrections Canada. However, in a recent study it was suggested that approximately
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2.8% of total inmates may be veterans. This “suggests that there may be 626 offenders
who served in the Canadian military (383 in institutions and another 243 supervised in
the community). Moreover, there may another 633 sentenced or remanded veterans in
provincial or territorial corrections”.273 The implications for corrections based on a
comparative analysis with other states and existing data suggests that “as the number of
veterans in the general population grows, their presence in correctional facilities is also
likely to increase—and […] those who have been deployed overseas in recent years are at
comparatively higher risk of involvement with the justice system”. 274 It should be noted
that studies suggest that deployments alone do not increase the risk of criminogenic
behaviour, but rather the presence of an OSI. 275
There is a significant gap in the collection of data regarding veterans who are
incarcerated. Canada’s allies currently track with substantial detail veteran offenders who
are in prisons, their crimes and illnesses. 276 This kind of information would be of great
assistance to Canada in helping medical personnel address criminogenic factors in order
to reduce criminal misconduct. Further, it would assist the JAG in formulating
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appropriate military justice policy. This thesis suggests that a concerted strategy for data
collection on traumatized veterans who are incarcerated in military and civilian jails and
prisons is required. This should be a joint initiative between Veterans Affairs, Corrections
Canada and the Department of National Defence.
Generally speaking, incarcerating offenders with mental illness has become more
and more common. 277 Unfortunately, veterans with PTSD in prison are placed at
significant risk. They need to remain constantly hyper-vigilant for violence and personal
harm, thereby impeding treatment. Further, veterans can become re-traumatized, causing
their symptoms to be exacerbated and increasing their aggression and the risk of violence.
In addition, longer periods of imprisonment can cause a veteran’s functioning to
deteriorate. 278 All of this increases the risk of longer periods of imprisonment,
interference with treatment and a higher likelihood of recidivism.
More significantly, veterans who require immediate treatment may not get it.
According to the most recent Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional
Investigator, “a significant portion of the inmate population that suffers from mental
illness is ‘falling through the cracks’, as they do not have access to intermediate care in
their penitentiary nor meet the admission criteria of […] psychiatric treatment
facilities.” 279 Further, when dealing with veteran screening for OSI, “federal corrections
has limited capacity to systematically assess […] neurological dysfunctions upon
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admission to a federal penitentiary”. 280 This may include TBI, OSI, PTSD, addictions
and increased suicidal ideations. While much of the above would apply to all offenders
with mental illness, “[i]f the experiences of Canadian veterans are similar to those
reported in the U.S. and U.K. research, they may have higher risks and needs than the
general offender population”. 281 If Corrections Canada cannot meet offender basic mental
health requirements, incarcerated veterans and those who are concerned about their wellbeing should be troubled. Failure to treat veterans for their hidden wounds and the
corresponding increased recidivism rates are costly to society.

2.2.5

The Cost of Veteran OSIs
While there are no specific recent Canadian studies that have tabulated and

projected the costs of dealing with veteran OSI, it is conceivable that the costs will be
significant. An American study by the “RAND Corporation estimates the costs of the
psychological and neurological injuries suffered by Iraq and Afghanistan veterans at
between $4 and $6.2 billion, just in the first two years after combat”. 282
If we use this forecast and compare the American forecasted amount to the 30,000
Canadian troops deployed to Afghanistan, the cost in the first two years post combat is
between 51.4 and 80 million dollars (30,000 Canadian troops 283 x $4 and $6.2 billion /
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2,333,972 US Troops 284 ). Clearly, there are other factors (such as currency differences
between Canada and the United States) that would impact the actual figure. Similarly,
these numbers strictly cover 2 years post-combat Afghanistan. They do not incorporate
veterans suffering from OSIs from other deployments such as Rwanda or Bosnia. Still,
these numbers provide a simplistic approximation of some of the economic costs of
veteran OSIs for Canada – until a more detailed economic analysis is undertaken. 285
Fortunately, these costs can be mitigated with early treatment. “When the impacts
of an operational stress injury are treated in a timely and appropriate manner, full
remission may result in 30% to 50% of cases”. 286 Using the figures suggested above, this
could result in savings to the government of approximately 15.4-40 million dollars over a
two year period. A small investment in programs like diversion for veterans would
facilitate faster treatment and perhaps mitigate long term costs associated with treatment,
pensions, incarceration, court costs, unemployment, and dependant health and social
welfare. Further, if Canada can retain experienced soldiers, there is a training savings
associated with not having to medically release injured members.
This thesis suggests that the Government of Canada truly understand and attempt
to quantify the actual costs of this problem. This may help foster broader acceptance of a
treatment based approach by demonstrating the actual expense and the financial benefits
284
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of mitigating it. Further, better focused treatment options within jails and prisons tailored
to veterans who need to be incarcerated may better treat the root illness and reduce
overall costs to the taxpayer. This is notwithstanding the human and ethical component of
facilitating treatment for injured veterans and their families.

2.3 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout Chapter 2, the scope of the problem was discussed in order to
substantiate a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures System in Chapter 4. In
addition, a number of specific recommendations were made in order to improve the
current situation for traumatized veterans. These recommendations, which will form part
of the overall “campaign plan” also discussed in Chapter 4, can be summarized as
follows:
1. There should be better data collection, tracking and analysis as it relates to
mentally injured veterans or those suffering from TBIs. This information should
be provided and reviewed in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) annual report as
it relates to military justice. The Department of Veterans Affairs, with assistance
from Attorney Generals, should analyze the information related to civilian justice.
Also, there should be a concerted strategy for data collection on traumatized
veterans who are incarcerated in military and civilian jails and prisons. This
should be a joint initiative between Veterans Affairs, Corrections Canada and the
Department of National Defence. Understanding how and why veterans end up
before justice processes may help identify criminogenic factors and improve
prevention and treatment strategies;
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2. There should be better systematic processes to track, monitor and assist released
veterans to ensure a safer transition to civil society;
3. There should be more stringent policies that address mental health discrimination
to assist in expediting change and defeating stigma among the veteran and
military community. Some improvements may include: better safeguards on
employment through accommodation, a specific offence related to OSI
harassment and increased privacy safeguards;
4. There should be more extensive training on OSIs for military personnel from the
moment of recruitment. This includes attacking the stigma and culture of
repressing mental health problems during basic training. This education process
must be directed to all rank levels;
5. All military justice participants should be trained to detect mental illness and to
identify when there is a relevant correlation to the offence(s) charged. In
particular, justice officials need more training on the symptoms of mental illness,
mental health problems and addictions to ensure appropriate diversion and
referral. Within the unique summary trial process, specific training on detection
needs to be incorporated into accreditation processes for presiding and assisting
officers;
6. There is a need to provide mentally injured members with the option to elect court
martial, regardless of the charge;
7. There should be specific policy direction from military justice leaders on how
subordinates are to deal with circumstances where mental illness is suspected,
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alleged or proven. These policies would enhance consistency in veteran treatment
by justice officials, increase awareness, reduce stigma and foster detection;
8. The Government of Canada should quantify the actual costs of mentally injured
veterans. This may help foster broader acceptance of a treatment based approach
by demonstrating the actual expense and the financial benefits of mitigating it;
and
9. There is a need for better focused treatment options within Canadian jails and
prisons tailored to veterans who need to be incarcerated. This may better treat the
root illness and reduce overall costs to the taxpayer.
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CHAPTER 3

THE AMERICAN PHENOMENA: A COMPARISON

The United States continues to make substantial advancements for veterans
caught up in the criminal justice system, including treatment during civilian incarceration
and specialized VTCs. 287 Examining the solutions of our American allies may be of
assistance in deciding the best way for Canadians to address this serious issue.
In order to understand whether American solutions to the legal problems of
traumatized veterans would be of assistance to Canada, a brief comparison of the relevant
veteran OSI issues and justice processes of both countries is appropriate. The United
States is used as a comparator because it is Canada’s closest ally. In addition, its military
and civilian justice system has similar origins, operates within a concurrent jurisdiction
framework and remains somewhat analogous. Further, the most recent deployment was to
the same location, Afghanistan, where troops often fought side by side with each other.
Finally, as will be seen, the magnitude of the problem the U.S. faces is comparable on a
per capita basis.
This chapter will examine the processes currently in place for American mentally
injured veterans. In particular, it will compare those systems with Canadian ones. This
comparison will be used build on existing processes in order to substantiate a proposed
Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures System in Chapter 4. It will also provide
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some specific recommendations on improving the current Canadian justice systems for
veterans.
In particular, the first section will compare the magnitude of the traumatized
veteran problem with our American counterparts. This section will demonstrate that the
scope of the problem is comparable and similar for both countries. This similarity is
relative to population differences and the number of military members found in the
general population.
The second section will compare the existing military justice processes between
Canada and the United States. This will highlight that while there are similarities between
the Canadian and American military justice processes; there remains important
differences that may require different solutions and tactics to deal with mentally injured
military offenders caught up in Canadian military justice.
The third section will compare the American civilian justice processes for
veterans with Canadian systems. In particular, it will review some caselaw for veterans
before civilian justice processes. It will demonstrate that American courts are prepared to
recognize that veterans with OSIs require treatment based sentences. Further, courts at
the highest level have determined that OSIs are relevant to sentencing. Some American
states have recognized the importance of treatment based options to justice processes and
OSI based mitigation in their legislation.
The fourth section will examine specifically Veterans Treatment Courts. These
are problem solving courts specifically designed for veterans that are currently being used
in many American states.
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Finally, a brief summary of relevant recommendations for Canadian justice that
have been generated by comparing our justice processes with those of the United States
will be summarized at the conclusion of Chapter 3. These proposals are collateral to the
overarching argument for a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures Process
detailed in Chapter 4. These collateral recommendations include: the creation of
Canadian legislation which expressly considers the impact of military trauma and injuries
as it relates to criminal and disciplinary processes; options for veterans to self-identify
OSIs on their provincial driver’s license; and options for specialized housing and
treatment for veteran inmates in Canadian civilian institutions.
3.1

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM
In order to substantiate that existing American justice models for veterans are

appropriate for Canadians, it is important to compare whether the scope of the problem is
comparable.
As of 2009, there were 21.9 million American veterans living in the United
States. 288 After more than a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has
more than 2.3 million veterans who have deployed in the “War on Terror”. 289 “Nearly 20
percent of military service members who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan -300,000 in all -- report symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder or major depression
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[….]” 290 This percentage is consistent with Canadian figures, which suggest rates
between 14.5 and 23.1% depending on where in Afghanistan service members were
posted and their role. 291
“On any given day, veterans account for nine of every hundred individuals in U.S.
jails and prisons [….O]n any given day approximately 9.4 percent, or 223,000, of the
inmates in the country’s prisons and jails are veterans”. 292 It should be noted that this
figure also corresponds to the percentage of veterans in the general American population.
While Canadian data suggests that approximately 3% of Canadian inmates are veterans,
this also mirrors the percentage of veterans in the general Canadian population. 293 In
other words, the magnitude of the problem regarding veterans who are incarcerated in
civilian institutions is the same relative to the military members found in the general
population.
Americans studies have noted factors at play among that state’s forces that
aggravate the problem, including: long and multiple deployments, younger service
members, increased exposure to combat, access to care and monitoring of reservists, the
militia or National Guard. 294 Similarly, Canadian reports have suggested that veteran OSI
problems tend to increase when there are multiple close deployments. 295 Also, increased
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exposure to actual combat is a factor that exacerbates conditions. 296 In addition, Canadian
reservists may “fall through the cracks” and have difficulty accessing specialized
treatment. 297 While similar factors make the problem worse, the impact on individual
soldiers is equally comparable.
United States officials have also concluded that the impact of untreated OSIs on
members includes: misconduct and poor discipline, unethical behavior, substance abuse,
marital conflict, family violence, homelessness and suicide.298 Canadian officials have
made similar findings. 299
Having demonstrated that the nature and relative scope of the Canadian problem
is very similar to that of the United States, it is helpful to examine how veteran offenders
are treated in the American military justice system.

3.2

THE MILITARY JUSTICE PROCESS
A military member who is charged with an offence in the United States may face

administrative measures from a Commander. Alternatively, they may be required to face
a non-judicial punishment if the offense is minor. Such hearings conducted by the
Commander are non-adversarial and the standard of reasonable doubt applies. “The
service member may request an open or closed hearing, speak with an attorney about his
296
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case, have someone speak on his behalf, and present witnesses who are reasonably
available. The rules of evidence do not apply”.300
The Canadian military has administrative measures that can be imposed; however,
these are not considered part of the disciplinary or criminal process. Still, the prior or
likely imposition of administrative measures on an offender may be considered on
sentencing by a service tribunal.
The American Commander may also choose to dispose of the offenses by courtmartial. This requires “preferring” or forwarding charges to a higher authority. Once
preferred, they are referred to court martial. The court martial must be convened by a
convening authority, who is ordinarily “the commander of the unit to which the accused
is assigned”. 301 Conversely, in Canada, the convening authority functions are performed
by the Court Martial Administrator, a civilian bureaucrat.302 Otherwise, the process is
relatively similar to the Canadian military justice system. 303
In the United States there are currently three types of courts martial with varying
levels of punishments and procedures. The Canadian military had a similar structure until
2008, when legislative changes were prompted by a Court Martial Appeal Court decision
ruling that the scheme was unconstitutional. 304 Currently, there is only a Standing or
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General Courts Martial. 305 The Standing Court Martial (SCM) is presided over by
military judge alone and the General Court Martial (GCM) has five panel members and a
military judge. 306 The choice of mode of trial ordinarily lies with the accused as opposed
to the chain of command. 307 Regardless of the mode of court martial in either country, the
process is adversarial with counsel appearing for both the prosecution and defence. 308
While there are semblances of a civilian criminal trial, there are procedural differences
and unique rules of evidence. 309
The appeal or review process in the United States differs somewhat from Canada.
In America, the appellate process begins with a review by the convening authority. In
serious cases there is an automatic review by the Department of Defence's Court of
Criminal Appeals, composed of military judges. Both the convening authority and the
Court of Criminal Appeals may alter the decision or sentence as long as the jeopardy to
the offender does not increase. The next court in the appellate process is the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces. It is composed of five civilian judges appointed by the
President for fifteen years. This Court may only review questions of law. 310 Finally,
either party “may petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari
from the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The review by the Supreme Court is
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entirely discretionary and extremely rare”. 311 Conversely, the appeal process in Canada
from a court martial does not involve any decision making by the accused’s chain of
command. Instead, the accused or government may appeal directly to the Court Martial
Appeal Court, 312 then the Supreme Court of Canada – both composed of civilian
judges. 313 In addition, there have been occasions where counsel has tried to use the
Federal Court of Canada to deal with court martial matters, though these are unusual.314
When dealing with mentally injured veterans who are still serving, the United
States military justice system has additional early detection processes for mental illness
not available in Canada. While Canadian military judges may order an assessment of
fitness for trial, the Canadian chain of command or convening authority does not have
this ability. In the United States, both military judges and convening authorities may
request a mental health assessment. The examination is often called an RCM 706
board. 315 The board is called upon to determine: whether at the time of the alleged
offence, the accused had a severe mental disease or defect; the accused’s clinical
psychiatric diagnosis; whether she was unable to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of
her conduct; and whether the accused is fit for trial. This report may “lead to the case
311
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being suspended, charges being dismissed by the convening authority, administrative
separation of the accused from military service, or the charges being tried by courtmartial”. 316 Regardless of the results, additional examinations may be ordered as the
matter progresses through the military justice process. 317 In essence, the American
convening authority, usually, the accused’s Commanding Officer, has the powers of a
Canadian military judge to order an assessment of fitness and criminal responsibility. 318
The United States military justice system currently does not have a diversion
process, such as a VTC. The lack of problem-solving diversion is currently receiving
substantial criticism, including from within the ranks of the American Judge Advocate
General’s office. 319 According to Seamone, the military justice system “undermines the
stated sentencing philosophy of rehabilitation of the offender, the way it erodes the
professional ethic by denying core values, and the way it defies the moral obligation to
advance the interests of both the veteran and the society he will rejoin.” 320 He advocates
for convening authorities to implement “treatment-based suspended punitive discharges
for combat traumatized offenders,” 321 and to divert offenders to civilian PSCs through
pre-trial agreement. 322 Further, he advocates for treatment-based sentences. 323
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Similarly, the Canadian military justice system does not have diversion or
treatment based sentences beyond remanding to a psychiatric facility after a successful
defence of mental disorder. 324 Further, the Canadian convening authority does not have
the ability to grant clemency pre or post-conviction. The referral authority, who refers
from the unit to the DMP, may provide comments on disposition during referral; however
they must refer for trial or direct a summary trial be held. 325 Arguably, the Commanding
Officer could decide not to proceed with charges, 326 but he/she is not authorized to get a
mental health assessment in relation to a disciplinary matter, nor impose treatment as part
of a sentence. 327 The CDS and Officers commanding a Command may suspend
incarceration imposed by a court martial and lower ranking officials may also do so for
summary trials. 328 While military judges may also suspend their own sentences of
incarceration, 329 their ability to oversee future treatment is often perceived as limited due
to the ad hoc nature of the military justice system. 330
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A recent case involving a massacre in Afghanistan has raised serious questions
about the impact of PTSD on soldiers serving in operations. Army Staff Sergeant Bales
has been charged with 17 counts of premeditated murder of Afghan civilians. He had
reportedly sustained a brain injury in Iraq and was on his fourth tour of combat duty at
the time of the alleged offence. His defence team is expected to raise undiagnosed PTSD
as a related cause of the incident. 331 Initial reports from his lawyer suggest that Bales was
“suffering from severe nightmares, flashbacks of war scenes and persistent headaches
after his multiple combat tours”. 332  The handling of this case by the American military
justice system is anticipated to come under intense media scrutiny. Canada has not had to
deal with such a massacre in recent memory and certainly not during the War on Terror –
although it is possible to conceive as there are Canadian soldiers who have done four or
more tours during a short period of time, with mental health issues arising. 333
A brief comparison demonstrates many similarities between the Canadian and
American military justice processes. However, there remain important differences that
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may require different solutions and tactics to deal with mentally injured military
offenders caught up in Canadian military justice. Seamone’s idea to use existing civilian
PSCs within the civilian justice system 334 is worth exploring.

3.3

THE CIVILIAN JUSTICE PROCESS
American civilian justice officials are often faced with veteran offenders who

have OSIs. How they are dealt with varies from state to state and judge to judge. While
many states have set up specialized VTCs, it is likely that many are diverted to other
PSCs, such as DTCs, DVCs or MHCs. “The rapid expansion of specialized treatment
courts is noteworthy. As of 2012, there are over 3648 problem-solving courts in the
United States […] including at least 2459 [DTCs and] 250 MHCs”. 335 Unfortunately,
there are no statistics available to determine just how many veterans are being put
through these types of civilian diversion processes. There is a similar lack of data on the
Canadian experience with diversion to non-veteran PSCs.
Although diversion may be available, it is not always used when it could be due to
a multitude of factors, including the experience level of the justice officials involved
regarding mental illness detection and the lack of consent of the accused due to stigma or
employment consequences. In those cases, and in those states without PSCs, judges and
officials are often forced to craft decisions that they deem just. A review of the caselaw
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demonstrates that unfortunately, the results are uncertain and do not always foster
treatment. This is also consistent with the Canadian experience as demonstrated above. 336
A brief review of some recent high profile cases highlights some similarities with
Canadian justice and a similar evolution with respect to understanding the impact of OSIs
on a criminal prosecution with respect to fitness, criminal responsibility and sentencing.
In October 2009, an Oregon jury found Jessie Bratcher, a former member of the
National Guard that had served in Iraq, guilty of murder except for insanity related to a
PTSD flashback from the war in Iraq 337 (the process is akin to the Canadian “not
criminally responsible” process). 338 Bratcher was diagnosed with PTSD after serving 11
months in a forward operating base in Kirkuk, Iraq in 2005. “His unit patrolled villages
around Kirkuk under constant threat of insurgent attacks and roadside bombs. In 2005,
Bratcher watched as one of his closest friends was crushed by a Humvee during an
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accident while out on patrol”.339 Shortly after, “a roadside bomb exploded near
Bratcher’s Humvee at the same intersection where his friend had been killed”. 340
The jury had heard how in the summer of 2008, Bratcher’s pregnant fiancée,
Celena Davis, told him that Ceja Medina had raped her and that the baby might not have
been Bratcher’s. Bratcher proceeded to put the barrel of an AK-47 in his mouth. He later
cut Davis’s hair off. Two days later, Bratcher purchased a gun. After discussing what to
do, the two decided to go to the police. Because it was the weekend, the police station’s
door was locked. As a result, they proceeded to Ceja Medina's home. The evidence
showed that Bratcher called Ceja Medina into his front yard and shot him six times. At
the time of the murder, he stated that he experienced a flashback to Iraq. 341
A forensic psychologist for the defence argued that “Bratcher's flashback was
triggered by the stress around the rape allegation”.342 He had experienced other
flashbacks while incarcerated and was previously diagnosed with PTSD. In sentencing
the offender, the judge found Bratcher to be a danger to the community and ordered that
he be placed under the lifelong supervision of the Oregon Psychiatric Security Review
Board. 343 “Under Oregon law, jurors could have convicted Bratcher on a reduced charge
of first-degree manslaughter, if they determined that he was a sane person acting in the
passion of the moment”. 344 The "guilty except insane" decision allowed Bratcher “to
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receive psychological treatment instead of prison”. 345 This is akin to the 2007 decision of
the Manitoba Court of Appeal in R. v. Borsch 346 which affirmed that PTSD can be used
to support an NCR defence.
The Oregon Bratcher decision was on the heels of a Supreme Court of the United
States unanimous decision to overturn a combat veteran’s death sentence because the
defence had failed to introduce mitigating evidence of PTSD. 347 In that case, Porter, a
decorated veteran of the Korean War who was wounded and traumatized during heavy
combat, was convicted of the murders of his former girlfriend and her lover. The highest
American court stated:
[o]ur Nation has a long tradition of according leniency to
veterans in recognition of their service, especially for those
who fought on the front lines as Porter did. Moreover, the
relevance of Porter's extensive combat experience is not
only that he served honorably under extreme hardship and
gruesome conditions, but also that the jury might find
mitigating the intense stress and mental and emotional toll
that combat took on Porter. 348 [Emphasis mine]
The sentiments of the United States Supreme Court seem similar to the rationale
used by Judge Peter British Columbia Provincial Court Judge Peter Doherty when he
stated that incarcerating Corporal Berube, a mentally injured veteran, "might strike
thoughtful Canadians as manifestly unjust". 349 Still, the American decision binds lower
courts and clearly articulates the fundamental problem for veterans and the requisite
impact combat stress should have on mitigation when an OSI does not completely
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absolve criminal responsibility, but nonetheless has some bearing on the transaction that
attracted the justice system’s attention.
This spirit of leniency for traumatized combat veterans has been reduced to
legislation in California 350 and Minnesota. 351 In addition, in 2010, the United States
Sentencing Guidelines were revised to indicate that military related trauma can be
considered relevant in sentencing. This allows judges to depart from usual sentencing
guidelines “if the military service, individually or in combination with other offender
characteristics, is present to an unusual degree and distinguishes the case from the typical

350

California Penal Code, § 1170.9, online: <http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/displaycode?section=pen&group=01001-02000&file=1170-1170.9>: “(a) In the case
of any person convicted of a criminal offense who could otherwise be sentenced to
county jail or state prison and who alleges that he or she committed the offense as a result
of sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse,
or mental health problems stemming from service in the United States military, the court
shall, prior to sentencing, make a determination as to whether the defendant was, or
currently is, a member of the United States military and whether the defendant may be
suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of that service. The court may
request, through existing resources, an assessment to aid in that determination”.
[Emphasis mine]
351
Minnesota Statutes, § 609.115, Subd 10 (2008), online:
<https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/statutes/?id=609.115&year=2008>: “(a) When a
defendant appears in court and is convicted of a crime, the court shall inquire whether the
defendant is currently serving in or is a veteran of the armed forces of the United States.
(b) If the defendant is currently serving in the military or is a veteran and has been
diagnosed as having a mental illness by a qualified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist or
physician, the court may: (1) order that the officer preparing the report under subdivision
1 consult with the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, Minnesota Department
of Veterans Affairs, or another agency or person with suitable knowledge or experience,
for the purpose of providing the court with information regarding treatment options
available to the defendant, including federal, state, and local programming; and (2)
consider the treatment recommendations of any diagnosing or treating mental health
professionals together with the treatment options available to the defendant in imposing
sentence”. [Emphasis mine]
103

cases covered by the guidelines”. 352 No such legislation expressly considers the impact of
military trauma in Canada as it relates to a criminal process. In my view, it should.
In addition to judges, other American justice officials are also taking steps either
to assist traumatized veterans that come in contact with the civilian criminal justice
system, or to prevent them from doing so. For example, numerous states have provided
veterans with an option to self-identify that they are veterans with PTSD on their driver’s
licence. 353 The overall purpose is to “provide valuable information to first responders and
will help the Department of Veterans’ Services notify veterans of benefits they are
eligible to receive”. 354 As a result, it is hoped that many veterans who would otherwise
have been arrested and confined following ordinary traffic stops due to aggressive
reactions relating to OSIs will be diverted by police to mental health centers. 355 While
other U.S. states have followed or are currently examining this initiative, 356 no Canadian
provinces have openly discussed this issue. They should.
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American corrections officials are also attempting to better deal with the influx of
mentally ill veterans that are being incarcerated. Several states have begun providing
specific dorms or facilities for veterans within jails. For example, Georgia has opened a
16-inmate corrections facility near Fort Bening, a large military base. The programs are
geared towards veteran treatment in order to reduce recidivism. They also partner with
the multi-disciplinary team of the local VTC in order to better access reintegration
services for the veteran. 357 Similarly, the Florida Department of Corrections has also
created specialized housing for veterans. 358 According to Florida Corrections officials
“[g]rouping veterans allows prisons to tailor pre-release services to their special needs,
such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder counselling, and to familiarize inmates with
military benefits and supports available to them on the outside”. 359 Florida has created
five dormitories with a capacity of approximately 400 which are located throughout the
state. One facility is for female veterans.360 Conversely, there are currently no known
similar initiatives for veterans within Corrections Canada, although Corrections officials
acknowledge that more research and study is required on this issue. 361 While there are
more veterans in American jails and prisons, the most recent numbers from Correction
Canada officials suggest that as many as 626 inmates may be veterans. The differences in
the size of the two militaries do not justify Canada’s failure to provide specialized
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housing for veteran inmates with OSIs. It is far better that they be nationally based in one
prison or in separate smaller dorms within regional facilities. It is acknowledged that
these dorms may be smaller in size when compared to their American counterparts.
Regardless, Corrections Canada and their provincial counterparts should provide this
option for incarcerated veterans in civilian institutions.
A review of civilian justice processes that American veterans may face suggest
that many states have made substantial advancements in promoting treatment for
mentally injured vets, including police identification and diversion, government
synchronized veteran tracking through licensing, specialized veteran housing for inmates
that focuses on treatment, courts diverting veterans to mental hospitals or treatment
programs instead of jails or prisons, and legislated mitigation and treatment options for
trauma related to military service. Still, there is more to be done. Canadians seems to be
needlessly lagging behind in many of these areas, particularly with respect to specialized
veteran criminal justice diversion and the use of VTCs.

3.4

VETERANS TREATMENT COURTS
At last count, there were 88 VTCs in 27 states in the United States. 362 VTCs are

specialized alternative measures mechanisms for minor offences committed by former
members of the military. The purpose of the courts is to “keep those with mental health
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issues out of the traditional justice system”. 363 More specially, it is designed to reduce
recidivism by dealing with the core criminogenic factors such as homelessness,
aggression, and substance abuse.
A VTC is a problem-solving diversionary court, which is a hybrid of mental
health, drug treatment, sex offender and DVC. It deals exclusively with veterans
suffering from serious mental conditions, including OSIs and addictions. 364 Like
Canadian MHCs, the focus is on rehabilitation. These diversionary courts demonstrate a
societal willingness and inclination to focus on treatment and rehabilitation for mentally
ill offenders faced with criminal justice processes.
While there are differences between the respective State processes, the Alaskan
model exemplifies contemporary American VTC programs. 365 Essentially, the VTC
receives referrals post arraignment, regardless of whether the member is in custody. In
order to participate in the VTC, the accused must file a motion to determine eligibility.
The VTC sits one afternoon per week. Once the VTC judge assumes carriage of the file,
the accused and Veterans Services Representatives develop a treatment plan to be carried
out by Veterans Services. Both the Prosecution and Defence enter into plea discussions,
which can result in a modified incarceration sentence, the reduction of counts, or the
dismissal of all charges. Because the program is consent-based, the offender may opt out
of the process. Further, they may be removed or punished for non-compliance and placed
363
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back in the regular justice stream. Should they remain in the system, veteran offenders
plead to the offences agreed and then a court-ordered treatment plan is implemented as a
condition of bail pending sentencing. During the treatment phase, the Judge acts as a
mentor or coach in assisting and monitoring the progress of treatment. Once the treatment
plan is completed, the veteran graduates. The case is either dismissed or the offender is
sentenced to a completion sentence. The file is then closed. The Alaskan Veterans Court
process closely resembles the MHC models in Canada, such as the Nova Scotia Mental
Health Court. 366 The difference is that the provincial models do not currently have
specialized veteran treatment professionals or social workers with knowledge of veterans’
benefits on their multi-disciplinary teams.
The use of VTCs has been endorsed by the American Bar Association and the
National District Attorney’s Association. 367 Further, PSCs generally have been
encouraged by the Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court
Administrators. 368 No such public endorsements regarding veterans have been put
forward by Canadian counterparts, although PSCs generally are receiving support from
justice officials. 369 The support is backed by statistics indicating that reduced recidivism
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can be achieved through VTCs, along with substantial overall savings to the taxpayer. 370
These positive results would be beneficial for Canada.
3.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout Chapter 3, Canadian and American justice processes were compared
in order to substantiate and design an effective Canadian Military Justice Alternative
Measures System as set out in Chapter 4. In addition, a number of specific collateral
recommendations were made in order to improve the current situation for traumatized
veterans. These recommendations, which will form part of the overall “campaign plan”
also discussed in Chapter 4, can be summarized as follows (numbering continued from
Section 2.3):
10. There should be legislation which expressly considers the impact of military
trauma and injuries in Canada as it relates to a criminal process. This could
include options for treatment based diversion or sentence mitigation when
appropriate.
11. There should be options for veterans to self-identify mental illness where it may
reduce the likelihood of aggravating the condition. This would include allowing
the option to self-identify an OSI on their provincial driver’s license. This should
be linked to Veteran’s Affairs, providing that department with an opportunity to
offer services to injured veterans who self-identify.

law court procedures to better meet the realities of endemic social problems and better
serve the public.” [Emphasis mine]
370
Supra, note 131: “The programs have not only significantly lowered recidivism rates
for defendants who complete them, they also save taxpayers hundreds of thousands of
dollars each year -- money that would have been spent locking up offenders, county
officials said. The community as a whole also benefits because it is safer [….]”
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12. There should be an option for specialized housing and treatment for veteran
inmates with OSIs in Canadian civilian institutions.
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CHAPTER 4

REHABILITATING JUSTICE FOR VETERANS

Having suggested that a treatment based approach for veterans reduces recidivism
rates, saves public funds and treats veterans with the respect that the public thinks they
deserve, 371 this thesis will, in this chapter, examine how these approaches could be
implemented in Canada. 372 As the law and research in this area is developing, any
proposed model must be flexible, adaptable and able to evolve. The approach here will be
to examine a mechanism to incorporate a veteran focused PSC into the military justice
system and civilian justice systems. It will also canvas other potential interventions by
police, corrections personnel and counsel. This will include building partnerships in order
to maximize resources, collecting data and research and increasing overall support to
traumatized veterans. The “whole of governments approach” will culminate in a
concerted effort to reduce recidivism among veterans primarily through treatment, which
is to be supported by legislative, policy and educational initiatives. The purpose is to
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See also James Struthers, “Comfort, Security, Dignity: The Veterans Independence
Program, A Policy History” (December 2004), online: Veterans Affairs Canada
<http://veterans.gc.ca/pdf/pro_research/comfort-security-dignity-vip.pdf>: “Opinion polls
showed that sympathy for their clients far outranked support for refugees or people on
welfare. ‘It is veterans who most Canadians would like to receive more assistance.’”
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I reiterate that I am not suggesting that veterans suffering from mental disorders or
trauma should get preferential treatment over their civilian counterparts, rather that they
should at least receive equal treatment, except where there is an insurmountable valid
military reason for preventing it.
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ensure that the Canadian military justice system parallels the civilian justice system
except where there is clear justification for it to deviate.373

4.1

CREATING A SERVICE TRIBUNAL
In order to substantiate the point that military justice should change by focusing

on treatment for disabled veterans, it will be argued that a shift in military culture is
required. Several opposing arguments to VTCs within the Canadian military justice
process will need to be addressed. In my view, these counter-arguments need to be
addressed prior to discussing the mechanics of any military diversion proposal, because
they deal with the strategic level questions of whether any treatment based PSC is even
consistent with the unique nature and purpose of military justice. In particular, any
solution must be cognizant of the unique military justice requirement for expediency, the
ad hoc nature of military tribunals and the underlying purpose of military justice to
impose discipline, efficiency and morale. 374 This section will demonstrate that military
PSCs will not hurt expediency, discipline, efficiency or morale. Conversely, they will
foster or enhance these military requirements.

4.1.1

Expediency
A possible argument against VTCs in military justice is that they will be

inconsistent with the need for expediency. I will argue that while there is a need for
expediency, VTCs are as expedient as other methods.

373
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R v Généreux, [1992] 1 SCR 259, at para 60 [Généreux].
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The chain of command requires that discipline be maintained through swift
justice. 375 Parliament specifically created a statutory duty to deal with military charges
“as expeditiously as the circumstances permit”. 376 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Canada has stated that “[b]reaches of military discipline must be dealt with speedily
[….]” 377 It is noteworthy that Prime Minister Harper has stated that civilian justice must
also be “effective, swift and true” 378 and that the Charter requires that all justice matters
be “tried in a reasonable period of time”. 379 Further, the Supreme Court of Canada has
stated regarding civilian justice that “[t]he failure of the justice system to deal fairly,
quickly and efficiently with criminal trials inevitably leads to the community's frustration
with the judicial system and eventually to a feeling of contempt for court procedures”. 380
[Emphasis mine]
In the civilian realm, the highest court has articulated that criminal matters must
proceed quickly for a number of reasons, including: community support through positive
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See e.g. House of Common Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 44 (4 November 2011) at
1025 (Chris Alexander): “Therefore, it is vital that our armed forces take with them a
reliable justice system that is consistent with our values. When they are deployed, they
are governed by the military rather than the civilian justice system. Military justice in
Afghanistan, Libya and other countries where our forces are deployed must be swift and
fair and reflect the values of Canada's civilian justice system and its most recent
developments.” [Emphasis mine]
376
Supra, note 42, s 162: “Charges laid under the Code of Service Discipline shall be
dealt with as expeditiously as the circumstances permit.”
377
Supra, note 374.
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Prime Minister Stephen Harper, “Speech from the Throne” Here for All Canadians (3
March 2010), online: Government of Canada
<http://www.speech.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1388>.
379
The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11, s 11(b). See also, Askov v R, [1990] 2 SCR 1199: “[A]ll accused persons, each one of
whom is presumed to be innocent, should be given the opportunity to defend themselves
against the charges they face and to have their name cleared and reputation re-established
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perceptions of fairness; the reliability and availability of witnesses; the rapid reintegration
of innocent accused parties into society; and the fostering of trust in the justice system by
the community. 381
The reason for the perceived increased expediency requirement for military
justice relates to the unique (and self-evident) requirements of the profession of arms. In
particular, war cannot stop for an extended trial. Further, units cannot afford to lose
healthy trained members to repatriation from a war zone for minor offences in order for
them to prepare for the defence of a court martial. For example, the work-ups or predeployment training exercises for the Afghanistan combat mission lasted approximately
nine months. If accused parties’ positions have to be backfilled at the last minute, the
forces either have to draw upon previously deployed trained members 382 or place soldiers
into operational combat roles with little or no mission specific training. Either option
places soldiers and the mission at increased risk.
381

Ibid: “First, there is a collective interest in ensuring that those who transgress the law
are brought to trial and dealt with according to the law. Second, those individuals on trial
must be treated fairly and justly. Speedy trials strengthen both those aspects of the
community interest. […] From the point of view of the community interest, in those cases
where the accused is detained in custody awaiting trial, society will benefit by the quick
resolution of the case either by reintegrating into society the accused found to be innocent
or if found guilty by dealing with the accused according to the law. If the accused is
released on bail and subsequently found guilty, the frustration felt by the community on
seeing an unpunished wrongdoer in their midst for an extended period of time will be
relieved. There are as well important practical benefits which flow from a quick
resolution of the charges. There can be no doubt that memories fade with time. Witnesses
are likely to be more reliable testifying to events in the immediate past as opposed to
events that transpired many months or even years before the trial. Not only is there an
erosion of the witnesses' memory with the passage of time, but there is bound to be an
erosion of the witnesses themselves. Witnesses are people; they are moved out of the
country by their employer; or for reasons related to family or work they move from the
east coast to the west coast; they become sick and unable to testify in court; they are
involved in debilitating accidents; they die and their testimony is forever lost. Witnesses
too are concerned that their evidence be taken as quickly as possible [….]”
382
This contributes to increased deployment cycles and the potential for OSIs.
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Also, members in combat cannot have their minds on anything but combat. 383 If a
criminal or disciplinary trial is on their minds for any extended period, people are at
increased risk because they are not completely focused on their roles in combat. 384 If
people fail in combat for any reason, the result is not only that people can die or be
injured; but that the entire mission can fail. 385
In addition, war zones often become crime scenes with witnesses from various
states who speak different languages. It is absolutely imperative that evidence be
collected quickly and that matters proceed expeditiously in military justice processes to
ensure that litigators can test the evidence, track down witnesses and examine crime
scenes in their original form. For example, in the case of R. v. Wilcox, an application was
brought by the Defence to move the location of the trial to have the homicide crime scene
examined by the panel members. Unfortunately, the location of the shooting, a tent in
Kandahar, had been dismantled and relocated by the time the court martial got underway.
As a result, the panel relied on pictures and testimony to reconstruct the scene.386 It is the
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Travis L. Martin, ed, “Narrating the Past, Envisioning the Future” The Journal of
Military Experience, online: <http://militaryexperience.org/volume1/>: “While you fight
and suffer and struggle, you are also changing, becoming someone totally different. The
harsh and violent realities of war force you to change. Emotions are an inconvenience—
they distract you—making you feel and think instead of react. A distracted soldier is a
dead soldier.” [Emphasis mine]
384
See e.g. “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) / Booby Traps” GlobalSecurity.org,
online: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied-indicators.htm>: “Booby traps
rely on an unwary or distracted soldier touching or pulling a physical object [….]”
385
See e.g. Mark Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of
War (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999) at 64: “Unjustified disobedience to a
superior can be catastrophic for the safety of fellow soldiers in combat. It can also cause
mission failure.”
386
R v Corporal M.A. Wilcox, 2009 CM 2024, at paras 15 and 19: “[15] The applicant
now seeks an order to take a view of the Entry Control Point 3; clearing bays, which on
the evidence at trial to this point were located on the camp and were used to verify that
weapons were clear of ammunition; tent A-1 and the adjacent tent porch and bunker; the
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nature of a war zone that people and objects generally change more quickly than in
civilian society.
Further, justice is perceived to be more effective if it is quick. If fellow soldiers
see that committing an offence will result in an immediate correction or punishment, then
it is believed to act as a deterrent to others contemplating similar behaviour. The possible
offence can be as simple and disobeying a lawful command to “go over a hill” while
under real threat of death due to enemy gunfire. The failure to obey by one without real
immediate repercussion may cause others to weigh the risk of criminal prosecution with
the risk of death. Without a “habit of obedience”, the entire unit can be destroyed. This
can jeopardize the mission, which in turn may have national or international implications.
The so called “habit of obedience” has been historically fostered through immediate
correction, which for the most part is effective. 387 Unfortunately, it does not contemplate
mentally injured soldiers, because they should not be in combat. Maintaining an
operationally-ready military force for combat was the real reason that military justice was

25-metre range; and the Tim Hortons boardwalk, all, in order that the panel may, ‘fully
understand the testimony of the defence witnesses.’ […][19] As I have already noted, the
evidence on the application establishes that since the date alleged in the charge sheet, the
tent in question has been moved from its location in March of 2007. There is no evidence
before me as to whether the adjacent porch and bunker remain in the place or condition
that they were in at that time. There is a wealth of evidence before the panel of this court
of photographs taken both inside and outside the tent in question and showing the area
around the tent at or around the time of the alleged offences. This evidence is
supplemented by diagrams drawn by some of the witnesses who lived in the tent at the
time as well as by the investigator from the National Investigation Service. As well, there
are many photographs of the gate area known as Entry Control Point 3.” [Emphasis mine]
387
See e.g. Colonel Michael Gibson, “Canada’s Military Justice System”, online: (2012)
12:2 CMJ 61 at 62 <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol12/no2/61-gibson-eng.asp>: “In
the development of discipline, correction of individuals is indispensable; in correction,
fairness or justice is indispensable.” [Emphasis mine]
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designed. As a result, there is an “ableist” culture 388 that presupposes offenders are fit
and ready to fight, and that disciplinary or criminal behaviour can be corrected through
punishment. Regrettably, this may be creating a disadvantage to disabled veterans by not
having systematic diversion options that would facilitate treatment.
Expediency can be maintained with treatment based approaches, such as PSCs.
Most PSCs will have 6-24 months of ongoing treatment before graduation. 389 A minor
summary trial is often completed within a month of two of the offence and cannot
statutorily commence more than 12 months post-offence. 390 There are legislative
proposals underway to reduce that window to 6 months, although the accused could
waive the limitation period in order to avoid a court martial in certain circumstances. 391 It
should be noted that as long as the summary trial is commenced before the time period,
the requirements of the regulations are met. Often, summary trials are commenced and
adjourned until after the limitation period in order to preserve the ability to proceed in
that fashion. Despite assertions by Commanders that military trials must be resolved
within 6 months to enforce discipline, a recent study of courts martial delay indicated that
the average litigation period of a court martial in 2007 was 19.45 months. “The average
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108.06.
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from April 1 2006 to March 31, 2007 was 21 months [….] The situation has not changed
over the last eight years. […] The Court Martial system is, in fact, slower in disposing of
cases than the civilian system”. 392 While the JAG has adopted many of the
recommendations in that report, 393 there are still cases litigated that involve offences that
are in excess of 24 months. 394 In that respect, if diversion to a military justice PSC
happened quickly, the period from actual sentencing to VTC graduation would not likely
be very different in practice. In fact, graduation periods could be faster and more
expedient, as would be the public finding of responsibility at the commencement of a
treatment program.
The use of PSC mechanisms would be beneficial to the military justice system
because they may identify injured soldiers early, thereby reducing recidivism and
increasing the overall likelihood of a full recovery. 395 A guilty plea or admissions are
entered early in PSC models, eliminating issues of trial preparation, witness attendance
and other administrative resources that could be put to other military operational use. In
addition, the community, including the military community, will perceive the military
392

Judge Advocate General, External Review of the Canadian Military Prosecution
Service: Final Report by Andrejs Berzins & Malcolm Lindsay (Ottawa, National
Defence, 2008) at 10.
393
Judge Advocate General, JAG Annual Report 2009-10, Annex C: Annual Report of the
Director of Military Prosecutions (Ottawa, National Defence, 2012) online:
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/publications/office-cabinet/annrep-rappann-09-10/annex-cannexe-c-eng.asp>: “In the previous fiscal year, in response to the Bronson Report, DMP
completed a comprehensive review of all CMPS policies and procedures. […] DMP was
still working to adopt some additional recommendations from the Bronson Report that
had yet to be implemented by the end of the reporting period.”
394
See e.g. R v Collins, 2012 CM 4006: “Sergeant Collins forged the signature of
Corporal Pelletier on the 3 October 2008 form […] Sergeant Collins again forged the
signature of Corporal Pelletier on the 28 October 2008 form […]. A charge was laid in
November 2010 and the first charge sheet was initially preferred in June 2011. The
second charge sheet was preferred in January 2012.”
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See e.g. supra, note 131.
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justice process as fair by demonstrating, in a more tangible way, a balancing of the
requisite sentencing objectives, including rehabilitation. 396 Further, the community would
feel safer because the root issue is being resolved as opposed to simply being put off
through incarceration. This enhances the public perception of the administration of
military justice to reasonably informed members of the community.
While it can be demonstrated that PSCs can be just as expedient (if not more so)
as actual trials, the underlying purpose of military justice needs to be examined in order
to assess their compatibility.

4.1.2 The Purpose of Military Justice and VTCs
As highlighted by the Supreme Court of Canada, “[t]he purpose of a separate
system of military tribunals is to allow the Armed Forces to deal with matters that pertain
directly to the discipline, efficiency and morale of the military”. 397 Modern military
doctrine for the Canadian Forces reiterates this finding. 398 I will demonstrate how VTCs
can be implemented into military justice without the degradation of its underlying
396

Supra, note 42, s 718: “The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along
with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just,
peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the
following objectives: […] (d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; […and] (f) to promote
a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims
and to the community”.
397
Supra, note 374.
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Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada (Ottawa, Her Majesty the
Queen in Right of Canada, 2009) at 16, online: National Defence
<http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfpds-sppfc/english/documents/Duty-with-Honour-TheProfession-of-Arms-in-Canada-2009-e.pdf>: “[T]he Queen’s Regulations and Orders
assign NCMs specific responsibilities to ‘promote the welfare, efficiency and good
discipline of all who are subordinate to the member’ and the authority to execute these
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ensuring that subordinates are individually and collectively trained, prepared and capable
of accomplishing all missions assigned to them.”
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purposes of discipline, efficiency and morale. Further, in addition to actually addressing
possible counter-arguments against VTCs, this section demonstrates how they are
consistent with the underlying purpose of military justice.

4.1.2.1

Discipline

Throughout history discipline has been the cornerstone of military efficacy. For
example, Sun Tzu indicated that “[s]oldiers must be […] kept under control by means of
iron discipline”. 399 Canadian military doctrine states that “it is a professional
responsibility to ensure that the highest standard of discipline, especially self-discipline,
is maintained. […]. Discipline and teamwork remain vital [….]” 400 Discipline assists in:
building cohesion, achieving objectives not possible by military skills alone, allowing
compliance with the interests and goals of the military institution, facilitating immediate
and willing obedience to lawful orders and strengthening individuals to cope with the
demands and stresses of operations. 401 The Code of Service Discipline contained within
the NDA sets out the military offences and the legal system required to administer
discipline.
VTCs with a military justice scheme would not impair discipline. To the contrary,
they are designed to treat a member’s problems so that they do not commit further
offences. Eliminating aggression, addictions and hyperarousal symptoms among veterans
with OSIs will foster discipline. There is a deterrent component to VTCs because
offenders must be accountable for their actions in open court. They must continue to
399

Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Lionel Giles (Virginia: Wilder Publications,
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400
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appear week after week before a judge to report their progress. Arguably, multiple
appearances are more of a deterrent than simply showing up one day for sentencing. 402
Further, there is a constant threat of being removed from the program and placed back
into the ordinary criminal justice system. Also, reasonably informed peers would
understand that the member was ill and was being cared for by the military. In addition,
they will know that her criminal behavior is equally unacceptable requiring judicially
supervised treatment. Resolving the root problem publicly will foster discipline, thereby
increasing efficiency.

4.1.2.2

Efficiency

The concept of military efficiency is fluid and depends on the perspective
underpinning the discussion. Generally, it is understood to be the efficient use of military
resources in the course of military operations. Financial statements alone cannot be used
to measure military efficiency, as there are other intangibles that are engaged, such as
human courage or morale.
It should be noted that under the direction of General Rick Hillier, the previous
CDS, the focus was on operational effectiveness as opposed to efficiency. 403 Military
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See e.g. R v Babineau, 2011 CM 3009: “There is also the fact that you had to face this
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Daniel Gosselin, “Navigating the Perfect Wave: The Canadian Military Facing its
Most Significant Change in 50 Years”, online: (2008) 8:4 CMJ 83 at 85
<http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo8/no4/gosselin-eng.asp>: “This is where the
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who is not focused upon efficiencies, but upon operational effectiveness.” [Emphasis
mine]
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effectiveness and military efficiency may differ conceptually, 404 but military justice is
required to deliver both to Commanders. 405 The mode of delivery must adapt to changing
conditions on the ground, which currently have large numbers of veterans with OSIs and
TBIs. As the medical science in this area advances and general stigma decreases, higher
rates of diagnosis are likely.
VTCs in military justice would promote military efficiency, providing both
tangible and intangible results. From a financial perspective, they reduce recidivism
thereby reducing the costs of incarceration. Studies have shown that offenders with
mental health problems actually serve more time because of the difficulty of adapting to
the prison environment, and they are at increased risk to exhibit inappropriate or violent
behaviours, often reducing parole eligibility. 406 In addition, early treatment for PTSD and
other OSIs results in fuller recovery, thereby reducing medical costs on the military and
society post release. Further, reducing homelessness, substance abuse and unemployment
also reduces social welfare costs. If the veteran can return to employment, the result is
reduced pension or military benefits combined with the economic value of a member of
society generating personal wealth. Further, if the veteran can be retained, the experience
and training is not lost, resulting in reduced training costs for the Canadian Forces.
404
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Studies on actual rates of return for investment in treatment courts suggest that
“for every dollar invested in drug court, you will get $2.21 back from your investment.
[…] Drug courts that are treating high-risk and more serious offenders are returning
$3.36 for every dollar invested, and the best drug courts are returning $27 for every dollar
invested”. 407 VTCs are hybrid PSCs, which include DTCs. These figures suggest
significant savings to the overall public budget can be realized through relatively small
investments. Few other investments available have demonstrated such efficiency.
In addition to the financial benefits, veterans who are diverted to VTCs are more
likely to feel as though they are being looked after as opposed to being cast aside. This
improves morale, not only for the affected veteran, but for those peers who see how the
injured veteran is being treated. Knowing that veterans are being treated fairly and with
respect will foster a willingness to obey orders despite personal risk. This allows courage
to flourish. Numerous studies have found that “report[s] of low personal and unit morale
and lower unit cohesion were linked to increased reports of PTSD symptoms”. 408 Efforts
to eliminate symptoms should result in improved unit cohesion and improved morale.
Improved morale increases operational effectiveness. As a result, a move to incorporate
VTCs in the Canadian military justice system would be both efficient and effective for
the Canadian Forces.
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4.1.2.3

Morale

Carl von Clausewitz, a military strategist, stated “we should observe that
everything depends on the skill of our subordinate officers and still more on the morale of
our soldiers”. 409 [Emphasis mine] Canadian military doctrine suggests that “[m]embers of
the profession must ensure the care and well-being of subordinates. All leaders must
understand, both professionally and personally, that this vital responsibility is the basis
for fostering and maintaining an effective and cohesive force with high morale”. 410
[Emphasis mine]
VTCs foster morale by allowing leaders to “ensure the care and well-being of
subordinates”. 411 Their primary goal is to resolve the root problem, which is related to
OSIs. By treating this problem, unit cohesion and morale improves, so as to allow the
maintenance of “an effective and cohesive force with high morale” – a vital responsibility
of leadership. 412 Conversely, incarcerating operationally traumatized veterans destroys
morale and works against military goals.
The implications of not treating veterans with mental health injuries include:
lower morale, less discipline, decreased efficiency, and possible mission failures among
the Canadian Forces community. Using rigid processes to deal with mentally injured
veterans may make their illness worse, and in the process reduce the public’s confidence
in the administration of military justice. Further, if Canadian society believes that
veterans can be injured mentally and not adequately cared for on return from operations,
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it will be more and more difficult to get effective volunteers to put themselves at great
risk only to face further perils from their wounds when they return home. The absence of
a “motivated” quality volunteer force will degrade operational efficiency. Reduced
operational efficiency and potential for mission failures puts Canada and its foreign
policy agenda at risk.
Having demonstrated that VTCs are consistent with the inherent purpose of
military justice, three additional potential counter arguments need to be addressed,
namely: portability, war and peace and the ad hoc nature of military justice.

4.1.3

Other Possible Counter-Arguments

4.1.3.1

Portability

A possible argument against VTCs within military justice is that they will be
inconsistent with the need for portability. I will argue that while there is a need for
portability in military justice, VTCs would not likely have to enter into a theatre of
operations, though they could do so where necessary.
Canadian military justice is portable and is designed to function in war zones.
During combat operations in Afghanistan, numerous summary trials were held in theatre.
Conversely, there were very few courts martial held overseas. 413 The reason for this is the
practical difficulty of bringing personnel who have not received mission-specific training
into a theatre of operations, the increased logistical burdens and the overall safety issues
for the court martial entourage. Further, by the time a matter reaches court martial, most
413

See e.g. R v Semrau, 2010 CM 1002. See also, The Canadian Press, “Semrau court
martial adjourned” cbcnews (7 July 2010), online: CBC Radio-Canada
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of the military witnesses and the unit have left theatre, which makes a Canadian location
more optimal to achieve the aims of discipline since the trial will unfold at the unit.In a
recent court martial, Lt-Col D’Auteuil, military judge, indicated that generally Courts
martial will be held at the unit of the member to ensure the proceedings are available to
the community affected and to ensure the deterrent effect of any sentence imposed is
communicated effectively. 414 Also, “it has never been the practice at courts martial to
hold the trial at the scene of the alleged offence.Even a cursory acquaintance with the
exigencies of military operations discloses the impracticality of such a rule”. 415 In
addition to a deterrent component of holding the trial at the unit, there is an underlying
efficiency element that is also considered, in terms of having the trial take place in a
location that already has infrastructure to accommodate it. 416
A VTC would not have to enter into a theatre of operations and does not need to
be operationally portable. If a member qualifies for a VTC, it is acknowledged that they
require long term medical services that would make them unfit for operational duty. As a
result, the VTC would take place in Canada, preferably at or near the unit so as to provide
the requisite deterrent component. 417 Further, there would need to be multi-disciplinary
teams in place. Currently IPSC/JPSU has set up regional centers for OSI treatment. This
is likely where the convening of ongoing hearings should take place. From an efficiency
perspective, video conferencing could be used to reduce travel costs for brief
appearances. The propriety of using this technology can be assessed on a case by case
414
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basis. Currently video conferencing is in place in most permanent courts martial
locations, including: Halifax, Ottawa/Quebec and Victoria. This technology is already
frequently used for applications and show cause hearings. 418
In addition, there are new provisions for the appointment of part-time reservist
judges currently before Parliament. 419 Should it be necessary to have regionally located
judges for these types of hearings to reduce costs, then reservist judges could be used if
required. Based on the current caseload of the four military judges, it should be possible
to incorporate a VTC into their current functions.420 Further, having fewer trials, which
can last weeks or months, will free up judicial resources in order to supervise offenders
before a military justice-type VTC.
In summary, VTCs can be domestically portable to the extent required and costeffective, 421 which is consistent with military justice requirements. It is unlikely that it
would be required in a theatre of operations; however it could be done if needed, as
418
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See “2012 Decisions”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces
<http://www.jmc-cmj.forces.gc.ca/dec/2012-eng.asp>. Note that as of 27 May 2012, 14
cases were reported for the calendar year with many being guilty pleas. See also
“Biographies”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces <http://www.jmccmj.forces.gc.ca/bio/index-eng.asp>. Note that there are currently four full-time military
judges.
421
Supra, note 407, (Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse) at 1: “Many jurisdictions, including my
home State of Rhode Island, also are developing veterans’ treatment courts. Today’s
hearing will closely examine these intervention and treatment courts and the role they can
play as cost-effective solutions for protecting public safety and reducing recidivism”.
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would any other matter requiring a military judge. Current available technologies and
reservist judges could be used to reduce travel costs associated with potential increased
appearances. This would be offset by the diversion of trials. These diversionary processes
are beneficial, both in times of war and peace.

4.1.3.2

War and Peace

Another possible argument against VTCs is that military tribunals are not required
in times of peace regardless their focus. I will argue that there is nonetheless a need for
military treatment courts during times of war and peace.
Obiter comments in a recent Court Martial Appeal Court decision appear to
question the logic of the landmark Généreux decision and the purpose of a separate
system of military justice in a modern context. In R. v. Joseph Simon Kevin Trépanier 422 ,
the Chief Judge remarked how the French military justice system does not function
during peacetime. Conversely, he points out that the Canadian military justice system has
expanded even when not at war. “[N]otwithstanding its derogatory nature and the right of
every individual to equality before and under the law pursuant to section 15 of the
Charter, its constitutional legitimacy and validity have been affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in R. v. Généreux [….]” 423
The reality is that in order to instill a habit of obedience, it must be constant
through war and peacetime. If military personnel do not live, prepare and train for combat
conditions, they will not maintain the high-readiness and discipline that is optimal for an

422

Supra, note 304.
Ibid, at paras 22-23: “[T]he French authorities have abolished the military courts in
time of peace. They have kept them in time of war and for crimes committed abroad.”
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effective fighting force. Inattention to discipline in garrison led to the disciplinary
problems among Canadian Forces troops in Somalia. 424 Further, the military justice
system allows Canada to exert jurisdiction over members that commit offences on foreign
soil deployed during non-combat or peace-keeping operations. 425 Canada has an
operational interest in ensuring that its military members who engage in misconduct on
foreign soil are dealt with by Canadian military justice. This interest includes the
maintenance of morale.426

424

The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, vol 10 (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 1997), online:
<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol0/v0s12e.htm>: “ A number of factors contributed to the
disciplinary problems in the CAR, specifically in 2 Commando, prior to deployment,
including […] a tendency to downplay the significance of disciplinary infractions or to
cover them up entirely; and the continuing ability of CAR members to evade
responsibility for disciplinary infractions. As we explore in greater detail in Chapter 19,
the CAR was simply unfit to undertake a mission in the autumn of 1992, let alone a
deployment to Somalia. The three incidents of October 2 and 3, 1992, indicated a
significant breakdown of discipline in 2 Commando during the critical period of training
and preparation for operations in Somalia. Military pyrotechnics were discharged
illegally at a party in the junior ranks' mess; a car belonging to the duty NCO was set on
fire; and various 2 Commando members expended illegally held pyrotechnics and
ammunition during a party in Algonquin Park. The illegal possession of these
pyrotechnics was the result of theft from DND and the making of false statements. A
search conducted on the soldiers' premises uncovered ammunition stolen from DND, as
well as 34 Confederate flags.” [Emphasis mine]
425
The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry, vol 11 (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 1997), online:
<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c7e.htm>: “Under the Code of Service Discipline all
service offences committed outside Canada and most committed in Canada can be tried
by service tribunals.” See also supra, note 42, s. 60.
426
Michael R. Gibson, “International Human Rights Law and the Administration of
Justice through Military Tribunals: Preserving Utility while Precluding Impunity”,
online: (2008) 4:1 J Int’l L & Int’l Relations 1 at 25
<http://www.law.yale.edu/JILIR_International_Tribunals.pdf>: “It is readily apparent
why the sending state should wish to have such jurisdiction over its own nationals. This
permits it to exercise control over persons who have the potential to engage its state
responsibility through their misconduct. It also allows it to be satisfied that its own
nationals are being treated fairly. […I] t allows them to be subject to the domestic law of
their national state and tried in accordance with its national procedures, rather than the
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The Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry acknowledged France’s
decision, but reiterated the fundamental importance of maintaining a military justice
system during peacetime. 427 Still, the recommendations specifically pointed out that in
justifying its existence, the “Canadian military justice system should […] parallel the
civilian justice system unless there is clear justification for it to differ from the civilian
system”. 428 The Canadian civilian justice system is using PSCs to enhance treatment
where appropriate. There is no military justification to deviate from this practice.
In fact, VTCs promote the notion that military justice should continue to operate
during times of peace and war to ensure soldiers are properly diverted to treatment and
returned to their units for operations when possible. Because VTCs promote and foster
discipline and morale, they will efficiently enhance peacetime readiness for deployment.
Further, by providing for alternative measures that parallel the civilian justice system,
leaders can maintain the underlying philosophy of the restructured military justice system
post-Somalia: because CF members are Canadian citizens, “[a]s a basic rule, laws and
procedures governing their conduct should be the same as those for other citizens”. 429
VTCs can be implemented to meet this underlying philosophy, despite the ad hoc nature
of military tribunals.

possibly unfamiliar law and procedures of the receiving state, as well as being subject to
its punishments. […] Second, it allows them to be tried in a court which uses their own
language for its proceedings. Third, the provision of legal aid will allow them to choose
to be defended by a lawyer who speaks their language and is well versed in their national
law. As an ancillary benefit, the morale of the military member concerned will likely be
better if he or she […] are being tried in their own national legal system rather than that
of another state.”
427
Supra, note 111.
428
Ibid.
429
Ibid.
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4.1.3.3

The Ad Hoc Nature of Military Justice

Another possible argument against VTCs is the ad hoc nature of military justice. I
will argue that while the military justice system is ad hoc without a permanent court,
VTCs or a similar PSC can be used within the existing structure, if appropriate legislative
changes are made.
The Canadian military justice system is often referred to as an ad hoc system. The
Supreme Court of Canada compared military tribunals with ordinary criminal courts and
remarked that the judge advocate, military judge or panel is temporarily appointed to sit
on an ad hoc basis – when a breach of the Code of Service Discipline occurs. 430
The reality is that since 1992 there have been various decisions, reports and
studies calling for a permanent court. 431 Judges, prosecutors and defence counsel have
increased their respective independence based on decisions and legislative initiatives. 432

430

Supra, note 374: “At the conclusion of this type of court martial, the judge advocate
and members return to their usual roles within the military. For the members of the
General Court Martial, this means a return to their regular duties as officers. For the
judge advocate, it means a return to legal duties within the Office of the Judge Advocate
General.”
431
See e.g. Antonio Lamer, “The First Independent Review by the Right Honourable
Antonio Lamer P.C., C.C., C.D. of the provisions and operation of Bill C-25, An Act to
amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts,
as required under section 96 of Statutes of Canada 1998, c.35” National Defence, online:
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports-rapports/antonio-lamer/en/report_e.pdf>: “I am
recommending the creation of a permanent trial level military court, with judges
appointed until retirement.” See also supra, note 74 at 238.
432
See e.g. Leblanc v R 2011 CMAC 2 at para 64: “Given the fact that the issue of
security of tenure for military judges has been the subject of contradictory decisions that
have generated concern and uncertainty since 2005, that the Government has continued to
reappoint military judges as if the declarations of unconstitutionality of five-year terms
had never existed (see: the reappointment of judges Dutil and Lamont), and that no
legislation has been enacted to correct this situation, I have no other choice but to declare
invalid and of no force and effect subsections 165.21(2), (2.1), (3) and (4) of the Act as
well as articles 101.15, 101.16 and 101.17 of the QR&O as amended by Order in Council
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While the system remains ad hoc, it has moved towards permanency. 433 Further,
“[a]lthough a General Court Martial is convened on an ad hoc basis, it is not a ‘specific
adjudicative task’. The General Court Martial is a recurring affair”.434 Courts martial
convene to deal with a specific matter, then they conclude. Still, the matter can be
adjourned multiple times and can take close to a year or longer to be completed. 435 This
is similar to what would be required for a military justice PSC or VTC.
Despite the ad hoc nature of military courts, a convening order could conceivably
be used to deal with an injured member who needs to appear repeatedly before a military
judge. The judge could simply adjourn and reconvene as required until the matter is
concluded. While the mechanics of creating VTCs for military justice may be subject to
debate, the “institutional hardware” exists to facilitate their creation at minimal cost. It is
acknowledged that amendments to the NDA would be required; however, this is not
insurmountable. Determining the appropriate mechanics for a Canadian style VTC should
build on existing models found in both the Canadian and American civilian justice
system.

P.C. 20080548 dated March 11, 2008. However, I would suspend the declaration of
invalidity and its coming into force for a period of six months from the date of this
judgment.” See also supra, note 143, cl 134. See also, Security of
Tenure of Military Judges Act, S.C. 2011, c 22, s 2(3): “A military judge ceases to hold
office on being released at his or her request from the Canadian Forces or on attaining the
age of 60 years.”
433
Supra, note 74 at 217: “In more practical terms, the court martial system is already set
up like a permanent court.”
434
Supra, note 374.
435
See e.g. R v Corporal M.A. Wilcox, 2009 CM 2005.
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4.1.4

Building on Existing Models: A Canadian Military Justice
Alternative Measures System
As previously mentioned, the NDA is silent on alternative measures. Despite often

citing the Criminal Code in their decisions, 436 military judges may be reluctant to
actively incorporate the Criminal Code scheme for diversion. 437 Nevertheless, in light of
the Somalia Commission of Inquiry’s recommendation that the “Canadian military justice
system should […] parallel the civilian justice system unless there is clear justification
for it to differ from the civilian system,” 438 it is helpful to understand the civilian
diversionary regulatory scheme.
In order to use alternative measures in Canada, the Criminal Code requires that
doing so not be inconsistent with the protection of society. PSCs balance treatment with
the public interest, normally providing the prosecutor with a veto for diversion
participation. 439 In addition, Canadian alternative measures programs need to be
authorized by the “Attorney General or the Attorney General’s delegate or authorized by
a person, or a person within a class of persons, designated by the lieutenant governor in

436

See e.g. R v Campion-Wright, 2010 CM 1015, paras 30-31.
See e.g. R v Corporal M.A. Wilcox, 2009 CM 2025, para 5: “In my view, the force of
this particular Military Rule of Evidence is not sufficient to simply incorporate a scheme
such as that found in s. 722 of the Criminal Code for the admission of victim impact
statements into proceedings at court martial.” See also supra, note , s 179: “(1) A court
martial has the same powers, rights and privileges as are vested in a superior court of
criminal jurisdiction with respect to (a) the attendance, swearing and examination of
witnesses; (b) the production and inspection of documents; (c) the enforcement of its
orders; and (d) all other matters necessary or proper for the due exercise of its
jurisdiction, including the power to punish for contempt.” Counsel at courts martial have
argued that s. 179 can be used to expand military justice processes or adopt civilian ones.
I do not think it is appropriate for a diversion process.
438
Supra, note 111.
439
See e.g. supra, note 121: “That the Crown Attorney for the Nova Scotia Mental Health
Court consents to the accused’s participation.”
437
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council of a province”. 440 Currently, the federal and provincial governments have
authorized the use of various PSCs. American VTCs are hybrids of these courts.
It is unlikely that Canadian government officials would discriminate against
veterans by barring access to specialized diversion. Further, the current Minister of
National Defence (MND) has stated that he is “committed to ensure that we provide the
best possible support for members with mental or physical illness or injuries […]Our
government is building on our record of caring for our ill and injured personnel”.441
[Emphasis mine] Based on the statements of government officials, the political will
seems to exist for a military justice PSC or VTC.
Further, all PSCs are consent based, with accused parties having been advised of
the right to counsel. 442 Any proposed VTCs would need to be consent based and provide
the same protections. Also, in civilian PSCs, the accused “accepts responsibility for the
act or omission that forms the basis of the offence that [she] is alleged to have
committed”. 443 In addition, there needs to be a reasonable prospect of conviction. 444
Should an inculpatory admission, confession or statement be made during an alternative

440

Supra, note 97, s 717(1)(a).
Hon. Peter MacKay, “Statement by the Minister of National Defence on care for ill
and injured military personnel” (4 May, 2012), online: National Defence and the
Canadian Forces <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/news-nouvelles/news-nouvelleseng.asp?id=4180>. See also House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 127 (18
May 2012) (Hon. Peter MacKay), online: Parliament of Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Mode=1&Pub=hansard&La
nguage=E>": “We are moving forward to hire more mental health professionals. We, in
fact, have a goal of doubling the number. We are moving rapidly in that direction and
will continue to support those soldiers, their families and our veterans when they need
those services.”
442
Supra, note 97, s 717(1)(c) and (d).
443
Ibid, s 717(1)(e).
444
Ibid, s 717(1)(f) and (g).
441
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measures program, it must not be used in any subsequent court proceedings. 445 Where the
court is satisfied that there has been total compliance with the alternative measures terms
and conditions, it shall dismiss the charges.446 Also, there is discretion given to judges to
dismiss charges for partial compliance. 447 There are also Criminal Code provisions with
respect to records associated with alternative measures programs. 448 These processes
should be followed by any military justice PSC or VTC.
In proposing the incorporation of VTCs into the United States military justice
system, Seamone suggests using civilian VTCs and pre-trial agreements or chain of
command clemency post-conviction as a solution without legislative amendment.449
There are currently no VTCs in Canada, so that option is not currently available. Further,
existing PSCs are only developing, with many parts of Canada not having any. None
have specialized military/veteran support members on their multi-disciplinary teams.
Conversely, the Canadian military justice system does have a provision for
clemency similar to that suggested by Seamone. 450 However, the dynamic of a multidisciplinary team of treatment coordinated by a judge is lacking from the American
proposal as it relates to convening authority clemency. The CDS and/or Officers
commanding a Command do not generally have the specialized skill or time to lead ad
hoc multi-disciplinary teams of medical, legal and social work professionals in the
treatment and rehabilitation of injured members, while balancing public safety risks.
While it is arguably their responsibility, it would be better to have a trained military judge
445

Ibid, s 717(3).
Ibid, s 717(4)(a).
447
Ibid, s 717(4)(b).
448
Ibid, s 717.1-717.4.
449
Supra, note 2 at 3,
450
Supra, note 46, 114.02.
446

135

who leads the regional multi-disciplinary teams in treatment, while constantly assessing
the protection of society. Also, this should be constantly balanced by an independent
military prosecutor. Suggesting the CDS should preside over these matters would be akin
to having the Department of Justice Assistant Deputy Minister preside over individual
DTCs. It is simply not feasible, effective, nor efficient for Canadian military justice to
use the existing so called “clemency” regime as a substitute for formalized diversion.
Further, the deterrent component of a military tribunal overseeing treatment in an
open public forum, with the threat to the offender of being prosecuted for failing to
comply, better assists in the success of VTCs in reducing recidivism. 451 In addition, it is
more efficient to have specialized multi-disciplinary units deal with all regional
offenders, one of the enunciated purposes of military justice.452 It is equally more
efficient that military judges may simply sentence offenders who do not consent or who
do not qualify for diversion once referred.
This thesis does not purport to provide the perfect solution to incorporating VTCs
into military justice or Canadian civilian justice. It does attempt to provide some options
to facilitate discussion in order to move in the direction of implementing processes that
will foster a treatment based approach for psychologically traumatized veterans. While a
permanent court would reduce the amount of legislation and regulatory framework
required to create alternative measures, the absence of such a court does not inhibit an
effective diversion scheme from being created.
The best way to incorporate a VTC into the military justice system is through
legislative amendments. Until recently, this has proven difficult for military justice
451
452

Supra, note 414. See also supra, note 131.
Supra, note 374.
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initiatives. Despite almost a decade of proposals by successive vigilant JAGs and their
Deputies, attempts to improve the military justice system have often failed in the hands of
the Parliamentarians. 453 The current majority government has begun to address these
issues. 454
Attempting to incorporate VTCs in the absence of legislative amendments is not
advisable. While Seamone’s research and ideas are important, they are not applicable to
the Canadian military justice system context due to some systemic procedural differences
and societal conditions.
This thesis proposes a “Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures” scheme
that would incorporate diversion options for members suffering from OSIs. This would
be provided for most charges, 455 including the so called “Baby Five”. 456 This request for
diversion would be following a reasonable period of time, where the accused has access

453

See e.g. Michel Rossignol, “National Defence Act: Reform of the Military Justice
System” (22 January 1997), online: Public Works and Government Services <http://dsppsd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/CIR/961-e.htm> at 5: “The Government’s
legislative response to the recommendations made in the Lamer Report was first
introduced in the House of Commons on April 27, 2006 as Bill C-7. Bill C-7
subsequently died on the Order Paper when Parliament was prorogued on September 14,
2007. A successor bill, Bill C-45, was introduced in March 2008. Bill C-45 also died on
the Order Paper as the 39th Parliament was dissolved for a federal election. Bill C-41 was
introduced in the House of Commons on June 16, 2010. The changes between Bill C-41
and Bill C-45 were reflective of the amendments made to the National Defence Act
following the coming into force of Bill C-60 on July 18, 2008. They further respond to a
number of recommendations made by the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and
Constitutional Affairs following their study of the court martial system. Bill C- 41 died
on the Order Paper when Parliament was dissolved on March 26, 2011.” [Emphasis
mine]
454
See e.g. supra, note 143. See also supra, note 432.
455
In my view, this should include most offences except those that are serious in nature
such as homicide, aggravated sexual assault, etc. Determining the appropriate exclusions
should involve consultations with key players and canvassing current Canadian PSC
structures. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis.
456
Supra, note 46, 108.17(1).
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to legal advice. 457 Normally, this would occur at the same time of the election to mode of
trial, where permitted. The RDP should be amended to incorporate an annotation of this
option along with some indication of consequences. Some potential consequences include
an immediate repatriation if the accused is in theatre. In addition, an accused will be
obliged to provide written consents to allow assessment, treatment, and information
sharing with the military VTC multi-disciplinary team and the military judge.
At the time of the election where diversion is requested, the accused will be
immediately referred to a multi-disciplinary team, which includes a military psychiatrist,
military social worker and military mental health nurse to determine if the member has an
OSI. The military psychiatrist must always agree on the report’s findings, although a
majority of the quorum is required. Within 14 days, the OSI Diversion Assessment Board
(OSI DAB) 458 will provide a psychiatric report of assessment. This can be extended to a
maximum of 60 days if required. This will be similar to the American RCM 706 board
report, but more limited in scope. In particular, the report will determine only the current
clinical psychiatric diagnosis and whether it is related to an OSI. If an OSI exists, the OSI
DAB should assess whether the medical condition is related to the behaviour that led to
the offence. If so, the member would be considered eligible for diversion.

457

See e.g. supra, note 97, s 717(1)(d).
It may be that the Chain of Command would see fit to use these matters for other
mental health disorders not related to combat, such as schizophrenia. Although rare,
military justice has dealt with these types of issues. See e.g. R. v. Brown, 2010 CM 2004
at para 9: “I accept the evidence of the psychiatrists that the offender suffers from chronic
paranoid schizophrenia, and, on the basis of the evidence of Dr Joshi, I find that he was
suffering the symptoms of this condition to some degree at the time of the offences.”
458
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The RDP and all relevant evidence are immediately referred through the chain of
command to a Regional Military Prosecutor assigned for the VTC 459 within 14 days. The
OSI DAB report is sent confidentially to the prosecutor in order for her to assess whether
she should exercise a veto or block entry into the alternative measures scheme. She will
also assess the reasonable prospect of conviction. The Prosecutor shall allow diversion if
the member is eligible, unless doing so would be inconsistent with the protection of
society, including the military community. A DMP policy would be developed to
articulate appropriate factors to guide the Prosecutor in determining the appropriate
balance. This would include the position of the Chain of Command articulated during the
referral process. Any veto would need to be articulated in writing and the file sent back to
the unit for re-election into the ordinary military justice stream.
If the Prosecutor does not veto, she will draft a charge sheet and request the
convening of a “Treatment Standing Court Martial” (TSCM). The TSCM will then
convene with the accused present. The first hearing will involve reviewing the consent
forms endorsed for the OSI DAB and ensuring the requisite consent exists. The military
judge will then adjourn for 14-30 days in order for the multi-disciplinary team to confirm
eligibility and an appropriate treatment plan that addresses criminogenic factors. The
multi-disciplinary team will individually meet with the accused person prior to the next
appearance. Prior to the second appearance, the military judge will hold an informal
meeting with the multi-disciplinary team to discuss their findings and proposals in a

459

See supra, note 130. Within the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court, there are specific
lawyers assigned by the Nova Scotia Prosecution Service and Legal Aid. In my view, this
reduces the potential for conflict of interest should files need to be transferred back to the
usual criminal process. It also allows for increased specialized expertise which improves
efficiency. Further, it fosters the team cohesion of the multi-disciplinary team.
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collaborative way. They will determine an appropriate treatment plan to be implemented
over a period of 6-24 months. Should the member be released in the interim, the TSCM
would continue to have jurisdiction similar to existing prosecutions by virtue of the
NDA. 460
At the second appearance, the charge sheet will be read and the accused will
admit the particulars. The military judge will then make a finding of “responsibility”. The
summary of the OSI DAB will also be read. The accused will then consent and agree to
the diversion treatment plan. I would note that the rapid finding of “responsibility” is
consistent with the requirement that military justice be expedient. The process will
demonstrate to fellow members of the Canadian Forces that offenders are held
accountable, but also that truly injured soldiers get the treatment they need.
In the conduct of a regular court martial, a military judge should also be able to
formally order diversion screening with the accused member’s consent on his own or
either party’s motion. A military judge should be able to do so by “Order of Referral” to
the Court Martial Administrator to convene a TSCM. In a regular trial, this would allow
the first judge to simply adjourn proceedings until the diversion process is completed or
redirected back. The referring military judge would ensure the appropriate consents are
endorsed and the member is referred to the appropriate OSI DAB. The prosecutor will be
the recipient of the OSI DAB report and determine whether it will veto the diversion.

460

Supra, note 42, s 60(2): “Every person subject to the Code of Service Discipline under
subsection (1) at the time of the alleged commission by the person of a service offence
continues to be liable to be charged, dealt with and tried in respect of that offence under
the Code of Service Discipline notwithstanding that the person may have, since the
commission of that offence, ceased to be a person described in subsection (1).”
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In the proposed scheme, a defence counsel can make the request of the Prosecutor
at any time before a finding of guilt is entered before a military tribunal. If the matter is
convened, the Defence will make application to the military judge for an “Order of
Referral” to a TSCM. If not yet convened but with the Prosecution or unit during the
referral process, the member shall sign the appropriate consents and be referred to the
OSI DAB. The Prosecutor will proceed as she would through requested diversion.
Once the treatment program is fully completed, the veteran will “graduate”. As a
result, the charges against the member will be dismissed by the military judge. If the
program is partially completed, the military judge will have the discretion to dismiss the
charges, create a new treatment program or refer the matter for normal prosecution. It
should be legislated that delay associated with diversion attempts do not work against the
parties in any subsequent prosecutions. Failure to comply with conditions could result in
ineligibility for the diversion program and the offender could be sent back into the usual
prosecution track. Any charges dismissed by a military judge for completion or partial
completion of a TSCM program cannot be retried by a subsequent court. 461

461

See contra supra, note 97 ss 717(4): “The use of alternative measures in respect of a
person alleged to have committed an offence is not a bar to proceedings against the
person under this Act, but, if a charge is laid against that person in respect of that offence,
(a) where the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the person has totally
complied with the terms and conditions of the alternative measures, the court shall
dismiss the charge; and (b) where the court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that
the person has partially complied with the terms and conditions of the alternative
measures, the court may dismiss the charge if, in the opinion of the court, the prosecution
of the charge would be unfair, having regard to the circumstances and that person’s
performance with respect to the alternative measures”. [Emphasis mine] It seems
disingenuous to allow the prosecution of an offender who has complied successfully with
an alternative measures agreement over a protracted period under significant supervision.
In my view, this was meant to capture those offenders who begin but do not complete an
agreed alternative measures program.
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Further, the offender can consent to being found guilty and sentenced by the
TSCM judge for the sake of efficiency. This would occur by the judge ordering the Court
Martial Administrator to convene an SCM with himself as judge for the matter. Without
consent, the matter is to be convened with a different judge with the usual election on
mode of trial as appropriate.
In order to prevent abuse of the option of a diversion process, accused parties
would be immediately repatriated from theatre in the event that they self-identify as
having an OSI and seek diversion to a treatment court. Should it be determined that the
member was faking an injury, malingering and/or made a false entry on an official
document, such as the RDP, the accused would be subject to prosecution for these
offences. It is hoped that the prosecution of offenders who lie about an OSI in order to be
repatriated or to obtain diversion improperly would prevent abuse. Such behaviour could
also become a legislated aggravating factor for sentencing in order to ensure ample
deterrence for those who are not truly mentally injured and have other motives.
Military training instills the “keep it simple” principle. Further, officer training
encourages the use of visual aids in order to amplify the message. The following diagram
sets out the proposed TSCM process and attempts to follow both of these ideas of
officership.
Figure 1
OSI DAB
ST
DMP

The Proposed Treatment Standing Court Martial Process
Operational Stress Injury
Diversion Assessment Board
Summary Trial
Director Military Prosecutions
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TSCM Treatment Standing Court
Martial
CM
Court Martial
SCM
Standing Court Martial

Election/Referral
(14-60 days)

Member requests TSCM

OSI DAB Report

DMP Referral through Chain of Command

Screening
(14-30 days)

Appearance
(14-30 days)

Assessment
(14-30 days)

Program
(6-24 months)

DMP drafts Charge Sheet
requests TSCM be convened.

First appearance before
TSCM. Consents reviewed,
initial review of eligibility,
Adjourn for 14-30 days for
assessment.

TSCM consent withdrawn:
Re-election to ST or CM.
Judge can order CM be
convened or accept pleas of
guilt/sentence with consent.

Multi-Disciplinary Team determines
eligibility. If eligible, treatment program
developed.

Second appearance: Eligible - Plea
of “responsibility” entered, OSI
DAB Summary read, treatment
diversion program agreed to.
Adjourn for 14-30 days.

Subsequent appearances (14-30 days) – monitor
treatment diversion plan. Plan can be modified.

Graduation

DMP Veto: Out of TSCM process
Offer re-election to Summary Trial
(ST) or preferral to SCM or GCM

Program Completion: Charges dismissed.
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Second appearance:
Ineligible - Re-election to ST
or CM. Judge can order SCM
be convened to accept pleas
of guilt/sentence with
consent.

Substantial non-compliance:
Eligibility revoked.

Substantial completion: Judicial
discretion to dismiss charges or
revoke eligibility.

The eligibility requirements for a TSCM would parallel those of civilian courts. In
particular, in order to qualify a member must consent and have an OSI or other mental
disorder; and there must be a significant connection between the disorder and the offence.
Further, the offender must voluntarily undergo a clinical psychiatric assessment and
accept responsibility for the offence. Further, the Prosecutor must consent to the
offender’s access to this program. 462 Similarly, the so-called phases could be referred to
as the: election/referral, screening, appearance, assessment, program and graduation.
The RDP will indicate that charges were diverted to the TSCM and the member
graduated. This will not be a criminal record or an entry on a military conduct sheet.
Further, should an inculpatory admission, confession or statement be made during the
TSCM process, it may not be used in any subsequent court proceedings. 463
It is essential that the military TSCM multi-disciplinary team be regionally based
to allow for the ongoing treatment of veterans in the program. Existing personnel at
major bases could be used for this purpose.

4.1.5 The Multi-disciplinary Team
There are currently OSI clinics that are funded by Veteran’s Affairs. They are
located in: Fredericton, New Brunswick; Loretteville, Quebec; Sainte-Anne-de-Bellevue,
Quebec, Ottawa, Ontario; London, Ontario; Winnipeg, Manitoba; Edmonton, Alberta;
Calgary, Alberta; and Vancouver, British Columbia. All of these facilities offer military
personnel “clinical assessment and a variety of treatment options including individual
therapies, group sessions, psycho-education sessions, [addictions services,] and other
462
463
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Supra, note 97, s 717(3).
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resources” 464 tailored to each client’s needs. The services are delivered by clinical
“teams […] made up of psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mental health nurses,
and other specialized clinicians who understand the experience and needs of
Veterans”. 465 Services extend to partners and family members.
In addition, the Canadian Forces administers seven Operational and Trauma
Stress Support Centres (OTSSC) located at “Halifax, Gagetown, Valcartier, Ottawa,
Petawawa, Edmonton and Esquimalt”. 466 These locations coincide with where most
Canadian Forces members are stationed. In addition, “[e]lements of OTSSC programs are
also available at smaller bases depending upon population size and local resource
availability”. 467 Clinical teams at OTSSC include “psychiatrists, psychologists, social
workers, mental health nurses, addictions counselors and Health Services Chaplains.”
They are responsible for providing both treatment and education to clients and their
families.
The composition of multi-disciplinary teams at the OSI Clinics and the OTSSC
closely resemble those found on civilian PSCs. The difference is that PSCs also have
representatives from probation services, a judge, a prosecutor and a defence counsel. 468
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467
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See e.g. “Frequently Asked Questions” Nova Scotia’s Mental Health Court Program,
online: The Province of Nova Scotia
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/just/global_docs/MHC_FAQ.pdf>: “The Court has a dedicated
team comprised of a nurse, a social worker, a Probation Officer, a Crown Attorney, and a
Legal Aid lawyer. There is also a Provincial Court Judge assigned to preside in the
Mental Health Court.”
465
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Some PSCs further incorporate police into their team model.469 Currently, the Canadian
Forces has all this expertise at its disposal except those of a probation officer. A well
trained social worker and military police officer could fill this void.
The proposed TSCM multi-disciplinary team would require, at a minimum, a
military judge, a prosecutor, a defence counsel, a military psychiatrist, a military nurse, a
military social worker and a military police officer. Ad hoc members could include
military chaplains, psychologists,Veterans Affairs program managers and addiction
counsellors as requested or required. It should be emphasized that the Canadian Forces
and Veterans Affairs has these teams ready to treat veterans. TSCMs could use these
existing resources.
The legislation could convene these individual team members by name such as a
panel on a GCM, although formally naming them on a convening order is not required
and would be impracticable. 470 Ideally, the legislation would confer broad powers on
military judges similar to s. 179 of the NDA 471 in order to administer the alternative
measures scheme and allow flexibility for unforeseen developments.
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See. e.g. Heino Lilles, Tracy McPhee & Sandra Bryce, “The Domestic Violence
Treatment Option: A Yukon Initiative”, at 10 and 22, online: Centre for Children and
Families in the Justice System, London Family Court Clinic Inc.
<http://www.lfcc.on.ca/Lillies_DVTOPaper.pdf>: “The TC process uses a collaborative
effort among criminal justice system participants, who traditionally see each other as
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the police, treatment personnel, victim services workers and probation officers, must
change their outlook and conduct if TCs are to function effectively. In short, it requires a
team approach. [Emphasis mine]
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Admittedly, the proposed solution may be imperfect, incomplete and subject to
debate, revision, or improvement. Still, the absence of perfection should not prevent
progress. The “ninety percent solution” is sufficient as we traverse the divide of veteran
OSIs and disciplinary and criminal justice.

4.1.6

The Ninety Percent Solution
The Office of the Judge Advocate General’s (OJAG) mission is to deliver

“independent, operationally focused, solution oriented legal advice and services across
the full spectrum of military law, and superintends the administration of military
justice”. 472 [Emphasis mine] Legal solutions to deal with what is perceived to be a
“crisis” 473 for veterans and the Canadian Forces falls under the mandate of the JAG,
particularly when dealing with military justice. The JAGs vision includes being
“operationally focussed […] and networked legal professionals, proudly contributing to a
disciplined force and mission success in a manner that reflects Canadian values and the
rule of law”. 474 [Emphasis mine]
Being operationally focused necessarily means that perfection in legal advice may
not be possible. The reality for the men and women in the JAG who serve as legal
officers is that they sometimes have to give immediate operational advice to a
Commander, with little or no time to research it. The information provided and legal

swearing and examination of witnesses; (b) the production and inspection of documents;
(c) the enforcement of its orders; and (d) all other matters necessary or proper for the due
exercise of its jurisdiction, including the power to punish for contempt. [Emphasis mine]
472
“Office of the Judge Advocate General”, online: National Defence and the Canadian
Forces <http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/index-eng.asp>.
473
See e.g. supra, note 159.
474
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analysis, by the nature of the problem, are limited. For example, the decision to target a
person or object along with an assessment of collateral damage may need to be given
quickly. 475 The OJAG continues to provide excellent support, despite significant
pressures, because leadership understands that the ninety percent solution is
acceptable. 476 The ninety percent solution can be defined as implementing a solution
despite concerns that planning or research has not been fully prepared or canvassed
exhaustedly.
The JAG’s position on the ninety percent solution in the delivery of his mandate
is consistent with modern business approaches. Academics suggest that “[p]erfectionism
is a common psychological obstacle to productivity. In the perfectionist’s mind, the
product […] report, etc. she is trying to produce is not quite good enough just yet. […]
The problem is that somewhere along the pursuit for 100% perfection, we face
diminishing returns.” 477 This is sometimes referred to as “analysis paralysis” 478 .
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Michael N. Schmitt, “Precision attack and international humanitarian law”, (2005)
87:859 Intl Rev of the Red Cross 445 at 450, online: icrc.org
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(blog), online: do your best work
<http://www.doyourbestwork.net/2011/12/09/perfectionism-and-the-90-solution/>. See
also Jon Acuff, “The Problem with Perfection” The Ziglar Weekly Newsletter (17 January
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Company to Victory (New York: AMACOM, 2004) at 53.
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Civilian justice officials that are piloting PSCs realize that they may not have the
perfect model and are constantly reviewing, studying and adapting as required. 479 The
Military leaders should equally courageously implement PSCs into the military justice
system with the knowledge that there will be legislative amendments, evolutions,
problems and analysis required in the future. Still, a ninety percent solution to PSC
implementation is consistent with the JAG’s mission-vision: to provide operationally
focussed, agile, solution-oriented advice to a serious developing military problem, which
impacts military justice.
Additionally, it attempts to parallel civilian efforts where military requirements
allow, further bolstering the purpose of a separate military justice system which reflects
Canadian values while instilling confidence in the JAG’s leadership to superintend it.

4.2

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS WITH CIVILIAN AGENCIES
Notwithstanding the JAG’s role in military justice, the development of an

effective plan to address veteran OSI issues requires civilian partnerships. Ideally,
civilian PSCs that can deal with the specific needs of veterans should be developed.
Building bridges between these organizations and fostering knowledge of OSI issues for
veterans and military personnel before civilian justice will require the assistance of
focused military leadership, which carries accountability. The military’s lead expert on
legal matters involving its members is the JAG.
While it is understood that the government receives various forms of legal advice
from different departments regarding defence issues, only the OJAG fully appreciates the
479

See e.g. supra, note 128.
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dynamic of how incarceration or justice generally can impact military operations. The
military justice system does not prosecute all military members who are offenders. 480 The
reasons for not doing so may involve existing legislation, victims’ services capacity,
whether there are civilian co-accused, the investigating body, etc. Still, the impact on
military operations is not lessened simply because civilian authorities prosecute. This was
highlighted recently in a high profile civilian prosecution of a senior officer where morale
was reportedly severely affected. 481
The OJAG must continue to network and bridge gaps with civilian agencies in the
prosecution of military members so that civilian officials fully understand the impact on
operations and the particular needs of military members and their families. Further, the
military justice system must exercise its concurrent jurisdiction where appropriate.
The work required in creating an alternative measures scheme for serving military
members equally assists released veterans. In addition, because the care of veterans, and
the perception thereof, is thought to have a direct correlation to military effectiveness, 482
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See e.g. Mike Haynie & Robert B. Murrett, “This Memorial Day, supporting veterans
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military leadership should have a mandate to assist veterans. To that end, and in order to
avoid duplication, one government official should lead a “whole of governments effort”.
The primary effort now should be the creation of a military justice PSC, along
with education and training. Encouragement to improve treatment within civilian prisons,
data collection by Corrections Canada and prosecution agencies on veterans, and options
to identify OSIs (such as on driver’s licences) are but a few other initiatives that military
leaders can encourage in order to reduce criminogenic factors and behaviors related to
OSIs. This networking with civilian counterparts and other justice officials is consistent
with the JAG’s vision to be “networked legal professionals”. 483 Similarly, the current
mental health strategy for the Department of Veterans’ Affairs is consistent with this
concept and advocates “[n]urturing collaborative partnerships with other organizations
who share the goal of responding effectively to the needs of clients living with mental
health conditions”. 484
Partnerships, education and advocacy on behalf of veterans in tandem with
civilian justice counterparts will foster the creation of mechanisms that ensure members
and veterans are properly cared for when faced with civilian justice. Ideally, these
mechanisms would include civilian PSCs adapted to veterans’ needs.

resources as an element of security, says that rededicating ‘ourselves to providing support
and care of wounded warriors, veterans, and military families’ is fundamental to
America's defense posture. [Emphasis mine]
483
Supra, note 472.
484
“Veterans Affairs Canada Mental Health Strategy”, online: Veterans Affairs Canada
<http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/mental-health/health-promotion/strategy>.
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4.2.1

Civilian VTCs
Because of the lack of available data regarding the number of veterans and

military members processed through civilian justice, it is impossible to conclude that the
American approach of having numerous VTCs in each jurisdiction is required in Canada.
Still, any civilian PSC programming approach for veterans does need to be tailored
specifically to their unique needs and circumstances to maximize effectiveness. 485 As a
hybrid PSC, the VTC model has components of DVC, DTC and MHC, all rolled into
one. Further, there are unique medical and social services available through the Canadian
Forces and Veterans Affairs that require additional knowledge, expertise and partnerships
not currently available to civilian PSCs.
In keeping with efficiency and effectiveness, it would be beneficial to initially use
existing PSCs in civilian justice systems, but to adapt them on a case by case basis. For
example, the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court pilot model is located in Dartmouth, Nova
Scotia, near CFB Halifax and its lodger units. 486 If it were to be referred the file of a
military member or veteran, the partnerships built by the networked OJAG (as proposed
above) would prompt the collaborative team to contact their partners within the
Department of National Defence and Veterans Affairs. The civilian group could
incorporate some military specialists on their multi-disciplinary team. On those cases,
military psychologists, military social workers and Veterans Affairs personnel could
work with civilians to develop more enriched programs that enable better treatment for
veterans or military offenders. The partnership and collaboration in the civilian PSC
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would not only assist civilian justice for military members or veterans, but would foster
knowledge and training by military professionals that can be used in a military justice
TSCM process.
The civilian PSC would presumably have an interest in working with military
officials, because doing so would open up additional community resources in order to
further their aims. Many PSCs make significant efforts to identify, coordinate and
facilitate “collaborative relationships with community partners in areas related to mental
health, addictions, housing, vocational/educational training and other wellness-related
initiatives”. 487 By working with military officials on veterans’ files, these civilian PSCs
would access more expertise, resources and save time and effort in doing so. This
partnership is win-win and should be pursued with vigour.
Should data and research collected over time warrant specialized specific veterans
courts, then these courts could be developed from this pilot initiative. Still, by working
with existing PSCs and bolstering their collaborative teams with military and veteran
expertise, in essence the same end can be achieved, even without the formal VTC name.
Further, it maximizes efficiency.
The focus of advocacy by defence leadership should be on having these civilianmilitary models in every province and territory, beginning at locations with major bases.
These would complement TSCMs by providing diversion options for released veterans or
those injured persons over whom military authorities do not wish to exercise their
jurisdiction. The existing OTSSC structure would be the best place to start because of its
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proximity to personnel and access to the requisite collaborative professionals. 488 This is
not to say that outlying areas, where reservists or other retired veterans live, are any less
important. To the contrary, each member is equally worthy of VTC access. The reality is
that the project has to start somewhere and, as is said, the perfect is the enemy of the
good.
The general public may not understand that combat or deployments can cause
OSIs. They may not know that this type of injury can lead to criminogenic factors that
cause veterans and military members to become involved with the law. Their knowledge
may only come from television, movies or media reports, which may sensationalize risk.
Both military and civilian justice leadership must address the truth “head on” and inform
the public of the reality of these injuries as it relates to criminal justice. The United States
has done a good job in building public support for this notion, through a wide variety of
programs, services and educational efforts. 489 The result has been to allow more
acceptance of treatment based approaches for their nation’s veterans. 490 Canada must do
the same.
Civilian VTCs or ad hoc military-modified civilian PSC models will further
military goals of increasing morale, efficiency and discipline. Because of the stigma and
cultural beliefs associated with mental health in the military, education and training are
essential to fostering the treatment of OSIs. Military leadership has a role to play when
488
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the education relates to legal processes involving military members or veterans that
potentially have operational impact.

4.2.2

Education and Training
Education and training are required in order to combat the stigma of mental

illness in Canada and the Canadian Forces generally. 491 As has been explored above, the
rationale for such prioritization is self-evident. Stigma impedes OSI treatment. 492
Impeded treatment has a correlation to increased criminogenic factors.493 Increased
criminogenic factors can impact discipline and lead to misconduct. 494 Poor discipline by
military personnel undermines operation effectiveness and puts missions and public
safety at risk. 495
Recent efforts by the military to educate veterans and military members about
OSIs have been significant. 496 However, little has been done to educate the public on its
correlation to military justice or civilian justice generally. Similarly, military
commanders and personnel should be educated in treatment court options. Beneficially,
this type of learning would break cultural biases toward correction and punishment as the
only solution to recidivism. Further, it would foster acceptance for TSCMs as a military
justice option. In addition, it would assist in the overall goal of reducing stigma to
provide greater acceptance of OSI treatment. Knowledge of the existence of these civilian
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diversionary processes may increase awareness and acceptance of their use and reduce
military rates of incarceration while correspondingly increasing OSI treatment.
The OJAG is in a good position to administer this education effort because of its
knowledge, expertise and networked legal capacity. It already provides substantial
training to various levels of leadership across the Canadian Forces. Incorporating these
components of education into OJAG programs is not only efficient, but arguably is their
duty.
The OJAG has already taken important timely steps to educate its personnel on
OSIs and their relationship to military justice. 497 Further steps would be beneficial,
including the creation of specific policies for dealing with accused members who are
suspected or confirmed to have an OSI. In addition, should TSCMs or some other
diversionary process be incorporated into military justice, specific education for key
players would be necessary. In particular, military judges, defence counsel, prosecutors,
and members of the multi-disciplinary team would need to be specifically instructed in
PSC techniques. Sources of this training could include American VTC training resources
combined with shadowing counterparts in Canadian PSCs. This further enhances the
OJAG’s vision to be networked legal professionals.
In addition, civilian counterparts in the Federal and Provincial justice systems
need to understand the unique needs of veterans and how criminal processes impact their
careers, families and operations. They require training in numerous OSI justice related
issues, including: services available that would enhance their collaborative efforts at PSC
program treatment; the impact of incarceration for veterans with OSIs; and the
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appropriate available treatment options provided by the military or Veterans Affairs that
can be incorporated into such sentencing tools as probation orders.
As the JAG is the superintendent of military justice, he is the proper authority to
ensure prisoners with OSIs sent to the CFSPDB by military service tribunals are provided
with appropriate treatment. It may be that the existing programming for rehabilitation
would need to be modified for severe OSI disabilities in order to meet domestic and
international legal obligations.498 For example, it would not be considered lawful to
punish injured offenders for not doing something they could not reasonably do. If it
would be cruel to punish a prisoner for not standing at attention when their legs were lost
in combat, why would it be any more acceptable to punish a veteran whose OSI injuries
foster panic, violence, or “acting out”? 499 It would not. The wounds not being visible
does not make them any less real, but simply misunderstood. The OJAG may be able to
sensitize officials in the military or civilian prisons as to the impact of OSIs on offenders
that go through the military justice process. Clearly, the OJAG will need to work in
concert with medical officials; however, the JAG is well-positioned to lead some of the
effort, or at least advise the CDS on matters related to such an endeavour.
The Military Police and their civilian counterparts also need to be trained in
dealing with OSIs and mental illness generally. Normally, these actors are at the frontline of the criminal process. 500 They are also involved at various stages throughout the
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military justice and civilian justice processes including: investigation, court testimony,
diversion, enforcing orders or supervising custody. The CFPM is responsible for internal
policing policy and training; 501 however, they must work in concert with the OJAG in
ensuring that appropriate front line diversion or handling is legal and meets the purpose
and underlying philosophy of military justice.
A concerted education effort and package on the issue of military and veteran
mental health as it relates to criminal and disciplinary justice should be developed and
implemented as soon as possible. Because the target audience involves various players

someone is experiencing a mental health crisis. That makes it essential for the police (and
other front-line criminal justice and corrections workers) to have the very best education
and training in how to interact with people living with mental health problems and
illnesses. Most police agencies in Canada recognize the need to improve education and
training in this area and are working actively to address this need.” See also, James D.
Livingston et al, “Criminal Justice Diversion for Persons with Mental Disorders: A
Review of Best Practices” (31 March, 2008), online: CMHA BC Division’s Mental
Health Diversion Project <http://www.cmha.bc.ca/files/DiversionBestPractices.pdf>:
“Police must stabilize the scene using deescalating techniques or trauma-informed
responses appropriate for people with mental disorders. […] It is important for police to
be able to recognize behaviours, actions, and speech that are indicative of mental
disorder.”
501
“CF MP Gp HQ”, online: National Defence and the Canadian Forces
<http://www.vcds.forces.gc.ca/cfpm-gpfc/apm-agp/index-eng.asp>: “The CFPM also is
the Commander of the Canadian Forces Military Police Group. As the centralized MP
HQ, the CF Military Police Group (CF MP Gp) HQ provides direction to all Military
Police Branch members with regards to police policy and procedures, oversight on
policing and security matters, professional standards, security, equipment and training
[….]”
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within departments 502 , various departments within governments 503 , and various levels of
governments, 504 a “whole of governments approach” is required.

4.2.3 Whole of Governments Approach
The concept of “whole of governments approach” is one used by the military in
operations and now understood by most commanders. 505 In the operational peacebuilding setting, it has also been referred to as the 3D approach, the integrated approach
and the comprehensive approach; however the contemporary military term is the “whole
of government approach”. 506 It has been around for more than a decade. In 2005, the
MND referred to it as “bringing together military and civilian resources in a focused and
coherent fashion”. 507 It is widely viewed as coordinated and holistic, using a
collaborative approach to achieve maximum effect. 508
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Associate Chief Judge Pamela Williams of the Nova Scotia Provincial Court, who
presides over the Nova Scotia Mental Health Court, indicates that “a collaborative
approach to decision making is essential. An integrated team of professionals from a
variety of disciplines ensures that a holistic approach is followed”. 509 [Emphasis mine]
Similarly, VTCs use holistic and collaborative methods 510 consistent with familiar
military operational models.
The use of a “whole of government approach” model is suggested because it is
used and understood by military Commanders. The use of “governments” was substituted
because there are multiples levels of government that need to be involved due to their
administrative responsibilities of various types of courts and police forces. A so-called
“campaign plan” or strategy should be written to foster understanding, debate and
accountability.

“comprehensive approach” to operations. Such a force would employ diplomatic,
defence, development, and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other
agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan, and then applied in areas of
operations as needed. As such, the approach would entail traditional and non-traditional
military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the
“Effects Based Approach to Operations” (EBAO). The result would be greater mission
effectiveness”. [Emphasis mine]
509
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510
See e.g. “Veterans Court” The Philadelphia Courts (2012), online: First Judicial
District of Pennsylvania <http://www.courts.phila.gov/veteranscourt/>: “The
Philadelphia Veterans Court represents the latest problem solving court initiative, in
Municipal Court, addressing a holistic Treatment Court approach to dealing with justice
involved Veterans. […] This collaborative initiative between the Court, the District
Attorney, the Public Defender, the Veterans Administration and numerous Veterans
agencies [.…]”
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4.2.4

The Campaign Plan
This thesis does not purport to have the perfect blueprint or, in military

terminology, “campaign plan” 511 in order to resolve the OSI issues as they relate to
disciplinary and criminal justice. Still, it will offer a starting point or framework from
which justice officials can begin discussions in order to come up with a ninety percent
solution 512 and begin implementation.
The following diagram is a simple view of the initial focus that leaders should
consider when attempting to deal with veterans suffering from OSIs. It is holistic and
captures military and civilian required efforts. Responsible agencies were specifically not
named as it is clear there will be debate regarding who should be responsible for various
components. The OJAG should assist in a leadership capacity, but other Canadian Forces
leaders must equally be accountable and assist in meeting the MND and the CDS’s higher
intent “to create a command climate that allows those who need help to get it [and] foster
a social climate of understanding, acceptance and support”.513 Regardless of the specific
allocation of responsibility, Figure 2 provides an outline upon which leaders can build
systematic processes that further foster the appropriate treatment of our injured veterans.
Figure 2
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The Campaign plan has a basic two pronged approach – military and civilian
justice. Because Canadian Forces members are subject concurrently to both systems of
justice domestically and because released veterans will be subject exclusively to civilian
justice, both systems need to be addressed. Within each justice system, three basic areas
need to be examined initially, namely: legislation, policy and education.
Assuming there is an understanding and acceptance that OSIs can cause increased
criminogenic risk, misconduct and increased recidivism, legislative responsibilities
include a systematic review of existing legislative processes to determine what
amendments should be made to create a social climate of support and treatment for
veterans with OSIs. This may include specific amendments to the Criminal Code or the
National Defence Act, which could suggest that OSIs incurred on behalf of the nation or
honorable military service is a recognized mitigating factor in sentencing. 514 It may also
include modified regulatory correctional regimes at the military prison or satellite
detention barracks for OSI inflicted veterans. 515 The possibilities to improve are
countless; still the initial and most important legislative focus to meet the Commanders’
higher intent for military justice should be the creation of a TSCM or similar type
treatment court. While it is acknowledged that it may not be used very frequently, its very
existence will foster trust and morale, thereby increasing operational efficiency and
effectiveness. At a minimum, it enhances the perception that the Canadian Forces will

514

While it is acknowledged that judges most often do determine that these factors are
mitigating, formal recognition within legislation will foster acceptance which will assist
in reducing stigma, a barrier to treatment. Some American states have formally
recognized military service as relevant to sentencing in their legislative schemes. See e.g.
supra, note 39. See also supra, note 352.
515
See e.g. supra, note 94, which suggests that a boot camp style approach may not foster
reducing criminogenic factors; thereby adversely impacting rehabilitation.
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look after its ill and injured appropriately. On the civilian front, federal and provincial
governments should consider expanding existing PSC initiatives.
Simultaneously, existing justice policies need to be reviewed and amended in
order to combat OSI-related issues. In addition, new policies addressing these problems
should to be created. On the military justice side, the creation of specific mental health or
OSI justice policies should be created by the DMP, the DDCS, the Deputy Judge
Advocate (Regional Services),516 the CFPM and the CDS generally. These policies
should amplify the MND and CDS’s intent that the military fosters a climate of
understanding, support and treatment for veterans with OSIs.
On the civilian side, both federal and provincial prosecution services should draft
specific policies designed to get veterans suffering from OSIs into treatment as opposed
to jails, where possible. Further, police should also have specific policies to deal with
veterans inflicted with OSIs, with possible initial diversions available at the lowest
levels. 517 In addition, Corrections Canada and their provincial counterparts should also

516

The Deputy Judge Advocate (Regional Services) provides legal advice to the military
police and the chain of command administering the summary trial system.
517
See e.g. Uppala Chandrasekera, “Police & Mental Health: A Critical Review of Joint
Police/Mental Health Collaborations in Ontario Provincial” Provincial Human Services
and Justice Coordinating Committee (January 2011) at 28, online:
<http://www.hsjcc.on.ca/Uploads/PHSJCC_PoliceMH_Final_Report_January_31_2011.pdf>: “In terms of police involvement in diversion,
[…] police officers have the discretion to informally divert persons from the criminal
justice system when appropriate, and on a case by case basis, regardless of whether the
individual has a mental illness. However, informants also noted that different methods of
informal pre-charge diversion occur based on the police detachment and based on the
mental health services available in the community. Informants highlighted the need to
develop a standard provincial protocol for pre-charge diversion that can be used across
the province.” [Emphasis mine]
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have specific policies about the handling and treatment of prisoners with OSIs. 518 Legal
Aid organizations should have specific policies for dealing with OSI clients and bar
societies could assist in providing support and guidelines for counsel involved with
veterans in the civilian justice process. The underlying philosophy should be treatmentbased to resolve the root problem associated with the behavior attracting justice officials’
scrutiny.
Further, other government departments, such as the provincial Departments of
Motor Vehicles (DMV), could determine programs or services that may assist veterans
afflicted with OSIs in avoiding situations that could cause flare-ups. 519 In particular,
provinces may consider allowing OSI veterans to self-identify on their driver’s licence.
As noted earlier, this can assist police in better understanding the person they are dealing
with, avoiding unnecessary confrontation during routine traffic stops associated with the
injury and facilitating early diversion to treatment at the lowest possible level. This
option would also foster acceptance and reduce stigma, thereby increasing the likelihood
of treatment by veterans. It would also allow government agencies to acquire current
information on veterans in order to ensure the provision of available veteran benefits and
services.
Currently, there is a significant deficit of data regarding veterans suffering from
OSIs and their involvement in justice. The military currently does not collect data on how
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Supra, note 273 at ii: “High numbers of incarcerated veterans present a number of
implications for correctional services. Veterans often have treatment needs for
psychological injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Canadian medical
researchers have recently reported that many veterans suffering from these injuries do not
seek help for years and it is possible that the presence of PTSD or unresolved issues
surrounding trauma may impact the offender’s safe transition to the community.”
519
See e.g. supra, note 353. See also, supra, note 354.
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many service personnel suffering from OSIs are tried and convicted by summary trial or
courts martial. There is no information on how many are incarcerated at the CFSPDB and
whether their remission success 520 is lower than fellow prisoners. There are equally no
statistics on recidivism rates for veterans with OSIs as compared with the rest of the
Canadian Forces population. Similarly, there is a dearth of quantitative research on OSIs
and criminogenic risk for Canadians. It is unclear whether there is a link between the type
of OSI (PTSD, C-PTSD, major depression, addictions, etc.) and misconduct or criminal
behavior. There is no database of mentally injured veterans prosecuted in civilian courts.
As a result, the extent of the problem on civilian justice is unknown. Also, it remains
unclear how often military police or units use pre-charge diversion for members or
veterans with OSIs.
Similarly, civilian justice officials often do not collect data on veterans or military
offenders caught up in their systems. Corrections Canada does not currently track the
number of inmates that have military service, let alone those with OSIs, as does its
American counterpart. 521 Civilian police and prosecution services also do not collect
information on the impact of OSIs on the civilian court process or related diversions.
Further, Veterans Affairs and the Department of Justice do not systematically track
veterans’ involvement with civilian justice processes.
In summary, there is inadequate and insufficient data collection processes on the
issue of OSIs and Canadian justice. More information would enhance efforts to address
key issues of the problem, including: reducing criminogenic factors and recidivism,
520

The remission scheme at the CFSPDB is based on a point system. It is focused on
rehabilitation through a boot camp philosophy. See e.g. supra, note 46, Appendix 1.4,
Regulations for Service Prisons and Detention Barracks at ch 5.
521
See e.g. supra note 273.
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fostering early treatment and recovery, and determining appropriate incarceration
rehabilitation techniques. As part of the whole of governments approach, concerted
policy should be implemented to require departments and governments to collect, analyze
and share this information to further the common goal of assisting veterans in recovery.
The final component listed in the “campaign plan” is education. As indicated in
a Special Report from the Office of the Canadian Forces Ombudsman, “[e]ducation is the
single most important catalyst to change attitudes about PTSD in the CF”. 522 As
explained at various points above, existing attitudes and culture foster stigma which is a
barrier to treatment. The absence of treatment increases criminogenic factors for veterans
with OSIs.
From a military perspective the focus should be three-fold. First, both Canadian
Forces personnel and the general public need to be educated generally on the role OSIs
play in relation to misconduct and criminogenic risk, along with how PSCs can reduce
recidivism. Second, the general public needs to understand the importance of taking care
of veterans in the maintenance of an effective volunteer military force and related
implications on public safety. Third, the Canadian Forces also needs to commence
educating military justice officials, including Military Police, Presiding Officers,
Commanders, military prosecutors, military judges, and military defence counsel, on OSI
identification and specific diversion options that can be implemented to foster treatment.
The tools that can be used to educate include: CANFORGENS 523 , Defence
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Supra, note 231.
Canadian Forces General Orders. These orders are issued and provide direction on a
wide variety of topics regarding military affairs, including: leave, administration, and
policy.
523

167

Administrative Orders and Directives, policy, press releases or direct instructional
techniques.
Similarly, civilian agencies need to develop education strategies for the general
public from a civilian justice perspective. They also need to educate their justice officials
on OSIs and their correlation to civilian justice and public safety. This training may be
obtained from military personnel who are likely the subject matter experts. In order to
avoid duplication of effort, joint training between civilian and military organizations such
as police, prosecution, and corrections services on veteran specific issues would promote
collaboration and foster efficiency. 524 Similarly, should TSCMs or a similar PSC model
be implemented in the military, joint training and civilian shadowing of existing PSCs
would be beneficial to improve knowledge and to build relationships to further the
“whole of governments approach”. Further, existing working groups on mental health
provide a forum for military leaders to articulate the importance of the OSI issue to their
civilian counterparts. 525

524

There are currently conferences that are jointly attended by military and civilian legal
practioners, such as the Federation of Law Societies’ National Criminal Law Program,
online: < http://www.flsc.ca/en/national-criminal-law-program/ >. More specific focused
training on veteran related issues is what is contemplated here, and such conferences
could be used as avenues to further these ends.
525
See e.g. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, News Release,
“Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers Discuss Key Justice and Public Safety Issues
Facing Canadians” (27 January 2012), online:
<http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2012/just/0127n09.htm>: “Ministers
acknowledged that mental health issues present significant challenges for the justice
system. Ministers highlighted the success of the May 2011 Mental Health and Justice
Symposium in Alberta and discussed the Symposium’s recommendations. Ministers
asked senior officials to further engage their health and social service counterparts in
reviewing the recommendations and developing a work plan with the view of more
effectively managing this at-risk population.”
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There are obviously more legislative, policy and education initiatives that can be
developed. The “campaign plan” needs to remain flexible, agile and adapt to new
information as it becomes available. The most important component is that it be
developed and that implementation begins.
Aristotle is attributed with the statement that “we make war that we may live in
peace”. 526 Veterans returning from war seek a life of peace. Some find little and are
forced to live with the demons of OSIs. It is inherently unreasonable and unfair to
systematically respond to combat injuries by prosecuting and incarcerating veterans who
“act out” due to their illnesses. The very notion “might strike thoughtful Canadians as
manifestly unjust.” 527 A leading academic in Canadian mental health law, Professor
Archie Kaiser, succinctly and correctly summarized that “[t]o incarcerate people merely
because we have failed to develop appropriate supports has always been shameful
[….T]his is totally unacceptable.” 528
The pith and substance of Kaiser’s comments were echoed in the Second
Independent Review of Justice Patrick LeSage which was tabled last month in
Parliament. Following extended consultations, review and analysis, his sixth
recommendation was that “[t]he senior ranks of the Canadian military are encouraged to
do their utmost to ensure that those suffering from mental health issues are not placed in
the criminal justice system by default but receive the help they need from our health care

526

See e.g. Charles Webel and Johan Galtung, eds., Handbook of Peace and Conflict
Studies (New York: Routedge, 2007) at 347. See also Roberta Lynn Wodenscheck, The
Human Right to Peace: Why Such a Right Should be Recognized (Ann Arbor, Michigan:
ProQuest, 2004) at 31.
527
Supra, note 267.
528
Supra, note 5.
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system.” 529 This thesis has attempted to address these concerns while balancing the
military requirements of maintaining an effective fighting force.

529

The Honourable Justice Patrick J. LeSage, C.M., O.Ont., Q.C., “The Second
Independent Review Authority to The Honourable Peter G. MacKay Minister of National
Defence” (December 2011) at 18.
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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis has discussed the perceived “crisis” of OSIs and its impact on serving
military members, veterans and their families. 530 In particular, it has focused on its
correlation with military justice and civilian justice processes. It has suggested that
alternative measures need to be created or improved for military personnel and veterans
suffering from OSIs. In order to substantiate this position, this examination has reviewed
the history of mental health in combat and modern understandings of the injuries,
including the concept of comorbidity. It has articulated the difficulty in detecting the
illness, particularly for justice officials. Further, it has compared existing processes for
dealing with mentally injured veterans in the civilian and military justice system. It has
also compared treatment with both United States’ justice systems. It has articulated why
this issue is relevant now by describing the scope of the problem for the Canadian Forces
and the current challenges in detection and prevention of activities attracting military
penal consequences. It has shown that there are significant numbers of veterans
anticipated to be suffering from OSIs, and that there is a correlation to disciplinary or
criminal behavior.
In building upon existing civilian and foreign models and ideas, this thesis
proposed a Canadian Military Justice Alternative Measures Process. It has justified its
use by referring to the underlying philosophies of the military justice system, statements
of key officials, and the stated purpose of military justice: discipline, morale and
efficiency. It is hoped that innovative justice methods will better balance rehabilitation,
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See e.g. supra, note 159.
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public safety and the public interest by treating veterans with the respect and care that
they deserve.
In addition, the proposal advocates building partnerships with civilian justice
officials by using a “whole of governments” approach to deal with veterans who have or
will reintegrate into civil society. It provides a blueprint or “campaign plan” upon which
the Canadian Forces and others can build. It suggests three main areas of action, namely:
legislative reform, policy reform, and an educational initiative for justice issues
impacting veterans and military members with OSIs.
There were also specific collateral recommendations raised which form part of the
overall proposed campaign plan. Some of these ideas included better data collection,
tracking and analysis as it relates to mentally injured veterans or those suffering from
TBIs. It was suggested that this information be provided and reviewed in the Judge
Advocate General (JAG) annual report as it relates to military justice. Further, the
Department of Veterans Affairs, with assistance from Attorney Generals, should analyze
the information related to civilian justice. Also, there should be a concerted strategy for
data collection on traumatized veterans who are incarcerated in military and civilian jails
and prisons. This should be a joint initiative between Veterans Affairs, Corrections
Canada and the Department of National Defence. It is hoped that understanding how and
why veterans end up before justice processes may help identify criminogenic factors and
improve prevention and treatment strategies.
This thesis also recommended that there be better systematic processes to track,
monitor and assist released veterans. This may help ensure a safer transition to civil
society. Part of this solution may be to provide options for veterans to self-identify OSIs
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on their provincial driver’s license. This process should be linked to Veteran’s Affairs,
providing that department with an opportunity to offer services to injured veterans who
self-identify.
It was also suggested that more stringent policies that address mental health
discrimination are required to assist in expediting change and defeating stigma among the
veteran and military community. Some improvements suggested included: better
safeguards on employment through accommodation, a specific offence related to OSI
harassment and increased privacy safeguards.
As part of the education component, this thesis suggested that there is a need for
all military justice participants to be trained to detect mental illness and to identify when
there is a relevant correlation to the offence(s) charged. In particular, justice officials
need more training on the symptoms of mental illness, mental health problems and
addictions to ensure appropriate diversion and referral. Within the unique summary trial
process, specific training on detection needs to be incorporated into accreditation
processes for presiding and assisting officers.
This thesis also recommended that elections to court martial be provided to
mentally injured members regardless of the charge they are facing. Further, it was
suggested that there is a need for specific policy direction from military justice leaders on
how subordinates are to deal with circumstances where mental illness is suspected,
alleged or proven. These policies would enhance consistency in veteran treatment by
justice officials, increase awareness, reduce stigma and foster detection.
This thesis also recommends that the Government of Canada attempt to quantify
the actual costs of mentally injured veterans. This may help foster broader acceptance of
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a treatment-based approach by demonstrating the actual expense and the financial
benefits of mitigating it.
Further, it was recommended that governments provide an option for specialized
housing and treatment for veteran inmates in Canadian civilian institutions. This may
better treat the root illness and reduce overall costs to the taxpayer.
In addition, this thesis advocated the creation of legislation which expressly
considers the impact of military trauma and injuries in Canada as it relates to criminal
and disciplinary processes. This could include options for treatment based diversion or
sentence mitigation when appropriate.
A reasonably informed person would know that the OJAG has been proactive and
diligent in recognizing the issues identified herein, and have taken timely steps to educate
its members of the arguments surrounding the problem. 531 Further, this current
government has been the most legislatively proactive government in advancing military
justice for some time. 532 In addition, the concept of PSCs is cutting edge and is only now
taking hold in civilian justice. 533 More importantly, the use of formalized diversion for
military “correction” is only now being openly questioned 534 and debated. 535
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Supra, note 476.
See e.g. supra, note 143 and 432.
533
See e.g. supra, note 109: “Beginning in the area of mental health, this approach has
expanded to consider matters within criminal law such as drug abuse and domestic
violence and has spread from the U.S. to many jurisdictions. Canada has not yet
embraced problem solving courts to the same extent as has the U.S., although there are
signs that both federal and provincial governments in Canada are keen to do so. There are
currently Drug Treatment Courts (DTCs) in Toronto, Vancouver and St. John and the
Canadian Department of Justice announced its plan to create three new DTCs in the next
12 months. Problem solving court processes have also arisen in Canada in cases
concerning mental health, aboriginal justice and domestic violence”.
534
Ibid: “Problem solving courts have developed in response to the realization that a “one
size fits all” approach to criminal justice does not work in some contexts. The adversarial
532

174

Also, military leaders truly do care about their people, including those released.
The idea that a member or veteran would “fall through the cracks” saddens anyone in
uniform. If it occurs during a leader’s watch, it would be deemed by most as a personal
leadership failure. 536
While all players truly have the best interests of Canadian Forces veterans at
heart, they must now consider new alternatives to improve conditions and existing justice
processes for them. While a proposal has been provided, it is acknowledged that
improvements or other options may ultimately be preferable. Still, it is imperative that
decision makers do not become bogged down in the pursuit of perfection. Instead of
over-analysis, immediate actions that are adapted over time will generate progress. Using

nature of the traditional criminal justice model cannot effectively handle the complexity
of certain human and social problems, where failing to deal with fundamental causes
almost guarantees re-offending. As a result, initiatives have emerged which are designed
to enable courts to respond more effectively to cases where complex, often overlapping,
and sometimes intractable social and personal issues are involved. Specifically, courts
attempt to deal holistically with cases involving these difficult socio-legal problems by
implementing the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence wherein judicial case processing
is partnered with treatment providers and community groups to provide follow-up and
support for victims and offenders alike in order to reduce recidivism.” [Emphasis mine]
535
See e.g. supra, note 2.
536
See e.g. National Defence, Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine (Ottawa:
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2005) at 6 and 25: “[E]ffective CF leaders at
all levels […] demonstrate concern for the well-being of their subordinates, represent
their interests, and ensure they are supported and taken care of by the organization [….]
The whole purpose of leadership in the CF is to achieve essential outcomes. Essential
outcomes for the CF fall into the four broad categories of mission success, internal
integration, member well-being and commitment, and external adaptability. Although
mission success will almost always take precedence over other considerations, failure to
pay sufficient attention to other dimensions of effectiveness can seriously undermine
overall performance and may have secondary adverse effects on the image and reputation
of the CF or on public confidence and support. CF leaders have to understand that
effectiveness means paying attention to all essential outcomes. At times, this may require
leaders to make trade-offs, but part of the burden of leadership involves dealing with
competing values and priorities and managing the risks inherent in making decisions.”
[Emphasis mine]
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the ninety-percent solution concept will ensure that leaders take appropriate risks to be
effective in resolving the goal of reducing OSIs among its members and veterans. In the
words of General Patton, “a good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect
plan next week [….]” 537
The goal expressed here is consistent with the new Canadian Mental Health
Strategy 538 and the CDS’s higher intent to foster a climate of understanding and support
for OSI members. 539 Canadian Forces leaders have a responsibility, not only to meet this
intent, but to advocate for and protect their people in the pursuit of operational efficiency.
The idea of systematically treating mental illness with prosecution or
incarceration seems inherently unreasonable and unfair in a developed, civilized and
informed nation. To impose this type of treatment upon our nation’s veterans is not only
outlandish, but should shock the conscience of any reasonably informed member of the
community. Many of these military members became psychologically traumatized as
they sat and waited in the dirt of a foreign country, with bullets or explosions surrounding
them as they watched their friends be blown up, lose limbs or expire in their arms.
In the words of the current MND, "[t]he men and women who serve and sacrifice
in Canada's name need to know that their government will stand behind them and provide
the benefits they need when their service is complete […]" 540 Standing behind our
nations’ service members and veterans requires a multi-pronged approach. Recently, the
government has made significant advancements for veterans with OSIs in numerous areas
537

Supra, note 478.
Supra, note 140.
539
Supra, note 223.
540
Kris Sims, “Gov't won't appeal veterans' benefits ruling”, the observer.ca (29 May
2012) online: Sarnia Observer <http://www.theobserver.ca/2012/05/29/govt-wont-appealveterans-benefits-ruling>.
538
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including: education, 541 employment, 542 medical treatment, 543 and financial
compensation. 544 It is now time to look at how Canada’s justice systems can help reduce
injured veterans’ problems, rather than adding to them. It is time to rehabilitate existing
legal processes to adapt to the new conditions on the ground, by using new tactics. These
tactics will include ensuring that veterans receive equal access to justice processes that
are available to civilian counterparts. By implementing a treatment-based option to
justice processes, it is hoped that wounded veterans will find the peace and happiness
they deserve when they come home.

541

See e.g. Meaghan Whelan, “SIFE Memorial launches program for Canadian Forces”
Memorial University, online: Memorial University of Newfoundland
<http://today.mun.ca/news.php?news_id=4804>: “A group of Canadian Forces members
[…] participate in SIFE Memorial’s Based in Business program. The program, which is a
partnership with the Department of National Defence, gives medically-discharged
Canadian Forces members training and mentorship as they develop business plans and
put them into action. It’s the first-ever program of its kind in Canada.”
542
See e.g. The Canadian Press, “Helmets to hard hats: Harper launches job program for
vets” CityNews Toronto (7 January 2012), online: Rogers Communications
<http://www.citytv.com/toronto/citynews/news/national/article/179176--helmets-to-hardhats-harper-launches-job-program-for-vets>: “Helmets to Hardhats will […] provide
exclusive access for veterans to jobs and training opportunities in the construction
industry. That will include disabled veterans, reservists and transitioning members of the
Canadian Armed Forces. It will also offer apprenticeships in various building trades. The
Helmets to Hard Hats program […] builds on a program that has run for almost a decade
in the United States [….]”
543
See e.g. supra, note 466.
544
See e.g. “Improving Service to Veterans” Salute (2011), online: Veterans Affairs
Canada <http://veterans.gc.ca/eng/salute/article/751>: “As the starting point for many
major improvements, last fall the Government announced increased monthly benefits for
Canadian Forces Veterans and more flexible financial options for those injured in the line
of duty. The changes total two billion dollars and will bring the Department another step
closer to improving the quality of life of Canada’s Veterans.”
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